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The contributions collected in this volume were presented at a workshop organised by 
the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European 
Commission on 17 January 2008. As suggested by the title of the workshop, the main 
idea was to reflect upon ways to achieve and safeguard sound fiscal positions in the EU. 
Around ten years after the inception of the EU fiscal surveillance framework the event 
constituted an important opportunity to take stock of the successes and difficulties of the 
past and, on that basis, to examine and discuss ways to address evolving challenges. 
In terms of the economic and fiscal background, the date of the workshop coincided 
with a moment of change. Although, in January 2008 it was too early to foresee the 
extent of the current financial and economic crisis in that would unfold a couple of 
months later, a slowdown was clearly on the cards and, link to it, the understanding that 
public finances in the EU would face more difficult times and that the commitment of 
EU fiscal policy makers to fiscal discipline would be tested. 
Conversely, the years from 2004 to 2007 were a period of relative optimism. The 
economy had undergone a gradual recovery from the protracted slowdown of the early 
2000s and the fiscal situation in most Member States had recorded marked 
improvements that went beyond the mere effect of the cycle. Overall, public finances in 
the EU and the euro area as a whole had been put on a relatively sound footing 
especially when compared with the early 1990s, when the formal foundations of the 
Economic and Monetary Union were laid in the Maastricht Treaty. In 2007, the budget 
balance net of cyclical factors recorded a deficit of close to 1% of GDP in the euro area 
as a whole, down from more than 5% in the early 1990s. In parallel, the government 
debt ratio had declined to around 66% of GDP in the euro area as opposed to the peak 
of more than 70% of GDP at the end of the 1990s. 
Despite the impressive fiscal retrenchment programmes implemented in the run up to 
the EMU, plus the progress made between 2004 and 2007, the scope for further fiscal 
consolidation and for strengthening arrangements that help safeguard sound fiscal 
positions has not vanished.  
In the short term there are the apparent challenges ensuing from the financial crisis. The 
ensuing economic slowdown has generated considerable political pressure in the EU, an 
beyond, to loosen the reigns of fiscal policy. Discretionary fiscal stabilisation, which 
had been largely banned from the tool-kit of fiscal policy making for decades, is 
experiencing a renaissance. Additional complications arise from the unfortunate 
decision taken in some EU countries towards the end of the last economic recovery to 
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  7spend revenue windfalls instead of putting them aside for 'rainy days'. In the Member 
States concerned such decisions are going to amplify the budgetary shortfalls in the 
current and particularly deep downturn. 
As regards the medium and long term, the main challenge remains the impending 
budgetary impact of ageing population. Member States need to create the necessary 
room in their budgets so as to address the increasing weight of age-related expenditures. 
In spite of the clear progress in the area of public finances mentioned above, in 2007 
only 12 out of the 27 EU Member States recorded a budgetary position that was in line 
or in excess of the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO), that is the budget balance 
net of cyclical factors and one-off and other temporary measures which would ensure 
the long-term sustainability of public finances taking into account the budgetary costs of 
ageing. Based on the sustainability assessment carried out regularly by the Directorate-
General of Economic and Financial Affairs, in 2007 five EU countries were classified in 
the high-risk group and another five in the medium-risk group (European Commission, 
2007) 
On the whole, both short and long-term considerations clearly underscore the 
importance of taking a closer look at the mechanics and dynamics of fiscal adjustment 
in a bid to better understand the factors that are conducive to the achievement and 
consolidation of sound fiscal positions. In an attempt to concentrate on issues, which, 
based on past experience, proved to be particularly relevant or problematic, the 
workshop focused attention on three distinct thematic areas: (i) the role played by fiscal 
governance; (ii) lessons from fiscal consolidation episodes; and (ii) the response of 
fiscal policy to swings in economic activity.  
The rational for picking these areas is relatively straightforward. As regards fiscal 
governance, there is a fast expanding strand in the economic literature, reaching well 
beyond the realm of fiscal policy, highlighting the importance played by the quality of 
rules and institutions for economic outcomes. In particular, it has become increasingly 
evident that the specifics of the rules and institutions underpinning fiscal policy making 
have a measurable impact on key economic variables, including fiscal performance 
indicators. As a consequence, increasing attention has been paid to the question of what 
type of fiscal governance is supportive of sound fiscal policy and what type is not. 
The second thematic area links up with a relatively established yet still very topical area 
of research. Since the early 1990s a considerable number of studies have been 
conducted in the attempt to pinpoint from the existing and vast pool of real-live fiscal 
adjustments the recipe for successful fiscal consolidation. While this branch of research 
has indeed identified a number of relatively robust key ingredients for success, the 
interest in the determinants of lasting fiscal corrections has not petered out. New factors 
are being explored and new adjustment episodes are being added to the sample. 
The third thematic area deals with a particularly thorny issue related to the stabilisation 
function of fiscal policy. On a conceptual level there is general agreement that fiscal 
policy should inter alia aim at ironing out cyclical variations of economic activity. In 
practice, however, things turn out differently. Empirical evidence shows that fiscal 
policy in the EU has at best been a-cyclical and very often pro-cyclical especially in 
good times; the above mentioned spending of revenue windfalls in 2006/07 is the last 
example of such practice. Apart from having a de-stabilising effect on the economy, 
running pro-cyclical polices in good times can have has a non-negligible impact on the 
  8sustainability of fiscal policy as debt is being accumulated (or not reduced) in periods 
when additional resources become available. Reflections on how to limit or avoid pro-
cyclical policies are therefore important for achieving and safeguarding sound fiscal 
positions too. 
At the workshop, each of the three thematic areas was explored on the basis of two 
invited contributions. The first contribution under the heading Fiscal Policy and 
Institutions was by Jürgen von Hagen, who examined the question of whether and how 
fiscal institutions have an impact on the track record of the fiscal plans of EU Member 
States. The paper presented the results of an empirical analysis of the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes, in which EU Member States, under the provisions of the so 
called preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), are required to outline 
their fiscal plans for at least the next three years. More specifically, the aim of the 
analysis is to identify different elements that may shape or explain the difference 
between plans and outcomes and to quantify their impact. This type of analysis is not 
completely new as it links up with a number of existing works that also try to 
understand why some countries are better in sticking to budgetary plans than others. 
What is new and interesting in von Hagen's work, however, is the particular focus on 
the role played by institutions. The encouraging part of his findings is that strong fiscal 
rules are associated with more cautious economic growth projections underpinning 
fiscal plans as well as with more cautious projections for government revenues and 
expenditure. This is an additional and valuable piece of evidence in a progressively 
more conclusive mosaic suggesting that strong fiscal rules have a positive impact on 
various dimensions of fiscal policy making. It also backs one of the main objectives of 
the reformed SGP, notably to encourage Member States to strengthen fiscal rules and 
institutions. 
The second contribution dealing with Fiscal Policy and Institutions approached the issue 
from a completely different and relatively innovative angle. Acknowledging the 
growing evidence that institutions make a difference for fiscal policy making, the two 
authors, Stefania Fabrizio and Ashoka Mody, set out to explore the factors that shape or 
strengthen such institutions. Their work enters relatively new territory in that there are 
very few empirical studies dealing with the issue of how institutions are formed and 
changed. The line of reasoning that Fabrizio and Mody chose from the body of existing 
theoretical studies is to think of changes in institutions as a 'war of attrition' where 
beneficial reforms are delayed because different interest groups would like to enjoy the 
benefits without bearing the costs. Based on data of 23 EU countries, the authors 
identify two major catalysts of institutional change: favourable fiscal conditions on the 
one hand and difficult economic times on the other. Hence, more government resources 
would seem to help resolve distributional conflicts associated with institutional reforms 
while economic hardship seems to increase the likelihood of compromises. 
The session on Lessons from Fiscal Consolidation hosted two papers that aimed at 
(re)drawing the line between successful and unsuccessful fiscal corrections. The 
contribution by Stéphanie Guichard, Mike Kennedy, Eckhard Wurzel and Christophe 
André is a very comprehensive and detailed analysis exploring adjustment episodes in 
the OECD countries since 1970. What makes the analysis particularly interesting is its 
vast scope. On top of the traditional elements considered in the related literature, such as 
the composition and the size of the adjustment, the paper by Guichard et al. sheds light 
on a number of new aspects notably the role played by fiscal rules and institutions. 
Overall, the paper largely and reassuringly confirms established findings, such as the 
  9importance of initial fiscal conditions in triggering fiscal adjustment or the need to focus 
on expenditure cuts rather than revenue increases to make a correction more lasting. 
However, and more importantly, the paper also provides evidence that fiscal rules can 
be beneficial in several respects. Specifically, fiscal rules are associated with larger, 
longer and more successful consolidation episodes. 
While looking at the same set of countries and the same time span, the specificity of the 
second paper of the second session, authored by Silvia Ardagna, was to identify the 
conditions that make a consolidation both lasting and expansionary. The issue of 
whether and how fiscal consolidations can be made successful without harming or even 
supporting economic activity links up with the strand in the literature, which, starting in 
the early 1990s, explored the possibility of expansionary effects of fiscal contractions. 
Since then, evidence has been accumulated suggesting that consolidations centred on 
spending cuts on transfers, welfare programs and the government wage bill, rather than 
tax increases, increase both the likelihood of success and of having an expansionary 
impact on GDP growth. Ardagna's analysis contributes to this strand of the literature. 
Using a more involved econometric approach compared to other existing works, her 
findings underscore that the composition of a fiscal correction is important for growth 
notably thanks to the positive impact of the right measures on the labour market. She 
also finds some evidence that the right composition of fiscal adjustment can have a 
positive effect on growth via expectations of economic agents. 
Turning to the third and last thematic area, the Response of Fiscal Policy to the Cycle, 
the two contributions presented at the workshop may at first sight look somewhat 
technical, as they dig deep into specific issues related with the measurement of fiscal 
performance. However, it is precisely their specificity that makes them particularly 
valuable in an area which in the last few years has attracted increasing attention. 
The paper by Roberto Golinelli and Sandro Momigliano takes a closer look at the whole 
range of econometric studies based on so called fiscal reaction functions or fiscal rules, 
which in the last two decades have become increasingly fashionable to analyse the 
behaviour of fiscal authorities. The main attraction of such econometric studies is that 
they aim at identifying the determinants of fiscal policy making, as measured by the 
level or the change of the budget balance, on the basis of a relative simple framework. 
At the same time, the large body of existing work also highlights a rather disturbing 
element, namely a great variation of results concerning the estimated response of fiscal 
policy to cyclical conditions: based on similar sets of countries and time span different 
studies reach contrasting conclusions including all possibilities: counter-cyclical, a-
cyclical or pro-cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. On the back of this, the authors took 
the trouble to run through alternative variations of a particularly frequent class of fiscal 
rules in order to account for the divergence of results. The conclusions they reach 
primarily call for caution when comparing results across alternative specifications as 
they can have different interpretations. They also do not find support for the frequently 
held notion that fiscal policies have been pro-cyclical in the EU. In particular, real time 
data indicate weakly counter-cyclical policies, while ex post data sources broadly 
suggest a-cyclicality. 
The contribution by Matthias Mohr and Richard Morris concentrates on a specific 
practical difficulty in the implementation of the EU fiscal surveillance framework that 
has become particularly evident over the past several years. When the reformed 
Stability and Growth Pact entered into force in 2005 considerable hopes were attached 
  10to one of the main innovations introduced into the revised set of rules, namely to 
monitor and assess the fiscal performance of the Member States on the basis of the 
budget balance net of cyclical factors. Although experts were aware of the measurement 
uncertainties surrounding the cyclically-adjusted budget, the idea prevailed that such 
uncertainties would compare favourably with the volatility of headline figures. While 
there are still forceful arguments in favour of using the cyclically-adjusted budget 
balance for the purpose of fiscal surveillance, the experience of the past several years 
has clarified the actual degree of uncertainty involved. In their paper Mohr and Morris 
present and analyse this evidence in a very comprehensive and insightful fashion. In 
addition, they outline possible improvements to existing methods for the measurement 
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  122 Sticking to Fiscal Plans: The Role of Fiscal Institutions 
Jürgen von Hagen∗ 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The rules-based fiscal framework of EMU relies heavily on the development of 
medium-term fiscal plans of the member governments and their ability to stick to these 
plans. Since 1998, member countries of the EU submit reports of their medium-term 
fiscal plans every year as part of their Stability and Convergence Programs. This is 
based on Council Regulation 1466/97 and implements Article 99 of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Specifically, the programs include projections of key budgetary parameters and 
of real GDP growth.  
A number of recent empirical studies have investigated the quality of such projections 
interpreting them as fiscal and economic forecasts (Strauch et al., 2004; Annett, 2006; 
Brück and Stephan, 2006; Jonung and Larch, 2006; Pina and Venes, 2007) and testing 
for efficiency and unbiasedness. Interpreting the projections as forecasts assumes that 
they reflect the economic and fiscal outcomes governments expect given their economic 
medium-term economic forecasts and their current and expected fiscal policies. It is 
then natural to expect (and demand) that the projections should be unbiased and use all 
available information. This research has argues that there is considerable cross-country 
variation in the forecasting performance of the member state governments. Moreover, it 
has shown that the projections are often biased and inefficient. This casts doubt on 
either the governments’ ability to produce good forecasts or their willingness to disclose 
all the information they have. 
In this paper, we take a different perspective. We interpret the projections for economic 
growth as a strategic variable entering a government’s fiscal plan, and the projections of 
budgetary parameters as fiscal plans, i.e., expressions of a government’s fiscal 
intentions given its medium term economic forecasts.
1 This perspective takes into 
account that fiscal projections report what is intended by the policies a government 
foresees to adopt. Furthermore, it takes into account that fiscal projections are of an 
inherently political nature. For example, a government might have an internal forecast 
based on all available information and a no-policy change assumption indicating that its 
budget deficit two years ahead will exceed three percent of GDP. However, given that 
this would constitute a violation of the fiscal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, it seems 
very unlikely that the government would report and publish such a forecast, since it 
would signal to the European Commission and the European public that it intends to 
break the rules. Instead, the government will devise a strategy for avoiding a breach of 
the deficit criterion and publish the budgetary parameters consistent with that strategy. 
The fiscal projections then signal what the government expects from that strategy. 
Finally, our interpretation allows for the possibility that fiscal projections are used 
                                                 
∗ This paper has benefited much from discussions with Mark Hallerberg and Rolf Strauch and draws 
extensively on our joint research summarized in Fiscal Governance in Europe forthcoming at Cambridge 
University Press. I thank Steven Symansky for helpful comments at the Workshop. 
1 Moulin and Wierts (2006) pursue a similar interpretation. 
  13strategically, e.g., to reduce the likelihood of outcomes which are regarded as less 
desirable than others.  
From this point of view, deviations of the actual outcomes from the fiscal projections 
may be intended ex ante, when the projections are made, and they may be the results of 
economic developments or of changes in political intentions unforeseen at the time 
when the predictions were made. In this paper, we explore all three sources of such 
deviations empirically. Obviously, deviations from the projections ought to be small, 
regardless of their source, for the Stability and Convergence Programs to provide an 
effective framework guiding fiscal policies and the public’s expectations for such 
policies in the EU. In this paper, we try to separate these different sources and analyze 
the properties of the resulting deviations from fiscal projections empirically.  
We are particularly interested in the effect of fiscal rules and budgetary institutions on 
these two components. Budgetary institutions affect a government’s ability and 
willingness to stick to its medium term fiscal program. Regarding budgetary 
institutions, one may expect that a budgetary framework of fiscal contracts (Hallerberg 
and von Hagen, 1998) implies a stronger commitment to medium-term programs than a 
framework of delegation, as deviations from the program imply a need for renegotiation 
among the parties involved in the contract. This suggests that fiscal contracts lead to 
smaller deviations from such programs. At the same time, however, one may expect that 
governments operating under fiscal contracts are less able to react to unforeseen 
economic developments than governments operating under delegation, unless the 
former have fiscal rules for dealing with such developments, such as rainy day funds.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2.2, we provide a review 
of some recent related literature. In Section 2.3, we turn to our own empirical estimates. 
We use a data set of deviations of main fiscal aggregates, i.e. the budget balance, total 
spending and total revenues, from the projections given in the annual Convergence and 
Stability and Growth Programs by EU member governments from 1998 to 2004. Data 
availability allows us to look at forecast horizons ranging from zero to two years. We 
first provide some descriptive statistics. Next, we estimate empirical models of the 
projection errors for real GDP growth and the main budgetary aggregates. Finally, we 
correct the fiscal projection errors for the impact of the real growth projection error to 
get a measure of the discretionary parts of the former and estimate empirical models for 
these parts. Finally, we analyze the volatility of the projection errors. Section 2.4 
concludes. 
2.2  Recent Literature 
A very early study in this context is found in von Hagen and Harden (1994) who 
consider the bias and precision of government revenue and expenditure forecasts taken 
from the European Commission’s bi-annual Economic Forecasts. Based on data from 
1980 to 1991, the authors show that relatively high-debt countries and high-deficit 
countries in the EU tended to have overly optimistic and relatively imprecise revenue 
forecasts. The difference between high and low-debt and deficit countries was 
statistically significant. In contrast, expenditure forecasts did not vary systematically 
with the debt or deficit position of the countries. Furthermore, the authors show that 
countries with relatively good budget institutions had significantly more precise 
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forecasts published by the European Commission for 1995 to 2004. They argue that the 
introduction of the SGP led to the emergence of a political forecasting cycle: Euro area 
governments issue budget balance forecasts which are significantly upwards biased in 
periods closely before elections. Furthermore, they find that coalition governments and 
governments leaning to the political left make overly optimistic forecasts on the budget 
balance.      
Pina and Venes (2007) use fiscal forecasts reported by all EU member countries bi-
annually in the context of the Excessive Deficit Procedure. They show that budget 
balance forecast errors are systematically and positively affected by GDP growth 
forecast errors. They also find a negative impact of elections on the forecast error, but 
this effect is not significant in all specifications. In contrast, they find that errors are 
significantly negative when the outturn is reported by a government whose ruling 
parties were in opposition when the forecast was made. Finally, Pina and Veres show 
that budget balance forecasts made by governments operating under commitment- (or 
contract-) type budget institutions are systematically biased downwards.  
Strauch et al. (2004) use data from all Stability and Convergence Programs in the 1990s 
and until 2002 to analyze the bias and efficiency of projections for real GDP growth and 
budget balance forecasts. They find that some countries systematically have overly 
optimistic forecasts, i.e., forecast errors are negative on average, with others have overly 
cautions forecasts. They also find that budget balance forecasts are affected by the 
cyclical position of the economy and the form of fiscal governance.
2 Specifically, 
governments operating under contracts arrangements, which focus on numerical targets, 
tend to have overly cautious projections for the budget balance. Strauch et al. also show 
that these projections are not efficient in the sense of using all available information. 
Specifically, they are systematically encompassed by the European Commission’s 
forecasts. In a similar vein, Annett (2006) analyzes the properties of forecast errors for 
the general government budget balance in the EU-12 countries during 1999 to 2004. He, 
too, finds governments under contracts arrangements tend to underestimate the budget 
balance, i.e., their forecasts are overly cautious. 
Jonung and Larch (2006) focus on the properties of the GDP growth forecasts 
governments use as an important input into their fiscal projections. They find that there 
is a tendency in European countries to overestimate growth. This tendency is 
particularly pronounced as elections approach. Jonung and Larch show that 
governments relying on independent forecasting agencies have a smaller bias in their 
growth forecasts and recommend that all governments in EMU should be asked to use 
forecasts from independent agencies. 
Below, we use data from the annual Stability and Convergence programs to analyze the 
deviations between projected and actual outcomes for real GDP growth and the general 
government budget balance, revenues and expenditures relative to GDP. We thus extend 
the analysis presented by Strauch et al and, at the same time, focus on the EMU period 
starting in 1999. 
                                                 
2   For studies of the forms of fiscal governance in Europe see Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) and 
Hallerberg et al. (2007) and forthcoming. 
  152.3  An Analysis of Growth and Fiscal Projection Errors 
2.3.1  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our data is taken from the annual Stability and Convergence Programs of the EU-15 
countries from December 1998 to 2004. It contains projections for real GDP growth as 
the key economic forecast, together with projections of the general government balance, 
general government revenues and general government spending as ratios of GDP. All 
data are annual. We use projection horizons of zero, one, and two years, where zero 
means that a projection is being made for the fiscal same fiscal year. Actual realizations 
are taken from the Statistical Annex of European Economy (2007). For the subsequent 
analysis, we have seven Programs for each country and, hence, 105 observations for all 
variables.
3 
Let xt be a variable for which a projection is presented in a Stability and Growth or a 
Convergence Program, and xt
P the projection presented. With some abuse of language, 
we call ut
x = xt - xt
P the projection error, keeping in mind that the deviation between the 
actual value and the projection is not necessarily an “error” in the sense of being due 
entirely to a lack of information. Note that a positive error means that the projection 
underestimated the actual realization, while a negative error implies an overestimation 
of the actual realization. 
As argued above, a projection error for fiscal variables consists of two elements. One is 
the endogenous change in the variable projected due to unforeseen changes in the 
economic environment. The other is the change in this variable due to discretionary 
policy measures. Separating the two requires an identification of how the fiscal variable 
under consideration reacts to unforeseen changes in economic circumstances. Taking 
the projection error for real GDP growth as the main indicator of the latter, one might 
regress the fiscal projection error on the real GDP growth projection error and define 
the residual as a proxy for discretionary policy changes. This, however, amounts to 
assuming that discretionary policy does not or cannot react systematically to unforeseen 
changes in real GDP growth during the year. Since we do not want to make such a 
restrictive assumption, we use the budgetary elasticities calculated by the OECD to 
construct proxies for the discretionary part of the fiscal projection errors. Let βx,y be the 
elasticity of the fiscal variable x with respect to real GDP growth, y, as estimated by the 
OECD (van den Noord, 2000).
4 We define δt
x = ut
x - βx,y ut
y as the discretionary part of 
a fiscal projection error, where ut
y is the projection error for real GDP growth. 
Intuitively, the discretionary part of the projection error is the raw projection error, ut
x, 
corrected for the impact of unforeseen changes in real GDP growth through the 
automatic stabilizers built into the revenue and expenditure side of the budget.  
                                                
Note that this approach also corrects the fiscal projection error for any bias that the 
government might have introduced in the growth projection. For example, if βx,y > 0 and 
the projections for the fiscal variable and real growth are both upwards biased, the 
average of the discretionary part of the fiscal projection error will be smaller than the 
 
3 We focus entirely on budgetary flows in this analysis. Discrepancies between the annual budget balance 
and the annual change in public debt, which might arise from stock-flow adjustments and other 
accounting practices to “hide” deficits outside the budget, therefore do not affect our analysis and are 
beyond the scope of this paper. For an empirical analysis of such practices in the context of the Stability 
and Growth Pact see von Hagen and Wolff (2006).  
4 The elasticities for Luxembourg are taken from Bouthaineville et al.  (2001). 
  16average of the raw projection error, indicating that the discretionary bias in the fiscal 
projection is smaller than the total bias.     
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 report some descriptive statistics for the projection errors and the 
discretionary deviations. Real GDP projection errors are significantly positive on 
average for the current year (horizon of zero), close to zero for one year ahead and 
negative on average for two years ahead. This last observation is consistent with Jonung 
and Larch (2006). Average projection errors for the budget balance are significantly 
negative on average for all horizons, indicating that governments tend to show overly 
optimistic projections in their Stability and Convergence Programs. As Table 2.1 
suggests, this tendency to be overly optimistic on average relates principally to a too 
optimistic projection for general government revenues for the current and the next year. 
Projection errors for general government expenditures are sizeable on average, but, due 
to the fairly large RMSE’s, the averages are not statistically significant. RMSE’s are 
indeed large for the fiscal variables. For example, the raw data for general government 
revenues indicate that the 95-percent confidence interval related to official projections 
amount to approximately +/- 5% of GDP. Confidence intervals for general government 
spending are of similar size. This suggests that the precision of the fiscal projections is 
rather limited. 
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the discretionary deviations contained in 
the projection errors. Again, we find that the mean deviations for general government 
balances and revenues are significantly negative and that the RMSE’s are fairly large.  
In the empirical analysis below, we are particularly interested in the impact of 
budgeting institutions on growth and fiscal projections. Specifically, we explore the 
effects of the mode of fiscal governance and of fiscal rules. Following Hallerberg and 
von Hagen (1999) and Hallerberg et al. (2007), we distinguish between two forms of 
fiscal governance. Delegation refers to an institutional setting that vests the finance 
minister with significant agenda setting powers over the other members of the executive 
branch of the government, and the executive with significant agenda setting powers 
over the legislature. In our sample, governments operating under this form of fiscal 
governance are those of Austria, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, and the UK. 
Contracts refers to an institutional setting focusing on numerical targets negotiated 
among all members of the executive branch of the government at the start of the annual 
budget process and often derived from or anchored in the coalition contract under which 
the government was formed. In our sample, the governments operating under contracts 
are those of Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Finland, and Sweden. Since all countries in our post-1998 sample belong one of these 
two groups, we test for the impact of the form of fiscal governance using a dummy 
variable which is one for delegation countries and zero otherwise.   
With regard to fiscal rules, we use the classification proposed in von Hagen (2006) 
describing the stringency and enforcement of and the commitment to numerical rules in 
the budget process. According to the fiscal rules index constructed by von Hagen 
(2006), the countries with the strongest fiscal rules in our sample are Belgium, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the UK, Portugal, and Ireland. Below, we use a “rules” 
dummy which is one for these countries and zero otherwise. Note that, where both the 
delegation and the rules dummies are used in the regressions below, the reference case 
are contract countries with relatively weak fiscal rules, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. 
  17The distinction between modes of fiscal governance and fiscal rules is still somewhat 
loose in the literature and deserves some clarification in our context.
5 As mentioned 
already,  fiscal contracts typically focus on numerical targets for major budgetary 
aggregates such as the budget balance, total spending, and the total allocations for each 
spending ministry. As explained in Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) and Hallerberg et 
al (2007), the decisive aspect of such contracts is that the annual targets are negotiated 
among the main actors in the budget process at the outset of the annual process. These 
negotiations serve to reveal and solve the common pool problem of the government 
budget, i.e., the fact that most government policies are not funded from taxes paid by 
those who benefit most directly from them. The numerical framework of such contracts 
is not necessarily rigid, but helps to organize the negotiations.  
In contrast, we think of fiscal rules as a framework that puts emphasis on numerical 
targets set for multiple periods and often characterized by conditional provisions that 
clarify the steps to be taken to adjust the budget to unforeseen changes in economic 
circumstances during the fiscal year. While the contracts index used to quantify the 
strength of fiscal governance emphasizes the nature of the negotiations and the 
enforcement of the contract, the fiscal rules index emphasizes the degree of political 
commitment to the numerical targets, the length of the time horizon covered by the rule, 
and the nature of the conditional adjustment rules. In practice, it is true that there is 
some overlap between these two characterizations of budgetary institutions. As shown 
in von Hagen (2006), EU countries following a relatively strong contracts approach 
typically have stronger fiscal rules than others, too. Yet, the correlation is not perfect, 
and, as we will see below, the implications of the two types of budgetary institutions for 
the performance of fiscal projection errors are not the same. Our distinction between 
contracts and rules thus reveals the importance of the different elements of institutional 
design for the performance of budgetary projections. 
We also test for the impact of elections on growth and fiscal projections. For this 
purpose, we use the national election dates in National Elections. Finally, we use the 
output gaps provided by the AMECO data base to control for the cyclical position of the 
economies at the time when the projections were made.  
2.3.2 Explaining  Projection  Errors 
In this section, we present some econometric estimates of panel models explaining the 
projection errors for real GDP growth, the general government budget balance, general 
government revenues, and spending. All panels use time fixed effects to account for the 
impact of common cyclical movements and economic shocks and an adjustment for 
heteroskedasticity in the cross section. We are particularly interested in the impact of 
budgeting institutions on the projection errors. 
Table 2.3 presents the results for real GDP growth projection errors. For a projection 
horizon of zero, we find a systematic influence neither of the institutional dummies nor 
the electoral dummy on the projection error. The only significant effect is an interactive 
term between the output gap in the year when the projection was made and the 
delegation dummy. Accordingly, the current-year GDP projections of governments 
                                                 
5 For example, European Commission (2005) uses the criteria developed in Hallerberg and von Hagen 
(1999) for characterizing fiscal contracts to evaluate the strength of “fiscal rules.”   
  18operating under delegation are biased downwards when the output gap is positive and 
upwards, when the output gap is negative. 
For one-year ahead projections, we find that governments operating under delegation 
show significantly negative projection errors on average (model 4), while countries with 
relatively strong fiscal rules have significantly positive projection errors on average 
(model 3). Thus, governments operating under strong numerical rules have a tendency 
to bee overly cautious in the projection of economic growth, while governments 
operating under delegation have a tendency to be too optimistic regarding economic 
growth. Model (5) indicates that the projection bias is also closely related to the cyclical 
stance of the economy. This is consistent with the result in Strauch et al (2004). 
Governments systematically overpredict real GDP growth, if the output gap is positive 
in the year when the projection is made, and systematically underpredict real GDP 
growth when the output gap is negative.  
With a projection horizon of two years, we find a similar impact of the output gap. 
Furthermore, delegation countries overpredict real GDP growth on average, while 
governments operating under contracts and strong rules (captured by the intercept) show 
significantly positive projection errors on average (model 7). Only at this horizon we 
find a tendency for growth projections to be too optimistic when they refer to election 
years (model 6), but this effect looses statistical significance when we control for the 
cyclical stance.    
Next, we turn to the projections of general government budget balances. Results are 
reported in Table 2.4. At a horizon of zero, we find that countries operating under 
strong fiscal rules have significantly positive projection errors on average, while 
countries operating under delegation and weak rules (captured in the constant of model 
2) have negative projection errors. Thus, again, there seems to be a tendency of strong 
fiscal rules to induce overly cautious projections, while delegation leads to overly 
optimistic projections.  
In model 2, we also check for the effect of revenue and spending projection errors on 
the balance projection error. This tells us to what extent governments manage to 
counteract deviations from projections of one side of the budget by adjustments on the 
other side. In order to avoid problems with simultaneity, we use instrumental variables 
for revenue and spending projection errors in these regressions and employ lagged 
variables as instruments. Model 2 shows that revenue projection errors fully affect the 
balance while spending projection errors have a much larger effect. The interactive 
terms, however, show that governments operating under delegation manage to 
counteract revenue projection errors. For governments operating under strong rules, this 
does not seem to be the case. Using a Wald test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
revenue projection errors have no effect on the budget balance of governments 
operating under delegation at the ten-percent significance level. Governments operating 
under delegation also manage to counteract spending projection errors, and 
governments operating under strict fiscal rules achieve even stronger counteractions 
than these. We reject the hypothesis that spending projection errors do not affect the 
budget balance projection error for governments operating under strong fiscal rules at 
the one-percent level, and for governments operating under delegation at the six-percent 
level of significance. 
  19With models 3 and 4, we turn to the one-year-ahead projection error. Here, we find, 
again, that governments operating under delegation exhibit significantly negative 
projection errors on average, while governments operating under strong fiscal rules on 
average have positive projection errors which, however, are not statistically significant. 
Revenue and spending projection errors do not affect the balance projection error 
significantly. However, for governments operating under delegation, growth projection 
errors affect the overall balance projection error negatively. This suggests that 
governments operating under delegation allow for more fiscal slippage in years when 
the economy is strong. It is consistent with the tendency of European governments to 
adopt pro-cyclical policies documented, e.g., by Brunila and Martinez-Mongay (2002) 
and von Hagen (2006). We also find that fiscal balance projections are overly optimistic 
if the year to which they refer is an election year. 
For the two-year horizons, we find similar results. The coefficient on the delegation 
dummy is significantly negative, while the coefficient on the rules dummy is 
significantly positive. Different fiscal institutions thus induce significant differences in 
the projection bias. Revenue projection errors affect the overall balance projection error 
positively, but in governments operating under delegation this effect is 
overcompensated, suggesting that they allow for fiscal slippage when revenues are 
unexpectedly strong. Using a Wald test, we reject the hypothesis of no effect of revenue 
projection errors on the balance projection errors of governments operating under 
delegation at the 4.7 percent significance level. Spending projection errors affect the 
overall balance projection error negatively only in countries operating under strong 
fiscal rules. Delegation countries thus seem to be more effective in responding to such 
errors leaving the overall balance unaffected. Unexpectedly strong economic growth 
yields a positive balance projection error, but this effect is offset by governments 
operating under delegation and, less so, by governments operating under strong fiscal 
rules. 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 repeat these exercises for the revenue and the spending sides of the 
budget. As shown in Table 2.5, the revenue projections of governments operating under 
delegation are systematically upwards biased at all horizons, while the projections of 
governments operating strong fiscal rules and of governments operating under contracts 
and relatively weak rules (captured by the intercept) are systematically downwards 
biased. Revenue projection errors are positive for governments operating under strong 
rules if the previous year’s spending projection error was positive. This suggests that 
fiscal rules induce governments to correct for unexpected spending by raising more 
revenues than originally foreseen. 
Table 2.6 shows that spending projection errors are significantly negative at all horizons 
for governments operating under delegation and governments operating under strong 
rules. They are positive for governments operating under contracts and weak fiscal 
rules. Projection errors for real GDP growth affect spending projection errors negatively 
in the case of governments operating under delegation and those operating under strong 
rules. Revenue projection errors affect spending projection errors positively in the case 
of governments operating under strong fiscal rules and contract governments with weak 
rules. Such governments manage to cut back spending when revenues are weaker than 
projected, but they allow spending to increase beyond projected levels when revenues 
are stronger than projected. Governments under delegation, in contrast, do not allow 
spending to react to unforeseen changes in revenues.    
  202.3.3  Explaining Discretionary Deviations 
In Table 2.7, we report estimates for the discretionary deviations of the overall balance 
and expenditures from their projected levels. As before, we find that governments 
operating under delegation have significantly negative deviations from projections for 
the budget balance on average, while governments operating under strong rules have 
significantly positive deviations on average. Thus, the tendency for excessive optimism 
in the former and excessive caution in the latter group is not entirely due to growth 
projection errors. Election years lead to weakly significant deteriorations of the 
discretionary part of balance projection errors and affect spending positively for 
projections two years ahead. Revenue projection errors affect the discretionary 
deviation of the budget balance positively in all countries, but governments operating 
under delegation partially offset this effect. Spending projection errors affect the 
discretionary deviation of the balance negatively, but their effects are partially offset by 
countries operating under strong fiscal rules and, even more so, by countries operating 
under delegation.  
The reaction of discretionary spending deviations to revenue projection errors is 
positive in all countries at the two year horizon. Here, we find some interesting 
asymmetries in the reactions. Governments operating under strong fiscal rules respond 
positively to revenue projection errors, but more strongly to negative errors than to 
positive ones. Thus, when revenues are weaker than projected, spending adjusts 
strongly in this group.  When revenues are stronger than projected, spending is allowed 
to exceed projections as well. Governments operating under delegation, in contrast, do 
not respond to revenues stronger than projected but, at the zero and one-year horizons, 
they cut back spending below projected levels when revenues are weaker than 
projected.  
Within fiscal years, real GDP growth projection errors affect discretionary spending 
deviations positively, but the effect is offset by governments operating under delegation. 
At the two-year horizon, we find that discretionary spending deviations of governments 
operating under strong fiscal rules and under delegation respond negatively to negative 
real GDP projection errors. This may reflect the use of government spending to conduct 
anti-cyclical policies in economic downturns, but not during upswings.  
2.3.4  Volatility of Projection Errors 
In this section, we test whether the forms of fiscal governance and fiscal rules affect the 
volatility of the growth and fiscal projection errors. Since we know from the previous 
sections that these projection errors are biased for some governments, we cannot use the 
raw standard deviations for this purpose, since these are also affected by the bias. 
Therefore, we take the residuals from our models in Section 2.3.1 to compute the 
volatility of unexpected fiscal shocks to the balance and spending. Table 2.8 has the 
results. Here, we note that there is a consistent, positive association between strong 
fiscal rules and the volatility of real GDP growth projection errors. This may reflect the 
fact that, apart from the UK, these countries are small open economies, where growth 
tends to be more volatile due to external economic influences.   
  212.4  Conclusions 
The fiscal framework of EMU, with its strong emphasis of numerical targets and 
medium-term fiscal plans, requires that governments produce consistent fiscal programs 
and are willing and able to stick to them. In this paper, we have analyzed the properties 
of the deviations from the governments’ fiscal plans as given in the annual Stability and 
Convergence Programs, focusing especially on the impact of budgeting institutions. 
We find, first, that the fiscal projections reported in the Stability and Growth and the 
Convergence Programs are not very informative as indicators of future fiscal outcomes. 
Second, we analyze the properties of real GDP projection errors and find that growth 
projections of governments operating under delegation are upwards biased, while 
growth projections of governments operating under strong fiscal rules are systematically 
downwards biased. We find a similar tendency regarding government revenue 
projections. These results are consistent with those reported by Jonung and Larch 
(2006). They suggest that governments operating under strong fiscal rules tend to be 
overly cautious in their growth forecasts, and, therefore, that it is easier to stick to 
strong fiscal rules when growth is unexpectedly strong than when it is expectedly weak. 
Governments operating under contracts and relatively weak fiscal rules do not seem to 
have that tendency. This suggests that weaker rules leave these governments more room 
to manage fiscal policy in times when growth is weaker than projected.  
Governments operating under delegation, in contrast systematically deliver growth 
projections which are upwards biased. They thus base their fiscal plans on assumptions 
which are too optimistic in the underlying economic scenario. At the same time, 
governments operating under this form of governance should find it easier to adjust 
fiscal policies to changes in the economic environment since they do not have to 
negotiate fiscal adjustments among the partners of a coalition. Note, also, that several 
among these governments did not stick to the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact 
during the period under consideration. One interpretation of this result is, therefore, that 
such governments use overly optimistic growth projections in order to avoid explaining 
to their national and a European public how they intend to adjust their fiscal policies 
and return to the budgetary guidelines of the Stability and Growth Pact.   
Third, we find that governments operating under delegation have a stronger tendency to 
offset the effects of revenue projection errors on the fiscal balance than governments 
operating under strong or weak fiscal rules. We also find that governments operating 
under contracts or strong rules deviate from their spending projections in the same 
direction as their revenues deviate from projected levels. For governments under 
delegation, such a pattern does not hold. These results suggest that fiscal rules limit the 
ability of government to respond to changes in economic circumstances that were 
unforeseen when the projection were made more than an institutional framework of 
delegation. The observed tendency of governments operating under strong rules to be 
overly cautious in projecting growth, revenues, and balances is consistent with that. 
Such a bias reduces the probability of having larger deficits than intended ex post, 
which is attractive given that the EMU framework penalizes deficits but not surpluses.  
In sum, we find that differences in fiscal rules and fiscal governance explain a large part 
of the deviations of European governments from their fiscal projections. Our results 
suggest that, within the fiscal framework of EMU, a trade-off exists between delegation 
on the one hand and contracts and strong rules on the other. Governments operating 
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within the limits of the SGP. In contrast, governments operating under delegation have a 
strong tendency to be too optimistic in their growth and fiscal projections, which may 
be interpreted as a tendency to take these limits less serious. Neither group seems to 
regard the Stability and Convergence Programs as an opportunity to publish true 
(unbiased) forecasts. This underscores the point that these programs are used 
strategically. At the same time, the ability to manage fiscal flows after the projections 
have been made seems to be greater in the group of governments operating under 
delegation than in the group of governments operating under contracts and strong fiscal 
rules. Governments operating under delegation are, therefore, not necessarily more 
likely to go beyond the limits of the SGP, as they can react to unforeseen economic and 
fiscal developments. We conclude that, in the end, what matters most is the 
governments’ performance relative to the target of deficits close to balance or in 
surplus, not relative to the targets spelled out in the annual Stability and Convergence 
Programs.    
  23Appendix I:  Complementary Tables 
 
Table 2.1  Descriptive Statistics: Projection Errors 
 Horizon  Mean  t-value  RMSE 
Real GDP Growth  0  0.34  3.89***  0.91 
Balance  0  - 0.32  - 2.64***  1.26 
Revenues  0  - 0.68  - 3.02***  2.33 
Expenditures  0  - 0.33  - 1.53  2.21 
Real GDP Growth  1  0.05  0.34  1.45 
Balance  1  - 0.39  - 2.24**  1.80 
Revenues  1  - 0.46  - 1.86*  2.54 
Expenditures  1  - 0.09  - 0.43  2.26 
Real GDP Growth  2  - 0.19  - 1.20  1.50 
Balance  2  - 0.59  - 2.62***  2.32 
Revenues  2  - 0.20  - 0.74  2.76 
Expenditures 2  0.39  1.54  2.57 
Source: Author's calculations. 
 
 
Table 2.2  Descriptive Statistics: Discretionary Deviations 
 Horizon Mean  t-ratio RMSE 
Balance  0  - 0.49  - 3.77***  1.33 
Revenues  0  - 0.73  - 3.05***  2.45 
Spending  0  - 0.24  - 1.11  2.23 
Balance  1  - 0.40  - 2.52**  1.62 
Revenues  1  - 0.46  - 1.84*  2.58 
Spending  1  - 0.07  - 0.31  2.15 
Balance  2  - 0.50  - 2.56**  2.01 
Revenues  2  - 0.16  - 0.56  2.83 
Spending 2  0.35  1.45  2.45 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance of levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
Source: Author's calculations.  
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Table 2.3  Real GDP Growth Projection Errors 
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





































(2.41)**    0.52 
(2.35)** 
- 0.22 










Output  Gap       -0.33 





(2.89)***        
R²  0.25 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.53 0.50 0.53 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance of levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. All 
estimates include time fixed effects and are based on GLS correcting for cross-section heterogeneity. 
Source: Author's calculations.  
 
  25Table 2.4  Budget Balance Projection Errors 
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Horizon  0 0 1 1 2 2 
Constant -0.71  -0.94  -0.06  -0.02  0.04  -0.26 
(t-ratio) (-2.87***)  (-8.12)***  (-0.03)  (-0.21)  (0.31)  (-1.19) 
Delegation  -0.03    -0.66 -0.93 -1.11 -1.44 
(t-ratio) (-0.31)    (-3.63)***  (-3.27)***  (-4.87)***  (-4.96)*** 
Rules 0.62  1.11  0.36  0.56  0.24  0.89 
(t-ratio)  (2.47)***  (4.94)***  (1.18) (1.55) (1.25)  (9.03)*** 
Election  -0.13    -0.77 -0.72 -0.60 -0.50 
(t-ratio) (-0.40)    (3.02)***  (-2.75)***  (-2.29)**  (-2.23)** 
Revenues    1.33      0.97 
(t-ratio)    (3.11)***      (6.77)*** 
Revenues*Delegation    -0.74      -1.88 
(t-ratio)    (-2.05)**      (-3.62)*** 
Revenues*Rules   -0.33      
(t-ratio)    (-1.32)      
Spending    -3.60      
(t-ratio)    (-2.84)***      
Spending*Delegation    1.72      
(t-ratio)    (2.05)**      
Spending*Rules    2.32      -1.09 
(t-ratio)    (2.07)**      (-7.65)*** 
Growth         0.38  0.64 
(t-ratio)         (1.42)  (3.27)*** 
Growth*Delegation      -0.52  -0.65 
(t-ratio)       (-2.02)**   (-4.11)*** 
Growth*Rules        -0.31 
(t-ratio)        (-3.19)*** 
Lagged Growth  0.39  0.40  0.29       
(t-ratio) (3.88)***  (3.27)***  (1.64)*       
R
2  0.25 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.45 0.48 
Note: All estimates include time fixed effects and are based on GLS correcting for cross-section 
heterogeneity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance of levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Horizon  0 0 1 1 2 2 
Constant  0.14 0.47 0.83 1.21 1.28 1.27 
(t-ratio)  (0.69)  (1.18)  (4.12)*** (6.70)** (6.67)***  (5.66)*** 
Delegation  -1.09 -1.67 -1.68 -2.16 -2.20 -2.19 
(t-ratio)  (-4.13)*** (-3.90)*** (-5.06)*** (-9.28)*** (-7.10)*** (-7.05)*** 
Rules  -0.81 -0.59 -1.23 -0.67 -1.19 -2.89 
(t-ratio)  (-2.92)***  (-1.56)  (-6.62)**  (-2.70)*** (-6.31)*** (-5.22)*** 
Election       -0.89    
(t-ratio)      (-1.17)    
Spending*Rules   0.60
a  2.89  3.43 
(t-ratio)   (3.00)***  (8.35)***  (4.28)*** 
R
2  0.08 0.26 0.12 0.27 0.18 0.21 
 
 
Table 2.6  Spending Projection Errors 
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Horizon  0 0 1 1 2 2 
Constant 1.39  1.48  0.76  0.16  0.82  1.23 
(t-ratio)  (3.87)***  (4.33)*** (2.40)**  (1.64)*  (2.05)** (2.71)*** 
Delegation  -1.97 -2.11 -0.86 -0.68 -0.67 -0.87 
(t-ratio) (-5.31)***  (-5.73)***  (-2.71)***  (-2.5)**  (-1.42)  (-1.48) 
Rules  -2.15 -0.62 -1.34    -0.94 -0.66 
(t-ratio) (-4.88)***  (-1.20)  (-4.79)***    (-2.38)**  (-1.58) 
Election  -0.00  0.36  1.08  
(t-ratio) (-0.01)    (0.66)    (2.09)**   
Revenues       0.60
a  0.67
a
(t-ratio)       (6.42)***    (3.20)*** 
Revenues*Delegation       -0.65
a  
 
(t-ratio)      (-3.12)***    
Revenues*Rules   1.62     0.47
a
(t-ratio)   (4.86)***      (4.40)*** 
Growth      -0.50    
(t-ratio)      (-3.20)***    
Growth*Delegation   -0.52      -0.51 
(t-ratio)   (-1.89)*        (-2.35)** 
Growth*Rules   -0.69
a  -0.26  -0.99 
(t-ratio)   (-3.20)    (-1.98)**    (-3.13)*** 
R
2  0.26 0.51 0.16 0.51 0.20 0.52 
Note: 
a first lag. All estimates include time fixed effects and are based on GLS correcting for cross-
section heterogeneity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance of levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively 
Source: Author's estimations.  
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 Balance  Spending 
Horizon 0  1  2  0  1  2 
Constant  -1.23 -0.03 -0.27 1.02 1.42  1.30 
(t-ratio) (-11.67)***  (-0.21)  (-1.52)  (3.21)***  (20.14)***  (10.92)*** 
Delegation 0.23  -0.80  -1.43    -0.87   
(t-ratio) (1.15)  (-4.24)***  (-5.14)***    (-3.79)***   
Rules 0.98  0.51  1.00  -1.48     
(t-ratio) (3.45)***  (3.02)***  (5.63)***  (-2.88)**     
Election 0.03  -0.56  -0.41      0.46 
(t-ratio) (0.09)  (-1.76)*  (-1.79)*      (1.63)* 
Revenues 0.81    0.99 
   0.67 
(t-ratio) (3.11)***    (7.50)***      (1.77)* 
Revenues*Delegation -0.49    -1.94 
   
 
(t-ratio) (-1.52)    (-3.72)***       
Revenues*rules   0.96      1.16  1.38 
(t-ratio)   (2.78)***      (2.93)***  (6.59)*** 
Revenues*rules
c      0.73  0.51  0.48 
(t-ratio)       (4.11)***  (2.66)***  (4.33)*** 
Revenues*delegation
c      0.83  0.52   
(t-ratio)       (8.23)***  (4.68)***   
Spending -3.27     
   
 
(t-ratio) (-4.67)***           
Spending*Delegation 1.86           
(t-ratio) (4.07)***           
Spending*Rules 2.30  -1.18  -1.00       
(t-ratio) (6.53)***  (-1.73)*  (-10.40)***       
Growth       0.44     
(t-ratio)       (4.31)***     
Growth*Delegation    -0.44  -0.67
b   -1.26
c 
(t-ratio)     (-1.94)*  (1.56)    (3.20)*** 
Growth*Rules 0.58
a  0.23
a     -0.88
b  -1.87
c 
(t-ratio) (3.41)***  (2.19)**      (2.08)**  (6.83)*** 
R
2  0.29 0.26 0.40 0.63  0.59 0.62 
Note: 
a first lag, 
b only positive terms, 
c only negative terms. All estimates include time fixed effects and 
are based on GLS correcting for cross-section heterogeneity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance of levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
Source: Author's estimations.  
 
  28Table 2.8  Volatility Models 
 Growth  Balance Spending Revenues
Horizon=0
Constant 0.69  1.10  -4.26  1.56 
(t-ratio) (6.90)***  (8.25)***  (-1.25)  (0.82) 
Delegation -0.33  0.31  9.66  3.99 
(t-ratio)
  (-3.65)*** (1.37) (3.07)*** (1.53) 
Rules 0.23  -0.23  9.55  1.31 
(t-ratio) (1.07)  (-1.10)  (2.62)***  (0.60) 
R
2  0.08 0.08 0.18 0.08 
Horizon=1
Constant  0.85 1.88 1.14 2.53 
(t-ratio) (6.80)***  (3.89)***  (1.52)  (5.89)*** 
Delegation -0.12  0.36  1.14  2.80 
(t-ratio)
  (-0.43) (0.65) (1.47)  (2.97)*** 
Rules  0.78 0.47 1.66 2.46 
(t-ratio) (3.19)***  (0.47)  1.48  (3.39)*** 
R
2  0.12 0.04 0.08 0.06 
Horizon=2
Constant  0.76 2.11 1.23 3.52 
(t-ratio) (1.82)*  (2.77)**  (1.28)  (1.87)* 
Delegation  0.18 0.36 1.54 1.04 
(t-ratio)
  (0.71) (0.41) (1.39) (0.48) 
Rules  1.09 0.42 1.48 2.26 
(t-ratio) (2.05)**  (0.47)  (1.31)  (1.72)* 
R
2  0.06 0.02 0.08 0.02 
Note: All estimates include time fixed effects and are based on GLS correcting for cross-section 
heterogeneity. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance of levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
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Steven A. Symansky and Mark De Broeck
  
This paper makes a very valuable contribution to the important literature on the 
disciplining effects of fiscal rules and budgetary institutions. Specifically, the author 
examines projection errors in the medium-term fiscal plans prepared by EU 
governments. These plans figure prominently in EU fiscal surveillance, and have been 
the focus of attention in recent European Commission and ECB documents.
6 The paper 
uses a more recent sample than in earlier studies and considers both revenue and 
spending projection errors, in addition to deviations from growth and government 
balance projections. 
The paper’s main assumptions and results can be summarized as follows. Growth and 
fiscal projection errors can be decomposed into a discretionary element related to 
changes in policy intentions and an endogenous element reflecting unforeseen economic 
developments. Two key dimensions of budgetary institutions, the strength of fiscal rules 
and the mode of fiscal governance, are captured by 1,0 dummies.
7 The regression 
results show that countries which have both relatively strong rules and operate under 
contracts are overly cautious in their projections, which creates a safety margin under a 
fiscal rule. In contrast, countries with weak rules and a delegation framework tend to 
have overly optimistic forecasts, but also find it easier to adjust policies when projection 
errors materialize. 
However, the econometric analysis raises some interpretation issues that merit further 
clarification. The specification of the various panel regressions presented in Tables 2.3-
2.8, including the choice of regressors and the use of interaction terms, could be 
discussed in more detail. Did the author consider regressors not reported in the Tables, 
for instance transparency measures or a decentralization/fiscal federalism index? And 
how should the results reported in Table 2.7 be interpreted in cases where the growth 
projection error reflects a deliberate effort to conceal true fiscal policy intentions?
8  
To check the robustness of the econometric results, alternative indicators of fiscal 
institutions and rules could be considered. The paper uses dummies to distinguish strong 
from weak rules and delegation from contracts. The institutional data collected by the 
author and his collaborators in the Fiscal Governance in Europe project provide indices 
of the stringency of rules and indices of the form of governance.
9 The author should 
have tested these indices rather than relying on the 1,0 dummies. Using the same dataset 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Part III of the Public Finances in EMU 2007 report, June 2007, and ECB Working 
Paper No. 843, December 2007.  
7 The “rules” dummy is one for the countries with stronger fiscal rules; the “governance” dummy is one 
for so-called delegation countries. The two dummies are correlated in the sample in that fiscal rules tend 
to be weaker for governments operating under delegation (0,1 dummy combination). In fact, the UK is the 
only country combining strong rules and delegation. 
8
  As explained in the text, the discretionary fiscal projection error is corrected for a component attributed 
to the growth projection manipulation. But this still leaves open the question as to how to interpret the 
coefficient of the growth variable in the regressions reported in Table 2.7. 
9 A fiscal rule index is included in Table 8 of von Hagen (2006), and an index of the degree of delegation 
in the budget process can be constructed from the data annex to Hallerberg et al. (2007) following the 
methodology described in that paper’s section 4.1.  
  30collected for the project, robustness to alternative weighting schemes for the individual 
components of the two indices—for instance, more weight could be placed on 
components with a macro-fiscal dimension—and time-variation in the indices could be 
checked.
10 As illustrated in the Table 2.9 below, the ranking of rules according to their 
stringency in this paper in some cases differs from that in related work from the author 
and co-authors.
11 A final robustness check could involve employing the European 
Commission’s indices of fiscal rules and institutions collected for the Public Finances 
in EMU–2006 report. As also shown in the Table 2.9 below we found a few cases of 
differences between the author’s ranking of the strength of rules and that in the 
Commission’s data. 
In addition to robustness to alternative fiscal institutional indices, some other 
econometric issues could be addressed. In particular, the paper could add and discuss 
the results of conventional specification tests for the reported regressions. It also could 
clarify in more detail how the GLS econometric methodology can handle sampling error 
in the dependent variable due to either measurement error (Tables 2.3-2.6, where the 
dependent variable is a projection error, which is a constructed variable) or sampling 
error in an auxiliary regression used to generate the dependent variable (Table 2.8, 
where the dependent variable is a series of residuals from another regression). Although 
the author acknowledges simultaneity problems (when discussing the results in Table 
2.4), an explanation would be welcome as to why only revenue and spending projection 
errors and not growth projection errors are instrumented as regressors. One could easily 
think of situations where the growth projection error also is endogenous. Finally, the 
budget balance, revenue and expenditure are linked by an adding-up constraint. How 
has this constraint be taken into account when estimating the regressions reported in 
Tables 2.4-2.6? 
In sum, this paper provides valuable new insights into an interesting and important 
research question. Its contribution could be further enhanced by additional efforts to 
clarify the interpretation of the econometric results, check their robustness, and address 
some econometric issues. 
 
 
                                                 
10     It appears that the dummies used in the paper refer to the institutional situation as of 2001 while the 
macroeconomic and fiscal data cover the period 1999–2006. Use of time-invariant dummies assumes that 
there has been no change in the sample period. Institutional data for the Fiscal Governance in Europe 
project were collected in three rounds, 1991, 2001, and 2004, and they suggest that rules and forms of 
governance have been evolving over the sample period, in some cases very significantly so.  
11 The ranking according to mode of governance also can differ: the data annex to Hallerberg et al. (2007) 
shows Ireland and Sweden as countries with a relatively high value of the delegation index in 2004, but 
they are classified as contract countries in this paper. The difference appears to relate to the significant 
increase in the value of the delegation index for these two countries between 1991 and 2004. 
  31Table 2.9  Rules Indices 2004/05 
  EC  EC rank  von Hagen '04 
(1) 04  rank  Current  paper 
(2) 
LU 2.23  1  1.0  1  1 
GB 2.12  2  0.8  8  1 
NL 2.12  2  0.9  3  1 
DN  2.01  4  0.8 8   
FI  1.93  5  0.9  3   
ES  1.86  6  0.8 8   
SW  1.60  7  0.9  3   
GE  1.30  8  0.9  3   
BE  0.49  9  1.0 1 1 
FR 0.34  10  0.8  8   
IT 0.30  11  0.8  8   
AU 0.27  12  0.8  8   
PR  -0.46  13  0.9 3 1 
IR  -0.55  14  0.8  8  1 
GR -0.84  15  0.8  8   
 
  Implies that rules ranking from EC 05 is different than rank for current paper
Implies that rules ranking from von Hagen 04 is different than rank for current paper 
Notes: 
(1) Data from von Hagen et al. 2007 paper but the data are for '04. 
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3.1.  Introduction 
A substantial literature shows that a strengthened institutional framework for the budget 
process can help improve fiscal discipline and performance. Contributions include Alt 
and Lowry (1994), Poterba (1994), von Hagen and Harden (1995), Hallerberg and von 
Hagen (1999), and Alesina et. al (1999). These authors find that checks and balances in 
the formulation and implementation of the budget are not a “veil” but have real effects 
on budget outcomes. However, because these findings relied on cross-sectional 
evidence, they were open to the criticism that omitted determinants of fiscal outcomes 
may be correlated with budget institutions (rules and procedures of the budget process). 
Revisiting recently this subject, we have, in a series of demanding tests, examined the 
variation within countries over time and considered the influence of a wide variety of 
variables representing alternative hypotheses regarding the mechanisms contributing to 
budget deficits (Fabrizio and Mody, 2006). We continue to find that strong budget 
institutions are associated with greater fiscal discipline even when the politics is 
unfavorable to such discipline.  
If strong budget institutions are so potent in determining fiscal outcomes, then the 
factors that lead to their strengthening are of obvious interest. Surprisingly, this enquiry 
has received little empirical attention. The principal contribution of this paper is that it 
conducts, to our knowledge, the first statistical examination of the determinants of 
budget reform, using time-series measures of the quality of budget institutions for 23 
European economies during 1991-2004. We use this setting also to conduct a broader 
investigation of the political economy of reform. 
A ready body of theory guides the empirical work reported in this paper. Three themes 
in the literature are relevant. First, reforms occur infrequently. For a variety of reasons, 
the political process tends to maintain the status quo in policies. The central source of 
this inertia is conflict among interest groups, a conflict that results in inaction. In the 
specific context of politics and budgets, the problem arises in allocating rights to the so-
called common pool (Shepsle and Weingast, 1981; and Weingast et al. 1981). A strong 
incentive exists for public spending in favor of select interest groups that bear only a 
fraction of the taxes needed to finance the expenditures that benefit them. When the 
                                                 
∗ The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent 
those of the IMF or IMF policy. We are grateful to Mark Hallerberg, Rolf Strauch, and Jurgen von Hagen 
for sharing their measures of fiscal institutions, to several colleagues in the IMF’s European Department 
for helping update these measures, and to government authorities for directly responding to our queries. 
Michael Laver and Ken Benoit generously shared their ideology data. Preliminary results were discussed 
at the 9th Banca d’Italia Workshop on Public Finance, 'Fiscal Policy: Current Issues and Challenges', 
Perugia, March 29-31 2007, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission’s Workshop, 
'Achieving and Safeguarding Sound Fiscal Positions', Brussels, January 17 2008. Comments from Roel 
Beetsma, Jurgen von Hagen, and Dennis Quinn were most helpful. 
 
  33common pool-problem is severe, and is, hence, the source of budget indiscipline, 
Alesina and Drazen (1991) conclude that no group will be willing to forgo their benefits 
or bear the necessary tax burden, and fiscal consolidation will be delayed. In their 
words, a “war of attrition” will arise. While Alesina and Drazen (1991) emphasize the 
inertia on account of a distributional conflict, implicit in their analysis—and explicit in 
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991)—is the possibility of an impasse even when the size of 
the pie is known to grow once the reforms have been undertaken. Fernandez and Rodrik 
(1991) argue that the uncertainty surrounding the distribution of the gains—and the 
possibility that some may lose—hinders formation of the necessary consensus.  
When public finances are healthy, the cost of “conceding” is relatively small. In other 
words, even if a group were to find its demands on the common pool to be restrained by 
stronger checks in the budget system, there remains enough scope in the budget to 
accommodate the group’s reasonable and legitimate demands. All groups will, 
therefore, acquiesce in an earlier agreement to budgetary reform. This will be the case 
all the more so when the costs of conceding are equitably shared. Where a particular 
group is likely to bear a heavier burden, there may be a greater tendency to “hold out.” 
As Alesina and Drazen note, reforms will be accelerated by “a conservative government 
with a solid majority” (pp. 1174) and delayed by “weak and divided coalition 
governments” (pp. 1173). Thus, healthier finances can be expected to aid budgetary 
reform, but this advantage may be compromised in a fractionalized government, 
implying interplay of the state of public finances and political divisions in the decision-
making process. 
Where the internal dynamics continue to result in a deadlock, the status quo may 
nevertheless become untenable following an economic shock or a “crisis.” For some 
groups, the costs of continuing with the existing system may become too large. This 
forms the second strand in the literature. Indeed, as Rodrik (1996, pp. 26) notes: “...if 
there is one single theme that runs through the length of the political economy literature 
it is the idea that crisis is the instigator of reform.” In a crisis, the old distributional 
certainties dissolve. The war of attrition, for example, ceases when at least one interest 
group finds it superior to pay the price necessary for stabilization rather than continue to 
be hurt by the unresolved circumstances. 
Rodrik himself is skeptical of the analytic content of the crisis hypothesis. It is not 
surprising, he says, that things must get bad before the perception sinks in that they 
must be changed. Drazen and Easterly (2001) argue that there remains an interesting 
empirical question of what is the threshold of pain at which reform becomes imperative. 
Alesina et al. (2006) also pursue the empirical relevance of crises in escaping from a 
war of attrition and instigating reform. They respond, moreover, to Rodrik’s challenge 
to explain why the same crisis in different countries may elicit different reactions. 
Strong governments—those relatively unconstrained by internal or external 
opposition—they conclude, are more likely to undertake the necessary measures in the 
midst of a crisis. 
This brings us to the third major theme on the political economy of reform: spurred by 
crises or otherwise, are governments in a position to take decisive actions? This 
depends, first, on the ability of governments to take the necessary measures, as Alesina 
et al. (2006) point out. This ability is, in turn, a function of veto points in the 
government structure. While the notion that strong governments can ram through 
necessary reforms is well-entrenched, it raises troubling issues. At one extreme, it 
  34implies that authoritarian systems are best suited to forcing the pace of reform. Even in 
a democratic setting, the implication is that governments must go against legitimate 
opposition, which is assumed to be misinformed or opportunistically obstructive. 
Accordingly, a second, avenue is for democratic governments to establish their 
credibility and, hence, persuade the relevant constituents on the value of reform. In this 
regard, Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) offer the intriguing hypothesis that credibility 
is sometimes achieved by taking policy positions that go against the known ideological 
positions of policymakers. This they refer to as the “Nixon going to China” 
phenomenon. 
In our empirical analysis, the dependent variable is the change in budget institutional 
quality two years ahead. Because the changes take discrete values, we categorize them 
into four groups: a large improvement, an improvement, no change, and a setback. 
Using ordered logit regressions, we have four main findings: 
•  The gap between the highest possible institutional quality and the country’s state of 
fiscal institutions determines the scope of the subsequent improvements in the fiscal 
institutions’ quality. Not surprisingly, the larger is this gap at the beginning of the 
period, the greater is the scope (and possibly the incentive) for further improvements 
in institutional quality. 
•  We find strong evidence for the “war of attrition.” The reform of budget institutions 
becomes less likely just when it is most needed, i.e., when fiscal outcomes are poor. 
In other words, when the common-pool problem is severe, budget deficits will be 
large and the appetite to constrain them will be small. The implication is that 
countries will, all else equal, tend to move to two outcomes: small fiscal deficits and 
good institutions or large deficits and weak institutions. 
•  Hence, the crucial question is, How can a country exit from a vicious cycle of bad 
fiscal performance and delays in needed budget institutions reforms?  The findings 
do suggest that domestic and external economic shocks (if they are large enough) 
can help focus the minds of those competing for scarce budgetary resources and, 
hence, help build a constituency for improving budget institutions. However, to the 
extent that markets are forgiving and accommodate these economic shocks, even 
this form of external pressure may be insufficient. Forward-looking and strongly 
unified leadership appears to be a necessary ingredient of the solution.   
•  Finally, government ideology tends to matter when the economic situation is 
difficult. In that setting, “leftist” coalitions tend to be more proactive in reforming 
the budget institutions than “rightist” coalitions. In line with Cukierman and 
Tommasi (1998), the “unlikely” party carries greater credibility in breaking the 
logjam, particularly if its constituents are hurt in the short run. 
Though the interest in the political economy of reform is long-standing, the empirical 
literature remains dominated by case studies. Krueger (1993) and Williamson (1994) 
bring together several country case studies on the determinants of macroeconomic 
stabilization. In contrast, statistical testing of the rich set of available hypotheses has 
been more limited (see Drazen, 2000). Even within the statistically oriented literature, 
papers relying on direct measures of reform are few. Thus, Drazen and Easterly (2001) 
test the hypothesis that crises contribute to economic reforms; however, unable to 
measure reform directly, they acknowledge (pp. 149) that their approach requires the 
  35same variable to measure “crisis (when it indicates extremely poor performance) and 
reform (when there is a significant improvement).” This is also true for Alesina et al. 
(2006), who examine the determinants of deficit and inflation reduction in response to a 
crisis, where the crisis itself is measured by extreme outcomes of deficits and inflation. 
Our paper is related to Alesina et al. (2006) in the focus on the political economy of 
reform. We differ from them in analyzing the reform of the underlying budget processes 
rather than the fiscal outcome itself. Moreover, we define a crisis as an extreme 
macroeconomic outcome rather than as fiscal distress. Methodologically, we draw on 
Abiad and Mody (2005), who study the determinants of financial sector liberalization. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the construction of 
the index of budget institutions’ quality and the basic empirical approach. Section 3.3 
provides the main evidence for a reform process that is consistent with the war of 
attrition. Section 3.4 assesses how economic shocks—including a crisis—can shake the 
status quo that arises from the war of attrition. Section 3.5 examines how economic 
shocks interact with political ideology and whether this interaction provides evidence of 
unexpected political actions in times of economic stress. A final section draws lessons 
for the political economy of reform. 
3.2.  Data and Empirical Approach 
Effective budget institutions create mechanisms for fiscal self-discipline. From the 
initiation of budget design to its implementation, several decisions are necessary. At 
each point, various economic and political interests are represented. As such, budget 
priorities can be influenced, and, indeed, the budget can be hijacked as it makes its way 
through the complex approval and implementation process. Discipline is, therefore, 
crucial for ensuring the integrity of the process. This discipline may be generated in two 
ways, which, in practice, are typically combined (Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999). The 
“delegation,” or hierarchical decision making, approach creates clear authority and 
accountability by assigning budgetary powers to a strong central player (and is regarded 
as more suitable for single-party governments or governments where coalition parties 
are closely aligned). The contrasting “contract” approach allows for a cooperative 
process, buttressed by transparent rules, to balances tendencies to indiscipline (more 
suitable for multi-party coalition governments). There is, however, a minimum level of 
required centralization that fiscal institutions provide in all countries (Hallerberg and 
others, 2008). Our index is built from these core institutions that all countries need and 
draws on the desirable elements of both approaches. 
The index applies the principles of effective budget institutions to three stages of the 
budgetary process: preparation, authorization, and implementation, as described in 
Table 3.1 of Appendix I. For the preparation stage, the following features are considered 
as contributing to discipline: (1) fiscal rules that limit deficit spending; (2) budget 
parameters and norms; and (3) the relative dominance of the finance/prime minister in 
the budget negotiation process. The authorization phase requires (1) limiting on the 
scope of amendments; (2) setting an appropriate sequence of decision making in the 
legislative budget process; and (3) balancing the power of the executive and parliament. 
In the implementation stage, firmness in the execution of the budget is needed, together 
with the procedures governing adjustments to unforeseen shortfalls or unexpected 
overspending.  
  36We first construct a quantitative index of the quality of budget institutions over the 
period 1994-2004 for 23 European countries.
12 We follow closely our own recent paper 
(Fabrizio and Mody, 2006), which, in turn, drew on Gleich (2003) and Yläoutinen 
(2004). Expanding the data to a broader set of European countries was made possible by 
the reporting in Hallerberg et al. (2007). To confirm and update the status of budgetary 
practices, we have consulted annual fiscal budget laws and the Fiscal Transparency 
Module of the International Monetary Fund’s Reports on the Observance of Standards 
and Codes (ROSC). Where ambiguities persisted, we were in direct contact with the 
country authorities.  
As constructed, the index can vary from zero to four. Table 3.1 in Appendix I reports 
the weights used to aggregate the various characteristics. Table 3.2 reports the changes 
over time to the individual features in the different countries. On this basis, an index 
representing the overall quality of budget institutions for each country is constructed for 
each year in our sample. Table 3.3 reports the index for two years, 1994 and either 2003 
or 2004. As is clear, budget institutions have tended to improve over time in almost all 
countries. Figure 3.1 aggregates the indices for two groups of countries. The more 
advanced economies have gradually reached a plateau of improvement along the 
dimensions we examine. Countries in emerging Europe have made progress to varying 
degrees, with some suffering occasional setbacks. Figure 3.2 confirms that richer 
economies tend to have better institutions. Figure 3.3 shows that, because there is more 
scope for improvement when institutions are relatively backward, countries at the lower 
end of the spectrum tend to make more progress. 
The dependent variable is the change in budget institutions two years ahead. The two-
year gap is an empirical compromise. Often, the exact timing of a reform is not known 
with precision and, hence, fixing it in a particular year is difficult and potentially 
incorrect. Considering a longer spell would, however, have further shortened an already 
short time series. The change in institutional quality is categorized into four groups. 
Most (78 of the 102) observations are associated with no change in institutional quality. 
Twelve observations are associated with strengthening of up to 0.7 point (on the scale 
from zero to four), designated “an improvement,” and a strengthening larger than 0.7 
(associated with six observations) is referred to as “a large improvement.” Finally, for 
six observations, there is an institutional setback. We check our results for robustness to 
these categorizations (both by combining the two improvement categories and by 
further dividing them).  
The natural approach to analyzing these changes is through an ordered regression 
technique. Notice, it may appear in principle that we have over 200 observations, for 23 
countries and 10 years. However, that is not strictly true. Because we project reforms 
two years from the date of assessment, taking into account intervening years would lead 
to counting the same reform more than once. While there are statistical approaches to 
dealing with overlapping samples, we have chosen to put our analysis to a stringent test 
by dropping the intervening years. Taking account of missing values, we are left with 
about 100 observations for the analysis. Also, throughout, we report robust standard 
                                                 
12 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The index is also available for France and 
Ireland; however, these two countries are not included in the study as data for some of the political 
variables used in the analysis are not available for them. 
  37errors. Though there is no evidence that the residuals “misbehave,” there is the risk that 
the standard errors may not be consistent. However, in all cases, the results are 
manifestly stronger with the conventional standard errors.  
3.3.  The Setting: War of Attrition 
Table 3.4 presents the basic results to illustrate the presumption of a “war of attrition.” 
A few preliminaries are in order, however. First, we include throughout the gap between 
the highest possible institutional quality (taking the value four) and the country’s state 
of fiscal institutions. This “institutional gap” variable serves several purposes. First, the 
gap determines the scope of the subsequent improvements in quality of the fiscal 
institutions. Not surprisingly, the larger the gap in the quality of fiscal institutions at the 
beginning of the period, the greater the scope (and possibly the incentive) for further 
improvements in their quality. This is just a statistical validation of Figure 3.3. Second, 
as Figure 3.2 showed, per capita income is correlated with institutional quality. When 
we add per capita income as an additional explanatory variable, it is insignificant, while 
the institutional gap variable remains robustly significant. Finally, the strongly 
statistical positive sign on the institutional gap variable also captures the secular 
tendency for improvement in budget institutions.  
Year dummy variables that are included throughout pick up additional common 
influences in any particular year across all countries. Also, country dummy variables are 
also included throughout to minimize the risk of omitted country variables. These 
dummies allow for the possibility that influences unobserved by us, the 
econometricians, contribute to the likelihood of reform. We find that, in some cases, 
these fixed effects are of considerable importance. In other words, historical country 
features create inertia in institutions. While we have not attempted to identify the 
sources of this inertia, the implications are clear: overcoming it will require the 
country’s leadership to make a special effort to undertake reforms. Thus, the strongly 
negative coefficient on the Hungary dummy, for example, puts the onus on that 
country’s leadership to break through the historical constraints against reform. 
We use two variables to focus on the war of attrition. First, we use the lagged balance as 
defining the bargaining context within the existing resource constraints (for definitions 
and sources of all variables, see Appendix II). The use of the lag reduces the risk of 
reverse causality from budget institutions to budgetary outcomes. The result is that a 
larger primary budget surplus increases the probability of budgetary reforms (a deficit 
delays reforms).  Thus, a worse fiscal balance at time t-1 is associated with a smaller 
likelihood of improvements in fiscal institutions’ quality between t and (t+2). This 
finding is consistent with a more intense war of attrition among policymakers when the 
budget situation is adverse and, by implication, the claims on the budget are large. Thus, 
a country experiencing large fiscal deficits will find it difficult to embark on reforms of 
fiscal institutions before the deficit itself is brought under greater control.  
The implication also is that countries may move in “virtuous” and “vicious” circles. 
Stronger budget balances help strengthen budget institutions, which, in turn feeds back 
to further improving budget balances. In contrast, deficits are likely to persist as 
countries are unable to impose rules and procedures that impose self-discipline. This 
finding may, at first sight, seem to contrast with the conventional finding that a large 
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report that a deficit “crisis” (defined as crisis outcomes in the top quartile of their 
sample) is associated with a subsequent decline in the deficit. The implication of our 
finding is that the forces of the war of attrition tend to move countries to the corners: 
small deficits (surpluses)/strong institutions and large deficits/weak institutions. Clearly, 
a country in a large deficit/weak institutions outcome, reaches a crisis point, which 
forces a deficit reduction: it is only when the deficit is under control that the process of 
strengthening institutions can start.
13 
Our second variable, a more fragmented government coalition, is the conventional 
channel through which attrition is thought to act. The negative sign on this variable 
implies that more fragmentation is, indeed, less supportive of reforms, although this 
direct effect is not statistically significant. An indirect effect, however, is important. 
This is seen in the negative sign on the interaction between primary balance and 
fragmentation. The negative sign can be read two ways. First, fragmentation exercises a 
stronger negative influence when a larger primary balance provides the resource latitude 
for undertaking reforms. In other words, fragmentation is more powerful when the 
likelihood of reforms exists. When that likelihood is low, then fragmentation matters 
less, if at all. Second, as fragmentation increases, the positive influence of a larger 
primary balance is mitigated. These interpretations are pursued in Figure 3.4, following 
Franzese and Kam (2007). 
As Franzese and Kam (2007) have emphasized, when interpreting interaction terms, it is 
important to recognize that the effective coefficient on one of the two variables varies 
with the changes in the other variable—but so also does the standard error of that 
effective coefficient. Using the STATA code that they have generously posted, we 
generated Figure 3.4, which plots the effective coefficient and the upper and lower 
bands giving the 95 percent confidence interval within which the coefficient lies. The 
first panel shows that the effective coefficient on fractionalization has a point estimate 
close to zero in the lower ranges of the primary balance. In this range, the upper 
confidence band lies above the zero line and the lower confidence band lies below this 
line, implying that the effective coefficient is statistically not different from zero when 
the fiscal balance is in deficit. When the fiscal balance is about 3 percent of GDP, both 
the upper and lower bands are below the zero line: fractionalization, at that point begins 
to exercise a statistically significant negative effective on budgetary reforms. We will 
see below in a more fully specified model that fractionalization may exert its negative 
influence even earlier, before the primary balance reaches 2 percent of GDP. 
The second panel of Figure 3.4 shows that that the primary balance always has a 
positive and statistically significant value; thus, a larger primary balance aids reforms. 
However, as fractionalization increases, a given primary balance has a smaller 
stimulative effect. In other words, while a comfortable primary balance reduces the fight 
over scarce resources and, hence, creates the conditions for forward-looking discipline, 
a more fractionalized government interferes with achieving this discipline. This indirect 
effect of fractionalization, our data suggests, can be potent. 
Since the political process is complex, the possibility of omitted variables is always a 
serious one. In Table 3.5, we discuss a number of extensions of the basic model in Table 
                                                 
13 Tracing this dynamic fully requires longer time series on institutions. Preliminary efforts within the 
context of our data did not produce helpful results. 
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have a bearing on budgetary reforms. For example, fiscal discipline often weakens in an 
election year. Also, where the checks and balances through veto points are substantial, 
the risks of poor decisions are minimized. Finally, ideology is thought to influence 
reform decisions. Our results suggest that these variables apparently do not have an 
influence on budgetary reforms. It is possible, however, that there are more subtle 
influences that these variables exert. We explore one of these—that related to 
ideology—in Section 3.5. Importantly, the basic findings of this section—a direct 
influence of a larger primary balance and the erosion of this effect as fractionalization 
increases— remain intact when these additional variables are included in the regression 
specification. 
3.4.  Economic Shocks and Crises 
Thus, clearly, political influences matter. The question that arises whether economic 
shocks or a crisis can mitigate the tendency to the status quo arising from a war of 
attrition to encourage reform—or even, following from our analysis above, what forces 
are likely to halt and reverse the possibly unfortunate dynamic of a worsening budget 
situation and weakening controls. We explore these considerations in this section. 
In column 1 of Table 3.6, we add, as proxies to the so-called misery index, the 
unemployment rate and log of the inflation rate. The evidence is that a worsening 
domestic economic situation raises the likelihood of reforms. The unemployment rate is 
significant at the 10 percent level and the inflation rate is significant at the 1 percent 
level. The inference is that as domestic “misery” increases, political alliances cannot 
proceed with business as usual and are called on tighten the grip over public finances. In 
column 2, we add the current account surplus. The negative sign implies that a larger 
surplus reduces the likelihood of reform—an increasing deficit raises external 
vulnerability and with it the pressure to reform. Though, once again, the coefficient is 
significant only at the 10 percent confidence level, the combined sense of the 
exploration thus far is that internal and external economic distress does generate the 
expected tendency toward reforms.  
Before proceeding to examine this possibility in somewhat greater depth, two 
observations are in order. First, the core “war of attrition model” comprising the 
primary balance and government fractionalization performs well with the introduction 
of the additional variables; in fact, the point estimate on fractionalization is increased 
and the statistical significance of the interaction variable is stronger than before. 
Second, we also evaluated the influence of other plausible variables. We find, for 
example, that a country under the European Union’s watch through the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure does not do any better on reform proclivity than a country not subject 
to this discipline. There is some suggestion that countries that have adopted the euro, all 
else equal, tend to create more checks and balances in their budgetary process; however, 
this coefficient falls just short of being significant, even at the 10 percent level. 
Similarly, a country’s trade openness appears to favour reform but the statistical 
significance does not pass the relevant thresholds. 
With that, we return to the trio of unemployment, log of inflation, and the current 
account deficit. It seems reasonable to presume that the effects of these variables are not 
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has a smaller effect than an equivalent increase when the deficit is already large. It is 
beyond some benchmark that a country’s perception of itself as in a crisis forces 
political forces into needed action. 
As a first step, we construct two principal components of these three variables. The first 
principal component has an interesting interpretation. It is highly correlated with the 
inflation rate and with the current account deficit. We refer to this variable as 
“overheating” since unsustainable domestic demand is likely to be reflected in a 
combination of high inflation rates and large current account deficits. Our labelling of 
the second principal component as “stagflation” is more of a stretch: it has a tight 
correlation with the unemployment rate and more modest correlations with inflation and 
the current account deficit. In the rest of the analysis, we use these two principal 
components as our economic variables. 
In the first column of Table 3.7, we add the “overheating” variable. It has the expected 
positive sign but is not statistically significant. This we would expect since, at low 
levels of inflation and the current account deficit, there would be little pressure to 
respond. We test for a nonlinear response in two ways. First, in column 2, we allow for 
the possibility that the response to overheating changes once that variable crosses the 
75
th percentile of all the observations in our data set. Thus, our “overheating, 
nonlinearity” variable takes the value zero for all values of overheating below the 75
th 
percentile and then takes the overheating values thereafter. The positive sign with strong 
statistical significance points to a sharp nonlinearity. In column 3, we add the stagflation 
variable, which has a positive sign, but one that is not statistically significant. Thus, 
stagflation does improve the prospect of reform, and efforts to identify nonlinearities 
lead to findings similar to that for overheating. Once we add the stagflation variable, the 
sum of the “overheating” and “overheating, nonlinearity” coefficients is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
A second approach is to create a “crisis” dummy, which takes the value one when the 
overheating variable is over its 75
th percentile and zero otherwise. The coefficient on 
this variable is positive and significant; this is so with our without the stagflation 
variable (which is positive and statistically significant in this specification). Thus, the 
evidence once again is that, when overheating crosses a threshold, it significantly 
improves the likelihood of reform. 
3.5.  Credibility: Does It Take Nixon To Go To China? 
The evidence that reforms become more likely in a crisis raises a further intriguing 
possibility. In such exceptional conditions, Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) propose 
that desirable policy reforms could be undertaken by the less likely political party. Just 
as Richard Nixon, a Republican U.S. president, took the initiative to build ties with 
communist China, a leftist government may be better positioned to persuade voters that 
belt-tightening reforms are needed. The premise is that leftist governments are not 
otherwise disposed to tightening the fiscal belt (see, among others, Fabrizio and Mody, 
2006) and are, therefore, when they push reforms in that direction, likely to be taken 
seriously and not penalized by voters in subsequent elections. 
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Table 3.5, that the political ideology variable is not significant by itself (column 1). In 
the second column, we interact overheating with ideology. Now, the overheating 
variable by itself is positive and significant, implying that more overheating raises the 
possibility of reform. But the interaction variable is negative and also significant. This 
says that the response to overheating is smaller the more “right wing” the ruling 
government. Stated alternatively, a “leftist” government is more likely to respond to 
overheating. At its median value of the “rightist ideology” index, 11, the effective 
coefficient on overheating is almost zero and, at the 75
th percentile, 13.5, the response is 
negative (as if strongly rightist governments find it difficult to respond to overheating).  
In column 3, we interact the “rightist ideology” variable with our crisis dummy (which 
first appeared above in Table 3.7). We obtain a similar result. The crisis dummy itself is 
positive and significant, as above. And the interaction between this dummy variable and 
“rightist ideology” is negative and also highly significant. In this specification, the 
“rightist ideology” variable is positive and with a higher t-value than before. In the 
absence of a crisis, a rightist government will be more prone to reform. However, in a 
crisis, there is a reversal: the more leftist a government, the more likely it is to reform. 
Similarly, the force of response to a crisis depends on government ideology. Using once 
again the techniques of Franzese and Kam (2007), we show the effective coefficient on 
the crisis dummy as a function of the ideology variable. The response to a crisis is 
strongest under leftist governments. This response falls as the ideology moves rightward 
until it becomes insignificant, just beyond the 75
th percentile of the ideology variable. 
Figure 3.5 also repeats the interactions between the primary balance and 
fractionalization for the fuller model of column 3, Table 3.8. These basic findings are 
reinforced. The effective coefficient on the fractionalization variable now becomes 
negative and statistically significant for a lower value of the primary deficit (just under 
2 percent of GDP). The effective coefficient on the primary balance variable is now 
generally higher than in the simpler model. 
Table 3.9 shows that the actual changes and those predicted by the model match rather 
well. We tested the results by dropping one country at a time to assess if one country 
was driving the findings. This was not the case (results can be obtained from the 
authors). Also, we collapsed the institutional improvements into one category rather 
than dividing them into “an improvement” and “a large improvement.” Going in the 
other direction, we divided the improvements into three rather than two categories. 
Once again, our results held up well. 
3.6.  Conclusions 
As the process of globalization continues its inevitable march, some policy changes are 
increasingly being thrust on governments. This is especially the case for financial sector 
reforms. In Abiad and Mody (2005), we show that regional competition for reforms 
spurs all countries ahead. A research agenda that examines the relative influence of 
domestic and international factors on reform efforts still needs to be undertaken. But we 
have proceeded in this paper on the premise that fiscal policy is deeply influenced by 
domestic politics. There is evidence, even in the context of this paper, that external 
vulnerability (reflected in current account deficits) helps the reform process. 
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politics. 
Our findings suggest that a country can enter a fiscally “virtuous” or vicious” cycle. In 
“favorable fiscal times,” when fiscal performance is good, reforms are easier to 
undertake. The compromises necessary for the reforms apparently bite less. In “bad 
fiscal times,” when reforms have significant distributional implications (e.g., when 
imposing stronger checks and controls to reduce a large budget deficit by containing 
expenditures hurts particular constituencies), needed reforms are delayed. These 
findings are in line with Alesina and Drazen (1991), who argue that, when budgetary 
resources are limited and there are many claimants, a war of attrition ensues. No 
political interest group wants to give in, so the reform process stalls. 
How, then, does a country shake the status quo and, in particular, emerge from a vicious 
into a virtuous cycle? The answer is that economic pain helps. When economic 
conditions deteriorate, intractable opposing political positions are weakened, interest 
groups are unable to hold onto their claims, and compromises become feasible. We 
found, in particular, that an “overheating” crisis raises reform probabilities. Such a crisis 
is a combination of high inflation and large current account deficits, reflecting 
unsustainable domestic demand. Fiscal probity to withdraw stimulus from the 
economy—not just on a cyclical but on a structural basis as well—is a key policy 
requirement in this context. The results suggest that, indeed, such a response is 
forthcoming. 
Our finding on the importance of a crisis as a pressure for reform raised the question of 
whether the response to a crisis depended on the ruling government’s political ideology. 
We found, in line with Cukierman and Tommasi (1998), that needed credibility in a 
democratic context generates the conditions for the “unlikely” ideology to lead the 
response to a crisis. Thus, we find evidence that while in a non-crisis situation, rightist 
parties may well lead the reform process, in a crisis, leftist parties acquire credibility for 
reform because such action goes against their mandate. This is a hopeful finding since it 
points to a mechanism through which democracies can to deal with crisis. Reforms 
based on a government’s credibility are likely to be more inclusive, and, hence, possibly 
more sustainable than those based on “strong” democratic leaders. Political leadership is 
necessary in breaking the logjam, especially where long-standing historical forces create 
inertia in the reform of institutions. However, such leadership can derive from 
persuasion rather than force.  
  43Appendix I: Quality of Budget Institutions 
Following Fabrizio and Mody (2006) and Hallerberg et al. (2007), we constructed a 
quantitative index of the overall quality of budget institutions for 23 European 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom.  
The index is intended to consolidate the objective features of the budget process, such 
that a larger value implies more checks and balances. Values were assigned to the three 
phases of the budget process: (1) the preparation stage, when the budget is drafted; (2) 
the authorization stage, in which the draft budget is approved and formalized; and (3) 
the implementation phase, when the budget is executed and may be modified or 
amended.  
Data sources include annual fiscal budget laws, Reports on the Observance of Standards 
and Codes (ROSC) Fiscal Transparency Module, produced by the International 
Monetary Fund, and direct contact with the countries’ authorities. 
The tables in this appendix provide: (1) the components of this index (3.1); (2) the 
changes over time (3.2); and (3) two snapshots (1994 and 2003 or 2004) of the 
budgetary quality for the countries in our sample (3.3).  
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Preparation   0.33    
General constraint 0.33   
Spending and debt as share of GDP    4.00
Spending as share of GDP or golden rule or limit on public    3.00
Balance and debt as share of GDP    2.00
Balance as share of GDP    1.00
None   0.00
Agenda setting 0.33   
MF or PM determines budget parameters to be observed by spending   4.00
MF proposes budget norms to be voted on by cabinet  3.00
Cabinet decides on budget norms first  2.00
MF or cabinet collects bids subject to the pre-agreed ministry  1.00
MF or cabinet collects bids from spending ministers   0.00
Structure of negotiations 0.33   
Finance ministry holds bilateral negotiations with each spending   4.00
Finance ministry holds multilateral negotiations  2.00
All cabinet members are involved in the negotiations at the same time   0.00
Legislation    
Parliamentary amendments of the budget 0.33  
Are not allowed, or required to be offsetting  4.00
Do not required to be offsetting   0.00
Sequence of votes  0.33   
Initial vote on total budget size aggregates  4.00
Final vote on budget size or aggregates  0.00
Relative power of the executive vis-à-vis the parliament; can cause fall  0.33   
Yes   4.00
No   0.00
Implementation 0.33    
Changes in the budget law during execution 0.25 
Only new budgetary law to be passed under the same regulations as    4.00
Requires parliament consent   2.00
At total or large discretion of government  0.00
Transfers of expenditures between chapters (i.e. ministries' budgets) 0.25  
Not allowed    4.00
Only possible with departments with MF consent  3.20
Only possible with departments    2.56
Require approval of parliament   1.92
Only if provided for in initial budget or with MF approval   1.28
Limited   0.64
Unlimited   0.00
Carryover of unused funds to next fiscal year 0.25  
Not permitted    4.00
Limited and required authorization by the MF or parliament  2.67
Limited   1.33
Unlimited   0.00
Procedure to react to a deterioration of the budget deficit (due to  0.25   
MF can block expenditures    4.00
MF cannot block expenditures    0.00
Sources: Fabrizio and Mody (2006) and Hallerberg et al. (2008).Table 3.2  Index of Quality of Budget Institutions 
A. Preparation stage B. Authorization stage C. Implementation stage Overall quality index
Variable 1994 2003/04 Variable 1994 2003/04 Variable 1994 2003/04 1994 2003/04
1 2 3 Score Score  4 5 6 Score Score  7 8 9 10 Score Score Score  Score




























Czech Republic 0 3 4 1.32 2.31 0 4 4 2.64 2.64 4 1.28 1.33 0 2.32 1.65 2.07 2.18
0
(1)    4
(2)









Estonia 3 3 4 3.30 3.30 4 0 4 1.32 2.64 4 1.92 2.67 4 3.15 3.15 2.56 3.00
0
(4)
Finland 4 2 2 1.65 2.64 0 0 4 1.32 1.32 0 4 4 0 2.00 2.00 1.64 1.97
1
(7)
















Hungary 0 3 4 2.31 2.31 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.64 1.33 0 0.49 0.49 0.92 0.92
 

















Latvia 3 3 2 2.64 2.64 0 0 4 1.32 1.32 4 1.92 2.67 4 3.15 3.15 2.35 2.35































Slovak Republic 0 1 2 0.99 0.99 0 0 4 1.32 1.32 0 1.28 1.33 0 0.65 0.65 0.98 0.98
Slovenia 0 3 4 2.31 2.31 4 0 4 2.64 2.64 0 1.28 2.67 0 0.99 0.99 1.96 1.96
Spain 3 4 4 3.63 3.63 0 4 0 1.32 1.32 0 1.28 4 0 1.32 1.32 2.07 2.07
1.33
(11)
















(1)  Before 1998 
(2)  Before 2001 
(3)  Before 2000 
(4)  Before 2003 
(5)  Before 2002 
(6)  Before 1999 
(7)  Before 1996 
(8)  Before 2004 
(9)  Before 1997 
(10) Before 1995 
(11) Before 1994 
(12) Before 1993 
(13) Before 1992 








































































































A u s t r i a 1 131 78 1 822 28
Belgium 16 18 6 16 11 21 5 16
Bulgaria 3 4 22 13 4 3 15 13
Czech Republic 3 18 14 17 4 11 11 17
D e n m a r k 2 24 91 8 2 231 0 1 8
Estonia 21 4 20 21 18 11 20 21
F i n l a n d 8 41 37 1 131 47
Germany 16 4 17 19 4 11 12 19
Greece 1 1 14 1 18 21 6 1
H u n g a r y  1 2 132 4111
I t a l y 8414 4 1 1 84
Latvia 16 4 20 20 11 3 20 20
L i t h u a n i a 3 42 21 3 2 31 8 1 3
L u x e m b u r g 1 21 81 92 2 1 11 12 32 2
Netherlands 16 18 2 11 16 11 3 11
P o l a n d 3 4 1 2 6 1 11 11 3 6
Portugal 12 4 10 10 3 3 8 10
Romania 10 4 14 9 4 11 15 9
S l o v a k  R e p u b l i c 2443 1323
Slovenia 12 18 5 12 4 11 4 12
S p a i n 2 24 71 5 2 33 61 5
Sweden 3 4 8 5 18 11 19 5
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m 1 62 31 12 3 1 62 11 72 3  
Notes: 
(1) Higher rank indicates better quality (highest rank = 23) 
(2) Data for the new Member States are available until 2003. 








  47Appendix II: Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Institutional 
reform 
The change in the quality of budget institutions two 
years ahead, i.e., between t and t+2.  Appendix I 
Institutional gap 
The difference between 4 (the maximum value of 
the quality index and the quality of budget 
institutions in the country at time t. 
Appendix I 
Primary balance  The primary budget balance/GDP in t-1.  IMF, World Economic 
Outlook 
Fractionalization 
Measure of the distribution of parties in the 
government’s coalition, represented by the 
Herfindahl index, [1-[∑si]], where si is the share of 
party “i” in the coalition in year t. 
Parties and Elections in 
Europe (www.parties-and-
elections.de) and Elections 
Around the World 
(www.electionworld.org). 
Election year  A dummy variable taking the value 1 if an election 
occurred at time t.   
Political 
constraints  
The political constraint index (POLCON): measure 







An index of ideology at time t, taking values from 
[5 to 16], with higher values representing a more 
“rightist” world view. 
Benoit and Laver, 2006, 
www.politics.tcd.ie /ppmd/ 
Unemployment  The country’s unemployment rate at time t.  IMF, World Economic 
Outlook 
Log (inflation)  The log of the country’s [consumer price] inflation 
rate at time t. 
IMF, World Economic 
Outlook 
Current account 




A dummy taking the value 1 if the country was 





A dummy taking the value 1 in the year the country 
adopted the euro and thereafter.   
Trade/GDP  [Exports+Imports]/GDP at time t.  IMF, World Economic 
Outlook 
Overheating 
First principal component of the unemployment 
rate, log (inflation), and the current account surplus. 
Larger values imply a combination of larger current 
account deficits and higher inflation; hence, the 




Takes the values of the overheating variable above 
the 75
th percentile and zero below that. Is intended 
to allow for nonlinearity in policy response to 
overheating. 
Authors’ construction. 
Crisis  Takes the value 1 if the overheating variable is 
above its 75
th percentile and zero otherwise.  Authors’ construction. 
Stagflation 
Second principal component of the unemployment 
rate, log (inflation), and the current account surplus. 
Strongly correlated with the unemployment rate 




  48Table 3.4  War of Attrition 
 Dependent Variable: Institutional Reform 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
4.61 6.23 6.34 7.35  Institutional gap 
[4.02]*** [3.85]*** [3.92]*** [4.38]*** 
  0.50 0.49 0.92  Primary balance 
 [1.90]*  [1.76]*  [2.93]*** 
   -2.09  -0.80  Fractionalization  
(FRAC)     [1.00]  [0.42] 
    - 0 . 9 7   Primary  
balance*FRAC      [1.92]* 
Observations  102 102 102 102 
Pseudo R-squared  0.39 0.44 0.45 0.48 
Notes:  
Robust z statistics in brackets. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. 
Coefficients for country and year dummies not reported. 
 
Table 3.5  Political Constraints 
 Dependent Variable: Institutional Reform 
  (1) (2) (3) 
7.33 7.36 7.30  Institutional gap 
[4.25]*** [4.41]*** [4.53]*** 
0.92 0.92 0.91  Primary balance 
[2.98]*** [2.91]*** [3.05]*** 
-0.76 -0.80 -0.62  Fractionalization  
(FRAC)  [0.42] [0.42] [0.29] 
-0.99 -0.97 -0.98  Primary  
balance*FRAC [1.99]**  [1.90]*  [1.95]* 
-0.54  -0.54  Election year 
[0.54]  [0.54] 
 -0.23  -0.15  Political constraints 
 [0.04]  [0.02] 
   -0.02  “Rightist” ideology 
   [0.11] 
Observations 102  102  102 
Pseudo R-squared  0.48 0.48 0.48 
Notes: 
Robust z statistics in brackets, * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent; coefficients for country and year dummies not reported.     
  49Table 3.6  Economic Shocks 
 Dependent Variable: Institutional Reform 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
10.99 11.68  11.76  14.20  Institutional gap 
[2.75]*** [2.55]**  [2.67]***  [2.52]** 
1.42 1.41  1.41  1.85  Primary balance 
[2.09]** [2.00]**  [2.03]**  [2.07]** 
-0.17 -1.38  -1.41  -1.50  Fractionalization  
(FRAC) [0.06]  [0.48]  [0.49]  [0.55] 
-1.46 -1.34  -1.37  -2.02  Primary  
balance*FRAC [2.00]**  [1.97]** [2.01]** [2.16]** 
0.94 0.97  1.00  0.90  Unemployment 
[1.84]* [1.80]*  [1.90]* [2.26]** 
4.66 5.25  5.32  3.16  Log (inflation) 
[2.91]*** [2.83]***  [2.92]***  [2.43]** 
 -0.30  -0.29  -0.24  Current account  
  surplus    [1.78]*  [1.78]*  [1.79]* 
   -2.55  -2.80  Excessive deficit  
procedure dummy      [1.13]  [1.26] 
     4.37  Euro adoption  
dummy       [1.60] 
     0.09  Trade/GDP 
     [1.45] 
Observations 102 100 100 100 
Pseudo R-squared 0.54  0.56  0.56  0.60 
Notes:  
Robust z statistics in brackets, * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. Coefficients for country and year dummies not reported.     
  50Table 3.7  Crises and Reforms 
 Dependent Variable: Institutional Reform 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
7.27 8.00  14.45  8.22  12.38  Institutional gap 
[4.01]***  [4.49]*** [2.05]** [4.01]***  [3.13]*** 
0.86 0.96 1.61 0.97 1.57  Primary balance 
[2.52]** [2.32]** [2.09]**  [2.63]***  [2.53]** 
-1.00 -0.90 -1.07 -0.37 -0.45  Fractionalization  
(FRAC) [0.42]  [0.32]  [0.43]  [0.16]  [0.21] 
-0.95 -1.05 -1.25 -1.02 -1.31  Primary  
balance*FRAC [1.87]*  [1.74]* [2.02]** [1.85]* [2.06]** 
0.41 -0.46 0.00      Overheating 
[1.05] [0.83] [0.01]     
 1.33  2.36     Overheating  
nonlinearity   [2.22]**  [2.77]***     
    4.71  6.91  Crisis 
    [2.05]**  [2.45]** 
   2.24    1.55  Stagflation 
   [1.56]    [2.20]** 
Observations 100 100 100 102 100 
Pseudo R-squared 0.49  0.52  0.60  0.52  0.58 
Notes:  
Robust z statistics in brackets, * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. Coefficients for country and year dummies not reported.
  51Table  3.8  Credibility       
  Dependent Variable: Institutional Reform 
  (1) (2) (3) 
7.32 9.93  17.06  Institutional gap 
[4.73]*** [3.10]*** [4.43]*** 
0.91 1.12 1.29  Primary balance 
[3.09]*** [2.16]** [2.61]*** 
-0.66 -4.43 -3.81  Fractionalization  
(FRAC)  [0.30] [1.41] [1.11] 
-0.96 -1.27 -1.55  Primary  
balance*FRAC [1.90]*  [1.87]*  [2.08]** 
-0.02 0.32 0.41  “Rightist” ideology 
[0.11] [1.11]  [1.81]* 
 3.71   Overheating 
 [2.36]**  
 -0.31   Overheating* “Rightist”  
ideology   [1.97]**   
   45.79  Crisis 
   [3.67]*** 
   -3.06  Crisis* “Rightist”  
ideology     [3.75]*** 
    Stagflation 
   
Observations  102 100 102 
Pseudo R-squared  0.48 0.52 0.60 
Notes: Robust z statistics in brackets, * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** 
significant at 1 percent; coefficients for country and year dummies not reported. 
 
Table 3.9  Model Predictions 
  Predicted Probability of Change 
Actual change  Reversal  No Change  Improvement  Large 
Improvement 
Reversal  0.49 0.51 0.00 0.00 
No  change  0.04 0.89 0.06 0.01 
Improvement  0.00 0.38 0.51 0.11 
Large 
improvement 
0.00 0.06 0.26 0.68 
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Old EU members
New EU members 
(2)
Notes: 
(1) Higher rank indicates better quality (highest rank = 23) 
(2) Data for the new Member States are available until 2003 




  53Figure 3.2  Quality of Fiscal Institutions' Index and Per Capita Income 
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(1) Higher rank indicates better quality (highest rank = 23). Data for the new Member States are available 
until 2003. 
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(1) Higher rank indicates better quality (highest rank = 23). Data for the new Member States are available 
until 2003. 
Sources: Fabrizio and Mody (2006); Hallerberg et al. (2007) and authors' calculations. 
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  56Figure 3.5  Nonlinear Effects in the Full Model  
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  57Discussion 
Roel Beetsma 
This is a nice paper with interesting results. It provides a statistical investigation of the 
determinants of budget reform in a large panel of European countries over the period 
since the beginning of the nineties. In this regard, it pays specific attention to the state 
of the public finances, political divisions, economic crises and credibility aspects. In 
particular, the latter is interesting. The authors refer to the “Nixon goes to China 
phenomenon”. Nixon was the president who on the basis of his political preferences 
was the least likely to reach out to China. The fact that he nevertheless did reach out 
added to the credibility and success of his policy. Similarly, one may expect left wing 
parties to be the least likely to conduct reform. If they do decide to reform, this will be 
signal of credibility and determination to succeed. The authors find that overall right-
wing governments are indeed more likely to reform the budget in absence of crisis, but 
that during a crisis, the more leftist is the government, the more likely is reform. 
In the sequel I will comment on some further findings of the authors, the interpretation 
of those findings and some aspects of the empirical approach taken by the authors. 
What else do the authors find? First, they find that a worse budgetary position reduces 
the subsequent likelihood of reforms. They explain this as the result of an attrition war. 
Groups are fighting over who has to bear the cost of adjustment and each group waits 
for the other to give in. The authors thus implicitly claim that this effect becomes 
stronger and, hence, reform is postponed for longer, when there are fewer public 
resources. I am not convinced that this is the most plausible explanation. Another 
simple explanation that is easy to test is that economic recession may act as a third 
factor worsening the public budget and at the same time giving rise to social unrest, 
which makes it harder to implement a reform. 
Second, the authors find that a more fragmented government coalition is an impediment 
to reform, a finding that can reasonably be ascribed to a war-of attrition effect. Third, 
there is also an interaction effect between the primary budget balance and political 
fragmentation, implying that more fractionalisation reduces the effect of the primary 
balance on the likelihood of reform or that a higher primary balance makes the effect of 
fractionalisation on the reform likelihood more negative. In my view, this indirect effect 
goes against attrition war hypothesis. Under an attrition war, a low budget should be 
particularly bad for reform likelihood when fractionalisation is bigger. However, the 
opposite is the case: the estimates show that for high deficits the effect of 
fractionalization on reform is positive! 
The authors further find that higher inflation, higher unemployment and a higher current 
account deficit all make reform more likely. In other words, economic pain may shake 
the country out of the status quo of no reform. Being under the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure has no effect. Of course, here the question is whether there are enough 
observations during which the EDP was active to draw strong conclusions in this 
regard. 
  58The authors define an “overheating variable”, which is measured as a combination of 
current account deficit and high inflation. This variable is entered the budget reform 
regression in relative terms. That is the authors define a “crisis” to be present if the 
overheating variable exceeds its 75
th percentile. However, in my view it is more 
appropriate to define a crisis in absolute terms, because the current definition of crisis is 
immune to a European-wide improvement in current accounts and a European-wide fall 
in inflation. 
I am somewhat surprised that GDP (growth) nowhere appears as an explanatory 
variable of reform. Low growth increases the need for reform. Also I would think that 
growth would be a better measure of “crisis” than the variable that is now supposed to 
capture a crisis. After all, situations of “overheating” could simply be situations of rapid 
catching up: inflation is high for Balassa-Samuelson reasons, while the current account 
is negative because there is high capital inflow to finance investment and higher 
consumption (in anticipation of higher future income). 
On the basis of their results, the authors suggest two possible “long-run” outcomes. One 
is a long run with low deficits and good institutions. The other is one with high deficits 
and weak institutions which is the result of a vicious cycle in which high deficits 
prevent budgetary reform, which in turn leads to persistence of high deficits. However, 
in my view this really remains to be shown. First, can one indeed detect any tendency in 
the deficits over time that confirms the hypothesis? Second, one would also need to 
show that a higher index of the quality of budgetary institutions produces better 
budgetary outcomes. In fact, it would be interesting to set up a vector auto-regression 
(VAR) model that includes as endogenous variables institutional quality and primary 
balances and see what are the dynamic responses to exogenous shocks to, for example, 
economic growth or other variables that have been used to measure “crisis”. 
That being said, I believe that overall this paper is a very useful contribution to the 








  59Part II - Lessons from Fiscal 
Consolidation 
 
4  What promotes fiscal consolidation: OECD country experiences 
Stéphanie Guichard, Mike Kennedy, Eckhard Wurzel and Christophe André∗
∗ 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
Fiscal consolidation is required in most OECD countries. This is especially so in view 
of medium- and long-term spending pressures on public finances, related, inter alia, to 
ageing. Countries that are successful in consolidating will then face the challenge of 
locking in the gains achieved. Against that background, in this paper we present 
evidence on the factors that in the past were associated with successful consolidation 
and with the preservation of those gains. 
Based on a dataset covering a large number of OECD fiscal consolidation episodes 
starting in the late 1970s, we first present descriptive evidence on the features of these 
experiences and factors that may have affected the way they unfolded. Subsequently, 
regression analysis is used to identify a set of macroeconomic conditions and policy set-
ups that have been effective in triggering and sustaining these efforts. 
4.2.  Stylised features of fiscal consolidation episodes 
Using the definition presented in Box 1, since 1978, there were 85 fiscal consolidation 
episodes in the 24 countries under review. These episodes include only those that, once 
started, resulted in a noticeable improvement in the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(CAPB). A number of stylised patterns emerge from these episodes, as discussed below. 
Initial conditions, size and duration 
In line with findings from earlier analysis (Ahrend et al., 2006a and references cited 
therein), fiscal conditions prevailing just before the beginning of a consolidation 
episode seem to have had an impact on the size of subsequent efforts (Figure 4.1). The 
                                                 
∗ The authors were economists in the General Economic Assessment Division of the OECD’s Economics 
Department at time this paper was prepared. They wish to thank, without implicating, Jørgen Elmeskov, 
Mike Feiner, Vincent Koen, Peter Jarrett, Bob Price, Paul van den Noord, Boris Cournède, Romain 
Duval, Rudiger Ahrend, Chantal Nicq as well as the OECD Country Experts for helpful comments and 
drafting suggestions on earlier versions of the paper. Special thanks go to Anne  Eggimann for the 
preparation of the document. 
 
  60more negative was the CAPB (i.e., the larger the cyclically adjusted deficit), the larger 
was the size of ensuing fiscal consolidation. This may reflect that large deficits made it 
more necessary to consolidate and, at the same time, raised public awareness of the 
extent of the problem, making it easier to act. 
Figure 4.1  Initial Fiscal Positions and Subsequent Adjustment 
y = -0.47x + 2.77
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Note: The budget concept referred to is the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance. The total change 
during the episode is defined as the value in the last year of the episode minus the value in the year before 
the start of the episode. 
Source: OECD calculations. 
 
Most of the consolidation episodes were of short duration and involved only modest 
gains (Figure 4.2). The median improvement of the CAPB was 2.8% of GDP and the 
median duration was two years. There were, however, a number of large efforts, 
amounting to improvements of more than 8% of GDP, as well as a few episodes lasting 
from six to eight years.
 14 
In general, sizeable consolidation episodes also lasted for long periods, and vice versa 
(Figure  4.3, upper panel). On the other hand, long consolidation episodes tended to 
involve a lower “intensity” of effort, measured as total size of the consolidation per year 
(Figure 4.3, lower panel). Intense efforts are likely difficult to maintain over time either 
because of adjustment fatigue or because large, easy-to-implement measures (“the low 
hanging fruit”) tend to be done first. At the same time, large improvements obviously 
reduce the need for continued consolidation. 
 
14 Among large consolidation outcomes (improvements in cyclically adjusted balances in terms of per 
cent of potential GDP) were: Canada in the 1990s (8.1%); Portugal in the 1980s (8.5%); Sweden in the 
1980s (9.4%) and in the 1990s (11.7%); Greece in the 1990s (12.1%); and Denmark in the 1990s 
(13.5%). As to duration, fiscal consolidation was sustained for six years in Australia in the second half of 
the 1990s as well as in Belgium in the 1980s and 1990s; and in the United Kingdom and the United States 
in the 1990s. Consolidation lasted for seven years in Sweden in the 1980s and 1990s and for eight years 
in Japan in the 1980s. 
  61 
Box 1. Defining consolidation episodes 
The sample comprises all episodes of fiscal consolidation -- as defined below -- among 
24 OECD member countries since 1978 for which reliable data on key fiscal variables 
are available.
1 To identify episodes the same definitions were applied as in Ahrend et al. 
(2006). According to this definition, a fiscal consolidation episode: 
•  Starts if the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) improves by at least 
one percentage point of potential GDP in one year or in two consecutive years 
with at least ½ percentage point improvement occurring in the first of the two 
years.
2 
•  Continues as long as the CAPB improves. An interruption is allowed without 
terminating the episode as long at the deterioration of the CAPB does not 
exceed 0.3% of GDP and is more than offset in the following year (by an 
improvement of at least 0.5 % of GDP). 
•  Terminates if the CAPB stops increasing or if the CAPB improves by less than 
0.2% of GDP in one year and then deteriorates.  
The results of this mechanical definition were checked with OECD country experts and 
minor adjustments were made. The size of fiscal consolidation is measured by the 
change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percentage of potential GDP over 
the episode (last year of the episode minus the year before it starts) and the intensity is 
measured as the size divided by the length of the episode. Overall, the sample covers 
85 consolidation episodes (see Appendix II). 
________________________ 
1.  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
2.  The cyclically adjusted primary balance, which here is based on the method outlined in Girouard and 
André (2005), is an imperfect measure of discretionary policy actions. It can be affected for instance 
by asset price cycles (Girouard and Price, 2004; and Morris and Schuknecht, 2007) and one-off 
measures (Dafflon and Rossi 1999; von Hagen and Wolff, 2004; Koen and van den Noord, 2005) that 
do not reflect the policy stance. It is also affected by the measurement issues surrounding the output 
gap. However, given that only large changes qualify as consolidation spells, this problem is reduced. 
Debt-interest payments (as well as interest incomes) are excluded as they are largely outside the 
control of the fiscal authorities and thereby do not reflect directly the policy stance. 
 
Quality of the adjustment and successful consolidation 
A number of arguments and empirical studies suggest that spending restraint (notably 
with respect to government consumption and transfers) is more likely to generate lasting 
fiscal consolidation and better economic performance.
15 Indeed, related research 
suggests that both policy and long-term interest rates are more likely to fall when 
                                                 
15 Alesina and Perotti (1996); Alesina and Ardagna (1998); and Alesina and Bayoumi (1996). Von 
Hagen et al. (2002) also find that the likelihood of sustaining consolidation efforts seems to rise when 
governments tackle politically sensitive items on the budget such as transfers, subsidies and government 
wages.  
  62consolidation relies on current expenditure cuts rather than on tax increases, possibly 
reflecting the effects of the latter on costs and prices (Ahrend et al., 2006a). Moreover, 
there is evidence that the composition of fiscal consolidation is important for saving and 
growth, with spending based consolidation resulting in lower household saving and 
higher GDP growth.
16 
Figure 4.2  Strength and duration of consolidation episodes 
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Note: The budget concept referred to is the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance. 
Source: OECD calculations. 
                                                 
16 Bassanini et al. (2001), Ardagna (2004) and de Mello et al. (2004). Cournède and Gonand (2006), in 
the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, argue that tax 
increases are a much more costly way of achieving fiscal sustainability compared with spending 
restraint. 
  63 Figure 4.3  The relationship between duration, size and intensity of consolidation 
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Note: The budget concept referred to is the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance. 
Source: OECD calculations. 
  64Despite the case in favour of spending-based efforts, on average across the 
consolidation episodes studied here, revenue increases accounted for a larger fraction of 
the total reduction in the CAPB. About three quarters of the episodes under review 
involved both expenditure cuts and revenue increases and almost two thirds of the 
episodes involved larger contributions from revenue increases than from expenditure 
cuts (Figure 4.4). Reductions in capital expenditures usually played a smaller role in the 
total spending adjustment but in some cases they compensated for increases in current 
spending. 
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Source: OECD calculations. 
The success of consolidation policies might be judged according to whether fiscal 
adjustment is large enough to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio.
17 According to this 
criterion, slightly more than half of the consolidation episodes were successful. 
Moreover, in some 80% of these cases the sustainable position was maintained for at 
least two years. These successful episodes involved larger improvements in the CAPB 
(by almost ¾ percentage point of potential GDP compared with the median episode 
size) and lasted for longer (about twice as long as the median episode length of two 
years) than in the other cases. 
On the other hand, half of the episodes under review were not successful in the sense 
that one third or more of the total reduction in the CAPB achieved during the 
                                                 
17 Looking directly at the debt-to-GDP ratio has the disadvantage of including stock-flow adjustments that 
affect the level of debt but might be unrelated to discretionary consolidation policies and even reflect 
fiscal gimmickry designed to reduce debt levels in the short-term without improving the underlying 
government balance sheet. Considering the gap between the actual primary balance and what is necessary 
to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio during the episode and its immediate aftermath (typically in the 
following two years), as is done here, avoids this difficulty. This approach has been followed by Baldacci 
et al. (2004). 
  65consolidation phase was unwound in the two following years. For one-fifth of all 
episodes, the CAPB deteriorated by more (as a per cent of potential GDP) than it 
improved during the consolidation phase. Perhaps not surprisingly, backtracking 
-- defined as the loss of a third of the consolidation gains or more within two years -- is 
more likely to occur when improvements in the CAPB during the preceding 
consolidation episode were small (Figure  4.5). In addition, backtracking is almost 
always associated with spending increases (Figure 4.5, lower panel).
18 
Over the past decade and a half, a large number of countries have introduced fiscal rules 
with the aim of containing the political economy mechanisms leading to excessive 
spending and deficits  (often referred to as “deficit bias”).
19 Rules can focus on 
spending, deficits or revenues and may, in part, be seen as a tool to better communicate 
to the public fiscal objectives and outcomes.
 Using simple bivariate analysis, however, 
there is no clear relationship across consolidation episodes between the existence of a 
fiscal rule and a number of fiscal indicators (the total change in the CAPB, the change 
in revenues or the amount of backtracking). This suggests that the relationship may be 
weak or that it can only be detected by controlling for the other aspects of the 
consolidation process already mentioned. 
                                                
4.3.  Identifying factors that support fiscal consolidation 
The econometric evidence presented in this section is aimed at identifying the influence 
of various factors (notably macroeconomic and fiscal conditions, the composition of the 
fiscal adjustments and the existence of fiscal rules) along several dimensions of the 
consolidation process. These include: the initiation of a consolidation spell; the size of 
consolidation; the duration of consolidation; and success in reaching debt sustainability. 
The role fiscal rules have made to these various dimensions of consolidation is 
discussed separately.
20 The following sub-sections cover each of these four aspects in 
turn and Table 4.1, where the econometric results are synthesized, will be used as a 
guide to the discussion.
21 
Factors prompting and influencing the size and intensity of consolidations 
Econometric analysis confirms that the initial budget balance has played a significant 
role in kicking off consolidation (Table 4.1, column (1) marked “probability to start”).
22 
For example, a cyclically-adjusted primary deficit of 2% of (potential) GDP is 
 
18 Consolidation episodes relying on tax increases that were partially offset by higher spending during the 
episode were on average characterised by smaller improvements in the CAPB, shorter duration and more 
backtracking. 
19 For an overview on the sources of “deficit bias”, see von Hagen (2002). Also relevant are Rogoff and 
Silbert (1988); Persson and Tabellini (2000); Shi and Svensson (2002); and Alesina and Tabellini (2005). 
20 In the estimated equations, fiscal rules are accounted for by four dummy variables, representing the 
existence of a budget rule supplemented by an expenditure rule; the existence of a budget rule not 
supplemented by an expenditure rule; euro area countries during the qualification phase to the euro; and 
euro area countries under the Stability and Growth Pact. 
21 The results presented in Table 4.1 represent the final specifications following a general to specific 
procedure to identify the relevant explanatory variables. 
22 However, high debt levels were not found to increase the likelihood of starting a fiscal consolidation 
exercise. 
  66associated with a 13 percentage point higher probability of initiating consolidation than 
a balanced primary budget (Figure 4.6).
23 
There is weak econometric evidence that this effect can be compounded by higher long-
term interest rates (relative to an international reference level). One interpretation is that 
when the potential gain in terms of falling interest rates is high, consolidation becomes 
more attractive. Indeed, the fall in interest spreads through the 1990s in a number of 
cases appears to have led to a more relaxed primary budget stance (see Appendix I).  
Figure 4.51  Comparison of consolidation episodes with and without backtracking 
Episodes followed by backtracking
Episodes followed by little or no backtracking
Expenditure and revenue changes subsequent to 
consolidation
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Note: The budget concept referred to is the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance. An episode is 
followed by backtracking if more than 30% of the improvement in the cyclically-adjusted primary budget 
balance during the episode is lost in the two years following the end of the episode. 
Source: OECD calculations. 
                                                 
23  All other variables are evaluated at their mean. 
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Table 4.1  Summary of the main results: parameter estimates 














reach a primary 
balance that 
stabilises debt
Year before the episode started
Cyclically adjusted primary balance -0.046****  -0.567**** -0.594** 0.187****
(-6.54) (-4.92)    (-1.78) (4.14)
Gap to primary balance sufficient to stabilise debt 0.195****
(actual-target) (3.47)
Long term interest rates 0.010* 0.199**  0.078***
( domestic rate - foreign reference ) (1.88) (2.43)    (3.41)
Output gap  -0.113* 0.061** 0.079* -0.127**
(actual-potential) (-1.66) (2.54) (1.89)    (-2.37)
Elections 0.140***
(dummy taking the value 1 on election years) (3.12)
Composition of the adjustment
(1)
Share of primary current expenditure cuts 2.289****
(4.42)   
Share of social spending cuts 1.191***
(3.09)
Share of public investment cuts  -0.919** -0.758**
(-2.23) (-2.56)   
Share of direct tax increases -0.180**
(-2.27)   
Other




Expenditure rule and budget balance rule 1.493** -1.001****   0.586**
(2.07)    (-3.35)    (2.08)
Euro countries 1992-97 0.2556****
(3.57)
Euro countries 1998-2005 0.979*
(1.84)
O b s e r v a t i o n s 3 7 27 3 7 32 2 5 6 4
R




2 for probit; adjusted R
2 for pooled regressions. 
Reported coefficients for the probit equations (col 1 and 5) are the marginal effects (i.e., impact of the 
change of the explanatoty variable by one unit). 
Numbers in brackets are the t-statistics. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%, **** 0.1%.                    
Constants are not reported. Coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio (used to account for the sample 
selection biais in the size and intensity regressions) are not reported. 
(1) Share of each budget item in the improvement of the primary balance over the entire episode or time-
varying with duration in the probability-to-stop regression. 
(2) Elapsed time of consolidation in the probability-to-stop regression (a parameter value exceeding one 
indicates that the likelihood that the episode ends increases with its duration). Total length of the episode 
in the probability-to-reach regression. 
Source: OECD calculations.      










Initial budget balance = 0 (2) Initial budget balance = -2%
of GDP
Initial budget balance = -2%
of GDP and higher interest
rates (3)
Initial budget balance = -2%
of GDP and country aiming
to qualify for future euro
area membership
Probability to start consolidation, %
Effect of future euro area membership
Effect from higher interest rates
 
Notes: 
(1) Based on pooled probit analysis across 24 OECD countries and over the period 1978-2003 (equation 
shown in the first column of Table 4.1). Probabilities are evaluated at sample means for all other variables 
entering the estimated equation. 
(2) Measured by the cyclically-adjusted primary balance. 
(3) Interest rate gap to international reference is 300 basis point higher. 
Source: OECD calculations. 
 
There is no evidence that the size of the output gap played a significant role in 
triggering consolidation episodes.
24 Elections, on the other hand, have played a 
significant role: the probability of undertaking consolidation rose just after a general 
election suggesting that governments are more ready to start consolidation once a full 
legislative term lies ahead. In addition, in contrast with earlier research (Buti and van 
den Noord, 2004) suggesting that upcoming elections produce slippage in European 
countries, no support for the traditional “political cycle” was found for this broader set 
of countries: the probability of entering a phase of fiscal consolidation did not 
significantly fall just before a general election. 
Turning to the size of fiscal consolidation (column (2) labelled “size of adjustment” in 
Table  4.1), the analysis confirms again the significant role of initial budgetary 
conditions. The higher the initial primary deficit, the larger was the overall 
consolidation that was achieved over a consolidation episode. Similarly, the size of 
fiscal consolidation was also larger when interest rates were relatively high.
25 There is 
some suggestive evidence that this is also the case when initial activity was weak. 
                                                 
24 However, running the same type of regressions on episodes of fiscal expansion (defined exactly as the 
opposite of fiscal consolidation), it turned out that the probability of starting a fiscal expansion increased 
when the output gap is positive (results not reported here). Intermediate results also showed, in line with 
Ahrend et al. (2006a) that a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate can contribute to triggering a 
fiscal consolidation episode (but data availability reduces the size of the sample by about half).  
25 Similar results were obtained using the unemployment gap (difference between the unemployment rate 
and the structural unemployment rate (NAIRU)) rather than the output gap. The gaps used are ex post due 
to limited availability of real time data. 
  69More relevant for policy design are the respective roles played by expenditure- as 
against revenue-based consolidation. The size of the fiscal adjustment increased when 
episodes were driven by cuts in primary current expenditures. In alternative 
specifications (not shown), a heavy weight on individual current expenditure items 
(public consumption and social transfers) was also found to have a significant positive 
impact on the magnitude of the consolidation achieved
26. 
The “intensity of the adjustment” (consolidation per year, column (3)) was also affected 
by various macroeconomic developments. A larger initial deficit and higher long-term 
interest rates were associated with an increased intensity of adjustment. Weak activity at 
the outset, while increasing the size of consolidation, seems to reduce the intensity of 
effort: intense efforts are difficult when the economy is weak, making the adjustment 
more drawn out. Consolidation efforts based on public investment cuts have also tended 
to be less intense. 
Factors affecting the length of consolidation episodes 
A larger initial deficit was associated with a longer consolidation period (column (4) 
labelled “probability to stop consolidation” in Table  4.1). As suggested above, the 
probability of ending a consolidation period was also lower if it was initiated at the time 
of a large negative output gap. Perhaps not surprisingly, the longer a period of 
consolidation has been underway, the more likely it was to come to an end. Long efforts 
are likely to lead to adjustment fatigue.
27 Another possible interpretation is that the 
longer an episode lasts the larger the likely cumulated adjustment and accordingly the 
chance that successful consolidation will have been achieved. 
As concerns the instruments of consolidation, a large share of direct tax increases and 
public investment cuts raised the likelihood that a consolidation period would continue. 
These results are open to different interpretations. One such, suggested in previous 
research, is that it may reflect that some countries relied on “switching strategies” (von 
Hagen et al., 2002a), meaning that the government starts fiscal consolidation by raising 
taxes and/or cutting investment and then, subsequently, moves on to a broader strategy 
which would involve reducing current spending (which is more politically sensitive and 
takes more time to implement).  
Factors contributing to success in reaching debt sustainability 
An episode of consolidation begun under weak economic activity had a higher 
probability of success in the sense of reaching debt sustainability (Table 4.1, column 
5)). This may reflect the effect of weak initial conditions in terms of boosting the 
overall size of consolidation, as discussed above. 
Turning to the composition of consolidation, a greater weight on cuts in social spending 
tended to increase the chances of success. A reason for this could be that governments 
more committed to achieving fiscal sustainability may also be more likely to reform 
politically sensitive areas. As a by-product of doing so, they may at the same time 
                                                 
26 Kumar et al. (2006) also found a larger impact on primary balances of reductions in cyclically adjusted 
primary expenditure than revenues. 
27 This effect might be more pronounced than the estimates suggest, as uncontrolled sample 
heterogeneity tends to bias empirical hazards downwards (towards “negative duration dependence”). 
  70bolster the credibility of the consolidation strategy, thereby improving its chances of 
success.  
The longer an episode lasted the higher was the probability that it would achieve 
success. Taken together with the previously discussed positive relationship between 
stopping consolidation and duration this is consistent with the interpretation that long 
episodes are frequently terminated because they have achieved success. 
The econometric evidence on the role of fiscal rules 
Fiscal rules, in particular those that have expenditures as a focus (Table  4.2), are 
estimated to have affected several dimensions of fiscal consolidation. Differentiating 
budget balance rules according to whether they are combined with expenditure rules or 
not, it appears that the former have a more favourable effect on consolidation outcomes. 
The size of fiscal consolidation was significantly larger and the consolidation efforts 
sustained for longer when such rules were present. The results also indicate that 
adoption of a spending rule on top of a budget balance rule helped in the achievement 
and maintenance of a primary balance that was sufficient to stabilise the debt-to-GDP 
ratio.
28 
The finding that expenditure rules were an important ingredient in the success of a 
consolidation episode has intuitive appeal given the fact that most backtrackings in the 
sample studied here occurred on the spending side. The estimates may, however, also 
just reflect that countries supplementing the objective to achieve fiscal balance with 
expenditure rules are in general more committed to pursuing fiscal consolidation, and in 
particular to addressing issues regarding spending control (Wierts, 2007). 
Developments in the euro area illustrate a couple of important points about the rules and 
their relationship to the consolidation process. During the run up to the introduction of 
the euro (1992 to 1997), countries were found to have been much more likely to initiate 
consolidation (Table 4.1, first column). Indeed, our estimates suggest that the 
probability of undertaking a consolidation exercise more than doubled with the prospect 






                                                 
28 The European Commission has built some indicators of rules characteristics that focus on their 
“strength”; see European Commission (2006a) and Ayuso-i-Casals et al., (2006). The strongest rules have 
a constitutional base with no margin for adjusting the objectives, are monitored and enforced by 
independent authorities, include automatic correction and sanction mechanisms in case of non compliance 
and are closely monitored by the media. This work shows that, in Europe at least, strong national rules are 
usually associated with better fiscal outcomes and the characteristics that seem to matter most are the 
statutory base of the rule, the body in charge of enforcement (independent authority, government, etc.) 
and the enforcement mechanism (including the role of sanctions). See also Kennedy et al. (2001) and 
Mills et al. (2001).  
  71Table 4.2  Main fiscal rules currently applied in OECD countries 
Characteristics of the set of rules









Australia Charter of Budget Honesty (1998) yes no no no
Austria Stability and Growth Pact (1997) yes no no no
Domestic 
Stability Pact (2000)
Belgium Stability and Growth Pact (1997) yes no yes no
National budget rule (2000)
Canada Debt repayment plan (1998) yes no yes no
Czech republic Stability and Growth Pact (2004)  yes yes no no
Law on budgetary rules (2004)
Denmark Medium term fiscal strategy (1998) yes yes no no
Finland Stability and Growth Pact (1997) yes yes no no
Spending limits (1991, revised in 1995 
France Stability and Growth Pact (1997) yes yes Since 2006 no
Central government expenditure ceiling 
Germany Stability and Growth Pact (1997) yes yes no yes
Domestic Stability Pact (2002)
Greece Stability and Growth Pact (1997) yes no no no
Hungary Stability and Growth Pact (2004) yes no no no
Ireland Stability and Growth Pact (1997) yes no no no
Italy Stability and Growth Pact (1997) yes yes no no
Nominal ceiling on expenditure growth 
Japan Cabinet decision on the Medium term 
fiscal perspective (2002)
yes yes no no
Luxembourg Stability and Growth Pact (1997) yes no no no
Coalition agreement  on expenditure 
ceiling (1999, 2004)   
Mexico
Budget and fiscal responsibility law 
(2006)
yes no yes no
Netherlands Stability and Growth Pact (1997) yes yes yes no
Coalition agreement on multiyear 
expenditure targets (1994, revised in 
2003)
New Zealand Fiscal responsibility act (1994) yes yes no no
Norway Fiscal Stability guidelines (2001) yes no yes no
Poland Stability and Growth Pact (2004) yes no no no
Act on Public Finance (1999) 
Portugal Stability and Growth Pact (1997) yes no no no
Slovak Republic Stability and Growth Pact (2004) yes no no no
Spain Stability and Growth Pact (1997) yes no no no
Fiscal Stability Law (2001, revised in 
Sweden
Fiscal budget act (1996, revised in 
1999)
yes yes no no
Switzerland Debt containment rule (2001, but in 
force since 2003)
yes yes yes no
United Kingdom Code for fiscal stability (1998) yes no no yes
Source: OECD calculations.       
  
Source: OECD calculations 
  72This finding is consistent with other work which shows that during the run-up phase to 
the introduction of the euro EU governments consolidated during election years (Buti 
and van  den  Noord, 2004; and von Hagen, 2006). The Maastricht Treaty’s well-
publicised requirements made very clear the need for fiscal consolidation at the same 
time as the benefits of adopting the euro were perceived to be very significant, both by 
policymakers and the public, as were the disadvantages in the case of failure. In the 
period since the introduction of the single currency, however, membership in the euro 
area has only had a weakly significant effect on intensity.  
4.4.  Experience regarding the design and implementation of fiscal rules 
To pursue further the discussion of the extent to which key features of fiscal rules 
influence their effectiveness, this section reviews specific cases in which fiscal rules did 
-– or did not -– work. Particular attention is paid to issues of design, implementation, 
and the degree of flexibility to deal with shocks or changing macroeconomic conditions. 
Issues in designing fiscal rules 
On design, it is useful to start the discussion with a simple comparison between budget 
balance rules that are combined with expenditure rules and those which are not. 
Historical observation is consistent with the regression results in suggesting that in 
general budget-balance rules that are not combined with expenditure rules are less 
effective. A striking example of this is the United States experience: neither the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act of 1985 nor its revised version in 1987 succeeded in 
significantly reducing the fiscal deficit.
29 A further example is the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP), which has not so far led to sustainable positions being attained, notably in 
large EU countries. On the other hand, when the United States turned to an expenditure-
based rule, the Budget Enforcement Act (1990-2002),
30 a surplus was achieved and 
maintained for a time. Some EU countries (e.g. Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Finland 
and Czech Republic) supplemented the SGP by national rules (in most cases including 
some expenditure ceilings) and also enjoyed success. There were, however, some 
failures. For instance, after France introduced multi-year objectives for real government 
expenditure in 1998, its structural fiscal position deteriorated continuously until 2003, at 
which time it came under the European excessive deficit procedure.
31  
There is no one-size-fits-all rule applicable to every country but there seems to be a 
consensus that, to be effective, rules should have several features. In particular, they 
should be simple to manage, understand and monitor, while flexible enough to respond 
to the cycle. Against this background, there are several features of expenditure rules that 
                                                 
29 The GRH act was a budget balance rule (which targeted a balanced budget within six years). A key 
feature of GRH was that, in the absence of an agreement on how to reach the deficit targets, the rule was 
to be enforced by sequestration in spending programmes. It was abandoned in 1990 when the 
combination of the absence of ex ante consensus on spending cuts and overly optimistic budgetary 
projection resulted in sequestrations that were very large and politically not feasible. 
30 The Budget Enforcement Act consisted of caps on discretionary spending (in nominal terms) and pay-
as-you-go rules stating that new discretionary spending, excluding social security or revenue laws had to 
be budget neutral. 
31 Most of the slippage came from the social security and government sectors (Moulin, 2004). France was 
subsequently able to reduce its deficit to below 3% in 2005 and the excessive deficit procedure against 
France was abrogated in January 2007. 
  73can explain why they have often been associated with success: not only do they exclude 
cyclically volatile revenues but they can be (and often are) designed to let economic 
stabilisers work in a downturn and to save windfall gains during an upturn (Anderson 
and Minarik, 2006);
 they are typically more transparent than all but the simplest budget 
balance rule; they allow spending ministers/ministries to be held accountable (Atkinson 
and van den Noord, 2001); and they make the availability of financial resources 
predictable for policymakers and programme managers. 
An important issue in designing fiscal rules is their possible impact on the quality of 
public expenditure. Both expenditure rules covering total spending and budget balance 
rules can potentially cause allocative inefficiencies by biasing spending towards items 
that are politically sensitive and difficult to cut (Sutherland et al., 2005). Typically 
governments have responded by excluding some capital items from overall spending (as 
done notably by Golden rules as in the United Kingdom and Germany), but this may 
make the rule more difficult to monitor as well as easier to circumvent. Moreover, there 
is an element of arbitrariness in excluding physical investment from the rule but not 
current spending with investment attributes, such as spending on education. 
The time period over which the target is to be met is also important, not least in 
providing flexibility to deal with cyclical fluctuations. Although enforcing the rule on a 
year-by-year basis appears strict, many countries do just that, with varying degrees of 
success. Switzerland is an example of a country combining year-by-year enforcement 
with cyclical flexibility by targeting a balanced budget in cyclically-adjusted terms. The 
United Kingdom pursues another approach: its budget-balance rule
32 holds over the 
business cycle. Such a procedure, however, provides less accurate short-term guidance. 
As well, rules defined over the cycle or embodying some kind of cyclical adjustment 
require a subjective
33 assessment to be made about the cycle’s start and end dates and/or 
the size of the output gap, which (together with data revisions) creates a degree of 
uncertainty about whether or not the rule was (or will be) met. The same objections 
apply to rules such as the SGP that allow normal procedures to be waived in conditions 
of pronounced cyclical weakness. 
National fiscal rules are, in most countries, complemented by a wide variety of rules at 
sub-national levels. Such rules have a long history in several countries. With the trend 
to greater decentralisation of fiscal responsibilities in most OECD countries, rules for 
sub-national government have been seen as an important mechanism to reap the 
efficiency gains accruing from local autonomy while maintaining or establishing fiscal 
rectitude. As a result, rules have been set or strengthened at sub-national levels in most 
countries.
34 In particular, several European countries have aligned domestic fiscal rules 
for sub-national governments with their supra-national commitments by setting up 
domestic stability pacts. 
 
                                                 
32 There are two rules, one stating that government borrowing will fund only net fixed investment, not 
current expenditures; and one that requires that the ratio of net debt to GDP be held stable at a prudent 
level. 
33  While it would be possible to put in place an objective rule for dating the cycle, the method that the 
UK Treasury uses is a subjective “broad assessment of the available information”. At present there is no 
requirement for the Treasury’s assumptions about the timing of the economic cycle to be audited. 
34 Sutherland et al. (2005) provide a description of these rules and a discussion of the issues related to 
their design. 
  74Implementing rules 
To be effective rules must be enforced, but experience gives conflicting examples of the 
rigour with which rules should be implemented.
35 The Stability and Growth Pact, the 
1997 fiscal consolidation programme in Japan, and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act in 
the United States all reached a stage where the economic and political costs of following 
the rule rigidly were perceived as too high. However, Sweden, the Netherlands as well 
the United States (under the Budget Enforcement Act 1990-2002)
36 are cases where 
rigid rules were quite effective in supporting consolidation and without negative 
economic consequences. New Zealand, Canada and Australia, on the other hand, 
provide examples where governments achieved fiscal consolidations under quite 
flexible rules.
37 
In many successful cases, rules were reinforced by establishing a framework which had 
a strong reporting system and mechanisms that increased the political cost of breaching 
the rules (New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom, in particular). Ex post 
assessment is very important in the United Kingdom, Belgium,
38 Netherlands, Sweden, 
Australia and New Zealand. Most successful frameworks also stress the need to rely on 
prudent budget assumptions. As well, there are several cases in which successful rules 
followed the setup of new budgeting frameworks and changes to public-sector 
management that fostered increased accountability and efficiency (New Zealand, 
Australia, Sweden and the United Kingdom). More generally, and more difficult to 
influence, there seems to be differences across countries in the weight electorates give 
to the respect of rules and the extent of private-sector monitoring and discussion of 
fiscal performances. 
Adapting rules to changing circumstances 
Allowing rules to evolve in the light of progress in consolidation or a changing 
macroeconomic environment is often a necessary but tricky condition of success. For 
instance, in Canada (the only G7 country to have been able to keep net debt on a 
sustained downward trend), fiscal consolidation started in 1993 under legislation 
capping programme spending (self-financing programmes were excluded). As spending 
always remained below the ceilings, the rule was abandoned in 1995 and replaced by a 
contingency reserve within a prudent budget that could be used for debt reduction if not 
needed; this framework was replaced in 1998 by the “balanced or better budget policy” 
combined with a debt repayment plan: surpluses are used to pay down debt and 
                                                 
35 The European Commission has built some indicators of rules characteristics that focus on their 
“strength”; see European Commission (2006a) and Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2006). The strongest rules have 
a constitutional base with no margin for adjusting the objectives, are monitored and enforced by 
independent authorities, include automatic correction and sanction mechanisms in case of non compliance 
and are closely monitored by the media. This work shows that, in Europe at least, strong national rules are 
usually associated with better fiscal outcomes and the characteristics that seem to matter most are the 
statutory base of the rule, the body in charge of enforcement (independent authority, government, etc.) 
and the enforcement mechanism (including the role of sanctions). 
36 It included escape clauses, however, which were used extensively at the turn of the century. 
37 In New Zealand, for instance, principles of responsible fiscal management are legislated but not the 
targets; the government is required to set its short-term targets (usually revised from one year to the next) 
as well as its long-term intentions for a range of fiscal variables. In these countries there are no legislated 
mechanisms of sanction and correction in case of non compliance. 
38 The Federal Planning Bureau in Belgium has played a key role in fiscal consolidation by producing  
independent, politically neutral short-term macroeconomic projections (Bogaert et al. 2006). 
  75associated reductions in interest payments to lower taxes. Switzerland was successful in 
improving its fiscal position from 1999 to 2001, using a budget balance rule. Later on, 
however, the framework was modified to include expenditure targets. In attempting to 
make the SGP more effective, the European Commission and the Council have focused 
on cyclically adjusted balances in order to permit more flexibility in the enforcement 
mechanisms;
39 the jury is still out on the outcomes. Spain has also recently reformed its 
Fiscal Stability Law to take into account the cyclical position of the economy. 
Countries whose revenues are sensitive to terms-of-trade changes (not least oil 
producers like Mexico and Norway) have found it useful to establish stabilisation funds 
to deal with the windfall gains. These funds serve a number of purposes, including 
transmitting resource wealth to future generations, stabilising the exchange rate and 
shielding the economy from overheating due to excessive spending. Even countries that 
are less endowed with natural resources have found it helpful to set up similar 
mechanisms to deal with revenue windfalls such as “rainy day funds” or ex-ante rules 
establishing the share of revenue windfall to be used to reduce debt or saved (Belgium 
or more recently France).
 40  Such mechanisms can usefully complement fiscal rules by 
securing surpluses that arise during good times (Mills and Quinet, 2001). 
Transparency is a crucial feature of any successful rule. If the public understands why 
an action is being taken (and is convinced of its necessity), that greatly increases the 
likelihood of the associated rule being successful and sustained. As well, temporary 
departures from a rule need not be damaging if they can be explained convincingly 
(Hemming and Kell, 2001). This could be reinforced where rules are subject to 
independent verification. 
4.5.  Summary of the results 
To summarise, major findings of this analysis are: 
•  Large initial deficits and high interest rates have been important in prompting 
fiscal adjustment and also boosting the overall size and duration of 
consolidation. These results may reflect that public awareness of fiscal 
problems and needs can help in overcoming resistance to consolidation, a 
hypothesis which is also supported by the observation that qualification for 
euro area membership significantly increased the probability of starting 
consolidation. The policy implication would be that consolidation may be 
helped by the provision of transparent information and analysis of the fiscal 
situation. 
                                                 
39  This provides flexibility to the excessive deficit procedure if the excess of the budget deficit over the  
threshold of 3% of GDP appears small and temporary. Account will then be taken of any factor 
deemed relevant, including cyclical conditions, debt sustainability and implementation of structural 
policies that enhance growth potential and long-term sustainability of public finance. 
40  In Belgium unexpected tax revenues or surplus from lower than expected spending have been used to 
pay down national debt. In France, since 2006, the government has been required to define how 
possible differences between actual and predicted revenues would be allocated in the annual budget 
law.  
  76•  An emphasis on cutting current expenditures has been associated with overall 
larger consolidation. This could be because expenditure cuts, as opposed to 
revenue increases, are more likely to trigger lower interest rates and a 
sympathetic response of private saving, helping to bolster activity. But it could 
also reflect that governments more determined to consolidate are more willing 
to cut current expenditures, possibly thereby also demonstrating a commitment 
that makes substantial consolidation more feasible. 
•  Fiscal rules with embedded expenditure targets tended to be associated with 
larger and longer adjustments, and higher success rates. This could in principle 
reflect that well designed fiscal rules are effective or, alternatively, that 
governments committed to prudent fiscal management are more likely to 
institute a rule. 
•  Fiscal rules need to be adapted to country specific institutions and political 
systems, but, based on experience across countries, certain common design 
features seem important for their effectiveness. These include the need to 
combine transparency with sufficient flexibility to face cyclical (and other) 
shocks, a wide coverage across various budget items and effective enforcement 
mechanisms. 
  77Appendix I: The effect on debt of the fall in real interest rates 
In most OECD countries interest rates have declined substantially since the first half of 
the 1990s. In the United States, Japan and the euro area, long-term bond rates dropped 
between 1991 and 2005 by 3.6, 5.0, and 6.7 percentage points, respectively, which is 
reflected in a similar decline in the implicit interest rate on general government financial 
liabilities. Major factors that are likely to have impacted on the fall in interest rates are 
(Ahrend et al., 2006b): 
•  Inflation has remained low over several years and has also shown resistance to 
external shocks, most recently due to the large oil price hikes. Globalisation 
has also contributed to the low-inflation environment (Pain et al., 2006). 
•  Inflation expectations seem to have been better anchored. This likely reflects 
improved monetary policy credibility leading to lower term-premiums. 
•  For industrialised economies, notably the United States, aggregate domestic net 
dissaving appears to have been more than offset by high ex ante net saving 
from emerging market economies (notably those in Asia and, more recently, oil 
exporting countries). 
•  For euro area countries these factors have been reinforced by interest rate 
convergence towards the lower German level in the transition phase to 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
To illustrate the impact of the decline in the differential between interest rates and GDP 
growth rates, experienced over the past one and a half decades, on general government 
finances, Figure 4.7 shows the evolution of general government net financial liabilities 
that would have prevailed if effective interest rates on general government debt (implicit 
rates) had remained at the levels prevailing at the beginning of the 1990s (average rate 
over 1991 to 1993), leaving non-interest spending and nominal GDP on their observed 
paths.
 41 
The outcome illustrates the substantial impact that the fall in debt servicing costs has 
exercised on fiscal consolidation. The impact might be even larger than illustrated 
taking into consideration the positive impact falling real interest rates have on real GDP 
growth.
42 For about 38% of the countries government net financial liabilities in terms of 
GDP would be higher by a third or more if interest rates had not fallen from their level 
at the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, some 23% of the countries for which the net 
debt-to-GDP ratios declined over the last one and a half decades would have 
experienced rising debt ratios instead. 
                                                 
41 Net financial liabilities are defined as gross financial liabilities net of financial assets. In the simulations 
it is assumed that both liabilities and assets are subject to the same interest rate. The latter is given by the 
implicit interest rate on government financial liabilities -- general government interest payments divided 
by general government gross financial liabilities -- averaged over the first three years under consideration. 
The size of stock-flow adjustments has also been left unchanged in the simulations. 
42 On the other hand, one might argue that a counter-factual setting in which interest rates are assumed to 
remain constant would correspond to an environment with inflation exceeding observed inflation rates, 
which in turn would be reflected in higher nominal GDP growth. 
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  79   Figure 4.7 (cont.)  The evolution of general government debt-to-GDP ratios  
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Going forward, the opportunities for consolidation presented by the fall in inflation and 
interest rates over the past one and a half decades or so are unlikely to repeat 
themselves. This reinforces the need to step up consolidation efforts, against the 














  82Appendix II: Background information on methodology 
Definition of the main variables 
Macroeconomic and fiscal variables 
Fiscal and macroeconomic variables all come from the OECD’s Economic Outlook 80 
database.
43 A fiscal consolidation episode is defined in Box 1 in the main text. The 
duration of a fiscal consolidation episode is measured by the number of years that 
elapses between the start (first year) and the end (last year) of an episode according to 
the criterion given in Box 1. According to this criterion the following consolidation 
episodes were extracted: 
  Australia  1979-80, 1986-88, 1994-99, 2002-03 
  Austria  1981, 1984-85, 1992, 1996-97, 2001 
 Belgium  1993-98 
  Canada  1981, 1986-88, 1993-97 
 Denmark  1983-86;  1996-99 
  Finland  1981, 1984, 1988-89, 1994-98, 2000 
  France  1979-80, 1983-84, 1987, 1994-97 
  Federal Rep. of Germany  1981-85, 1989 
 Germany  1992-94,  1997-1999 
  Greece  1979-80, 1982-83, 1986-87, 1990-94, 1996, 1998 
 Iceland  1990-92,  1995-99 
  Ireland  1981-84, 1987-89, 1993-94, 2003-04 
  Italy  1980, 1982-83, 1990-93, 1995-97 
 Japan  1980-87,  1997,  2001 
  Korea  1981-82, 1993-95, 1999-2000 
 Luxembourg  1993-97,  2000 
  Netherlands  1981-85, 1991, 1993, 1996 
  Norway  1983, 1985-86, 1993-97, 1999-2000 
  New Zealand  1987, 1989, 1991-94, 2000-03 
  Portugal  1981-84, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1995, 2002-03 
  Spain  1983, 1986-87, 1992, 1994-97 
  Sweden  1979, 1981-87, 1994-2000 
 Switzerland  1994-95,  1999-2000 
  United Kingdom  1979-82, 1988, 1994-99 
  United States  1981, 1987-1989, 1993-98 
 
In addition, the following definitions apply: 
•  The size of fiscal consolidation is measured by the change in the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance as a percentage of potential GDP over the episode 
(final year of the episode minus the year before it starts) and the intensity is 
measured as the size divided by the length of the episode. 
•  The share of a budget expenditure item in the fiscal adjustment is defined as 
minus the difference of the relevant item as a percentage of GDP between the 
final year of the episode and the first year before the start of the episode 
                                                 
43   See OECD Economic Outlook Database Inventory, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/9/36462096.pdf 
  83divided by the difference in the primary balance as a percentage of GDP over 
the same period. For the duration analysis (the probability of stopping 
consolidation), the cumulative contribution of the relevant item is a time 
varying covariate over the duration of the episode. 
•  The share of a budget revenue item in the fiscal adjustment is defined as the 
difference of the relevant item as a percentage of GDP between the last year of 
the episode and the year before the start of the episode, all divided by the 
difference in the primary balance as a percentage of GDP over the same period. 
For the duration analysis, the cumulative contribution of the relevant item is a 
time varying covariate over the duration of the episode. 
•  For total and current primary expenditures and revenues, and for direct and 
indirect taxes, cyclically adjusted variables as a percentage of potential GDP 
(for both the numerator and the denominator) were used; for expenditure items 
where cyclically adjusted variables are not available the non-adjusted ones 
(both for the numerator and the denominator) were used. 
•  The primary balance (PB) that stabilises the debt to GDP ratio (PBO) is 
defined as: 
   PBO(t)/GDP(t) = -Debt(t-1)/GDP(t-1)*[1-(1+i(t)) / (1+g(t))]; 
where g(t) =GDPt/GDP(t-1)-1; 
and i(t) is defined as a moving average of the implicit interest rates on debt, in 
particular: 
   i  = (1/3)*ggintp[t-2]/ggfl[t-3]+(1/3)*ggintp[t-
1]/ggfl[t-2]+(1/3)*ggintp[t]/ggfl[t-1]; 
with ggfl being general government gross financial liabilities and ggintp the 
gross government interest payments. The gap to the primary balance sufficient 
to stabilise debt is defined as: 
   PB(t)/GDP(t)-PBO(t)/GDP(t). 
•  In defining the spread between the long-term interest rates and those in the 
reference country, Germany is used for European countries and the United 
States for the other countries. 
 
Dummy variables to capture fiscal rules and elections 
Two dummy variables were tested that reflect the existence, at least for some significant 
part of the general government sector, of (i) a budget balance rule defined as rules and 
targets for the fiscal deficit (cyclically adjusted or not) and (ii) a budget balance rule 
supplemented by an expenditure rule, defined as a rule and/or target that binds and 
controls expenditures in annual budgeting, such as expenditure ceilings and caps, and 
pay-as-you-go principles. These variables are rudimentary indicators as possible 
changes in the definition of the rule, obedience to the rule, or any characteristic of the 
  84rule (such as its legal base, sanctions implied, etc.) are not taken into account. Hence, 
the fact that the modalities of rules vary from one country to the other and change over 
time is not accounted for. The dummies are based on the cross-checking of several 
sources,
44 as well as on OECD country analysts’ expertise. When working on episodes, 
the dummies take the value 1 if the rule exists when the episode starts or is introduced 
very soon thereafter. 
For the regressions, it is the presence or not of a rule in the first year of the episode or 
soon after the episode started that is taken into account. Finally, two dummies are used 
to account for respectively the euro qualification contest (1992-97)
45 and the SGP 
period. 
Apart from the duration analysis, the election dummies are set to 1 if there is an election 
in the year preceding the start of the episode or after the start, respectively. In the 
duration analysis the dummy equals 1 if there is an election in the current year during 
the episode or, in an alternative regression, in the year following the current year. The 
information comes from national sites on elections results; the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA); and wikipedia.org. 
4.6.  Econometric techniques 
The aim is to analyse the key factors behind the different dimensions of fiscal 
consolidation episodes: the likelihood that such an episode occurs, the size and intensity 
of fiscal adjustment during an episode, the duration of the episode, and the probability 
of “success” of the episode in terms of the attainment of a primary balance sufficient to 
stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio and maintaining it stable for at least two years. Within 
each dimension the number of observations in the respective sample varies, as for some 
explanatory variables observations for early years are not available. For all parts of the 
econometric analysis, repeated consolidation spells occurring in one and the same 
country are treated as stochastically independent observations. Using a general to 
specific approach, the variables that were not significant were excluded so as to keep a 
preferred equation for each dimension. 
What factors trigger a consolidation episode? 
The model applied to generate the results shown in column 1 of Table 4.1 is a probit. 
The model was estimated on a pooled sample of 24 countries. For each year of the 
pooled sample the information of whether or not a consolidation episode commenced 
-- according to the criterion for the variation in the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(CAPB) as set out in Box  1 in the main text  -- was utilised for the estimator. 
Observations (years by country) on ongoing consolidation episodes were dropped. A 
positive coefficient in column 1 of Table 4.1 indicates that the respective explanatory 
variable will raise the likelihood of a consolidation episode starting. 
                                                 
44 Deroose et al. (2006); European Commission (2003 and 2006a) ; Fischer (2005); Gruen and Sayegh 
(2005); von Hagen (2006); IMF (2005); Janssen (2001); Joumard et al. (2004); Kennedy et al. (2001); 
Moulin (2004); Poterba (1997); and Tanaka (2005). 
45  For Greece since 1999. 
  85What affects the size and “intensity” of consolidation achieved over a consolidation 
episode? 
The model that generates the estimates of columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.1 is a linear 
regression model in which the change in the CAPB as a per cent of potential GDP over 
the consolidation episode (in column 3 it is the change per unit of time) is regressed on 
a set of explanatory variables. The sample consists of a maximum of 80 episodes that 
occurred among the 24 countries under consideration. “Censored” episodes that were 
not completed in the last year of the sample span (2005) were excluded. The within-
sample probability distribution of the dependent variable is truncated from below as the 
observations on the CAPB are subject to the selection criterion defining the start of a 
consolidation period, as described in Box  1 in the main text. To arrive at unbiased 
parameter estimates a two step procedure has been applied that utilises the outcome 
from the probit model described in the preceding paragraph (first step) in a generalised 
least squares regression of the change in the CAPB on a set of explanatory variables and 
a correction term (second step).
46 
More specifically, the regression equation is given by: 
  C =   α Y  + Ĝδ  + ε , 
with 
  C =     dependent variable 
 Y  =    explanatory  variables 








  δ α,     parameters to be estimated, 
       parameter estimates from the probit model  β ˆ
  ε      error  term 
  , ϕ  φ   density and distribution function of the normal distribution. 
The parametersα ,δ  are estimated using generalised least squares as the approach 
generates heteroscedastic residuals. 
What influences the duration of consolidation episodes? 
The model that generates the estimates in column 4 of Table 4.1 is a hazard rate model, 
the hazard rate denoting the exit rate from a consolidation episode, conditional on the 
episode having not terminated earlier.
47 The model estimates the impact of a set of 
explanatory variables, Z, on the likelihood of terminating a consolidation episode. The 
sample comprises the duration of the consolidation episodes under consideration, 
measured in years. The estimated duration distribution is Weibull, with hazard 
                                                 
46 For econometric details, see e.g. Maddala (1985). 
47For econometric detail see e.g. Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980). In the analysis at hand durations are 
measured in terms of discrete one-year intervals. For detail on grouping see Wurzel (1988). Earlier 
application of duration analysis to fiscal consolidation episodes can be found in von Hagen et al. (2002); 
Gupta et al. (2003); and Maroto-Illera and Mulas-Granados (2001). 
  86   h(d)  =  νρ d  1 − ρ , 
where  d denotes duration,  ν ρ,  parameters and ν  = exp( λ Z ) (proportional hazard 
specification), where λ  measures the impact of the explanatory variables on the 
duration of the episodes. To the extent explanatory variables take on different values 
over the consolidation episode, the exit rate is conditional on the entire path of the 
explanatory variables over time, up to the period prior of exit. A positive λ  coefficient 
indicates that a higher value of the explanatory variable increases the likelihood of 
terminating the episode (given its elapsed duration) or equivalently that the episode is 
likely to last shorter. For ρ >1 the likelihood of terminating a consolidation episode 
increases with the duration of the episode.  
What influences whether consolidation suffices to stabilise debt? 
The model that generates the estimates depicted in column 5 of Table 4.1 is again a 
probit. For each consolidation episode in the sample, the information is used of whether 
or not a consolidation episode is “successful” in attaining a primary surplus that at least 
stabilises debt during the consolidation episode and maintaining it during the following 
two years. 
  87Discussion 
Ludger Schuknecht∗ 
Some normative priors 
I would like to start my comment on this impressive paper by pointing to some 
conceptual and normative priors on fiscal consolidation. There has been significant 
theoretical and empirical research in recent years by economists from international 
organisations and academia in the domain of fiscal consolidation and sustainability. 
This has forged a broad normative consensus on the appropriate course of fiscal policies 
and the way to achieve it.
48 
First, sound fiscal policies aim to attain sustainable public finances which are good for 
growth, stability and cohesion in Europe.  
Second, if sound fiscal policies are achieved or an appropriate strategy towards such a 
position is in place, automatic stabilisers (rather than discretionary policies) should 
contribute to economic stabilisation. 
Third, fiscal consolidation and reform towards sustainability are best conducted as part 
of a medium term-oriented, ambitious and comprehensive strategy that emphasizes 
expenditure restraint and supply-side incentives so as boost confidence and growth. 
Fourth, consolidation should be accompanied by reforms of fiscal institutions that 
subject fiscal policies to spending and deficit constraints and a medium term budgetary 
framework. 
These principles are also embedded in the EU’s institutional framework, notably the 
Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon process. They have been reconfirmed in 
recent communication by the Eurogroup (spring 2007) and the ECOFIN Council 
(autumn 2007). 
Coverage and findings of the study are convincing 
When looking at Guichard, Kennedy, Wurzel and Andre (GKWA) from this 
perspective, the paper indeed covers an enormous ground. The paper defines 
consolidation episodes and assesses their contribution to fiscal sustainability, i.e., the 
stabilisation of the debt ratio. It analyses whether episodes were ambitious, over which 
time horizon they were undertaken and whether they were expenditure-based. It also 
looks at the role of fiscal rules and institutions.  
The results strongly support the above-mentioned principles comprising the policy 
consensus. The study finds that sustainability risks (as measured by fiscal imbalances  
                                                 
∗ The views expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB. 
48 European Commission Public Finance Reports of all recent vintages and the recent sustainability report 
(European Commission, 2006b) provide an excellent overview of fiscal developments, analytical issues 
and policy implications in this debate. See also OECD (2006). The ECB Monthly Bulletin article from 
February 2007 provides a short overview (ECB, 2007). There are numerous authored studies which are 
quoted in these reports. 
  88and interest rates) support the initiation of consolidation episodes, as well as their 
ambition and duration. Expenditure restraint and high-quality rules and institutions 
enhance the duration and ambition of consolidation. Especially the duration affects the 
“success” of consolidation in terms of supporting sustainability. 
Some small “quibbles” 
Given the overall very informative and convincing picture, I only want to add a few 
quibbles. First, the definition of consolidation episodes includes a large number of short 
episodes. They are identified on the basis of changes in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (CAPB) which is prone to significant measurement problems especially in the 
short run. Temporary measures and special factors are not excluded from this measure. 
Tax-rich/demand-based growth with significant revenue windfalls may result in an 
improved CAPB (or consolidation). This may lead to the identification of a 
consolidation episode when there was none or the omission of its identification when in 
fact consolidation was undertaken. 
Short episodes can also only capture the “numerator” effect of consolidation. Non-
supply-side effects of fiscal reform that improve deficit and debt ratios via the 
denominator only fully become effective over time. 
Second, the study does not cover the whole dimension of complementarity and growth-
friendliness of reforms. This is not a fair criticism as the coverage within the space of a 
paper (rather than a book) is already enormous. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing to this 
rather prevalent problem in the literature. A complement to the GKWA study in this 
regard is Hauptmeier et al. (2007). They undertake a number of case studies of medium-
term oriented comprehensive reform packages that focus on the expenditure side of 
budgets.  
My third point relates to the definition of sustainability. I wonder whether the criterion 
of “debt stabilisation” is strict enough, given significant implicit and contingent 
liabilities in most OECD countries. 
Further research 
The study also touches on a number of issues that warrant considerable additional 
research. First, the discussion on fiscal rules and institutions underlying fiscal policy 
making links up with the broader question in how far policies and activities in countries 
are on the whole more rule-based or whether policy discretion and rent-seeking abound 
and mutually reinforce each other. This question is very important in Europe with large 
public sectors and transfer systems. Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) have argued that 
reform of the state including fiscal consolidation, expenditure restraint and 
reinvigorated growth have been most successful in countries that have altered their basic 
policy regime. Changing from a transfer-oriented to a more opportunity-oriented system 
is what has been underlying the most successful fiscal consolidation and reform 
episodes such as in New Zealand of the 1980s, Ireland of the late 1980s and 1990s and 
several other episodes over the last quarter century. It appears to me that we still know 
relatively little how other countries can effectively learn from these episodes. 
  89Second, the study makes reference to the importance of simple and transparent rules and 
so does the revised Stability and Growth Pact. However, it seems to me that we know 
very little in how far simplicity and transparency in the rules help consolidation. 
Finally, the importance of public support for fiscal soundness is frequently mentioned. 
But again, we do not know how important it really is. In Germany, the media regularly 
report on the Maastricht deficit limits and scrutiny has always been tight. Yet, the 
German fiscal performance has been very mediocre. I do not know Italy too well but the 
discrepancy seems stark there too. In the French public, by contrast, fiscal laxity seems 
much more tolerated and the SGP appears to be seen as much more of a “nuisance”. Yet 
debt levels are similar to Germany’s and only very recently does the fiscal performance 
seem to be diverging. In the US, much seems to depend on the political and academic 
fashion of the day (or year). This point is important from a normative perspective and 
from the perspective of cohesion in Europe: how can we strengthen the role of the 
public so as to attain fiscal sustainability? 




5.1.  Introduction 
In the last forty years, periods of large fiscal expansions alternated with years of sharp 
fiscal contractions in all OECD countries. These episodes have been associated with a 
variety of outcomes: in some cases (but not in all) the fiscal tightening led to a reduction 
of the debt-to-GDP ratio (i.e.: successful fiscal adjustments); in several episodes (but 
not in all) private consumption, private investment, and GDP growth rates increased 
during the consolidation and in its immediate aftermath (i.e.: expansionary fiscal 
adjustments), contrary to the predictions of a standard Keynesian model.
49 
Cross-country differences in the consequences of fiscal consolidations have stimulated a 
lively debate on the determinants and effects of large changes in the fiscal stance. 
Theoretically, two non-mutually exclusive explanations have been proposed for 
expansionary and successful fiscal adjustments. One view is related to the impact that 
current fiscal policy has on the economy through its influence on agents' expectations 
about the stance of the future fiscal policy (the expectation view). This literature 
predicts that a fiscal contraction can be expansionary if agents perceive that the 
adjustment signals a change in regime that will lead to the stabilization of the debt-to-
GDP ratio and solve the country's fiscal imbalance. For example, the fiscal contraction 
generates a positive wealth effect and aggregate demand can increase if, in response to 
an increase in current taxation, agents expect that fiscal policy in the future need not be 
tighter, or even anticipate a reduction in the tax burden. The other view stresses the 
effect of the composition of current fiscal policy (whether the deficit reduction is 
achieved through tax increases or through spending cuts) on the economy through the 
labor market and the cost side of the firms (the labor market view). This view suggests 
that stabilizations that result from cutting public spending, especially transfers and 
government wage bills, rather than increasing taxes are more likely to be successful and 
expansionary. They induce a moderation in the wage claims by unions, stimulating 
employment, capital accumulation, and growth.
50 
There is evidence of both channels in the literature and Ardagna (2004) provides an 
overall empirical assessment of their relative importance and shows that the 
composition of fiscal policy is a crucial element for growth and that the labor market is 
                                                 
49   See, for example, Alesina and Ardagna (1998); Alesina and Perotti (1995); Alesina et al. (1998); 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and (1996) and McDermot and Wescott (1996). 
50 See Blanchard (1990); Bertola and Drazen (1993); Miller et al. (1990); and Sutherland (1997) for 
models that explain expansionary fiscal contractions through the expectation channel, and Alesina et al. 
(2002); Alesina and Perotti (1997), and Daveri and Tabellini (2000) for contributions that explain 
expansionary fiscal contractions through the labor market channel. 
50 A non exhaustive list of papers includes: Alesina and Perotti (1995) and (1997); Alesina and Ardagna 
(1998); Ardagna (2004); Giavazzi and Pagano (1990); Giavazzi et al. (2000); McDermot and Wescott 
(1996); von Hagen and Strauch (2001) and von Hagen et al. (2002). 
  91an important channel for the transmission of fiscal policy shocks. More generally, quite 
a large body of empirical evidence has accumulated on successful and expansionary 
fiscal stabilizations,
51 and the following ingredients seem to be important for a 
successful, long lasting and expansionary fiscal adjustment: a composition of the 
adjustment which emphasizes spending cuts on transfers, welfare programs and the 
government wage bill, rather than tax increases; a fiscal manoeuvre that consistently 
reduces the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio in a short period of time; and initial conditions 
signalling that a country's fiscal position is not on a sustainable course. Also, higher 
GDP growth due, for example, to other policy measures or to exogenous shocks, 
matters for successful fiscal adjustments, but the effects of fiscal policy characteristics 
do not vanish when one controls for the effect of GDP growth on the likelihood that 
governments achieve a permanent reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Finally, the 
evidence shows that episodes of successful and expansionary fiscal contractions are not 
simply due to expansionary monetary policy and exchange rate devaluations 
implemented to offset the fiscal contraction, even though exchange rate devaluations 
immediately before the fiscal tightening contributed in many episodes to the 
stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio and to a boom of the economy. 
This paper contributes to this strand of the literature by examining new evidence on 
fiscal adjustments in OECD countries from 1970 to today. The paper focuses on the 
medium-term response of the debt-to-GDP ratio and on GDP growth and examines both 
statistical and econometric evidence on the determinants and consequences that 
characterize fiscal stabilization programs. In particular, the paper investigates whether 
the size and composition of fiscal policy are crucial elements for successful and 
expansionary fiscal adjustments and whether the effects of fiscal consolidations depend 
on countries' initial fiscal and macroeconomic conditions. Finally, the role played by 
other economic policies (monetary policy and exchange rate devaluations) implemented 
at the time of the fiscal tightening is also considered. 
The paper is very closely related to the work of Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and 
Ardagna (2004). As in Alesina and Ardagna (1998), the paper selects episodes of fiscal 
adjustments, summarizes some basic statistics on government budgets and on 
macroeconomic outcomes from a few years before to a few years after the episodes of 
fiscal tightening, and identifies some empirical regularities that distinguish different 
types of episodes. As in Ardagna (2004), the paper performs an econometric analysis to 
assess the importance of the factors and the channels through which fiscal policy 
induces a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio and an expansion in output. In doing so, 
the paper addresses the joint endogeneity of the likelihood that governments implement 
successful fiscal contractions and of GDP growth; it controls for the stance of monetary 
and exchange rate policies around the time of the adjustment; and it explicitly accounts 
for the fact that what matters for economic activity is not only the current discretionary 
reduction in the deficit, but also the resulting expectations about the stance of future 
fiscal policy. 
Results are consistent with the existent empirical literature and adding ten more years of 
data and more evidence from episodes of fiscal consolidations occurred after 1994 does 
not really alter the conclusions reached so far. The most significant difference is on the 
role played by the composition of the fiscal manoeuvre in episodes of successful fiscal 
consolidations. In particular, while the existent literature finds that fiscal policy 
                                                 
 
  92composition is an important element in explaining fiscal adjustments that lead to a 
permanent reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio, this paper does not. However, as the 
existent literature, this paper finds that a composition of the adjustment which 
emphasizes spending cuts on transfers, welfare programs and the government wage bill, 
rather than tax increases, is a critical factor in explaining fiscal adjustments associated 
with a boom in economic activity. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the data and discusses 
the statistical evidence on fiscal adjustments. Section 5.3 describes the econometric 
issues and illustrates the specification for the benchmark model. Section 5.4 discusses 
the results. The last section concludes. 
5.2.  Data and statistical evidence 
We use a panel of OECD countries for a maximum time period from 1970 to 2006. The 
countries included in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. All fiscal and macroeconomic data 
are from the OECD Economic Outlook Database no. 81. The political data are from the 
World Bank database DPI 2006. 
We identify episodes of fiscal contractions following the literature on fiscal adjustments 
and using the same criteria as in Alesina and Ardagna (1998). Specifically, we use the 
following rule to define a period of fiscal adjustment. 
Definition 1: An episode of large fiscal adjustment is a period in which the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance improves by at least 2 per cent of GDP or a period of two 
consecutive years in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves by at least 
1.5 per cent of GDP per year, in both years. 
This is a rather demanding criteria, which rules out small, but prolonged, adjustments. 
We choose it because we are particularly interested in adjustments which are very sharp 
and large and clearly indicate a change in the fiscal stance. Also, we use the primary 
deficit, rather than the total deficit, to avoid that episodes selected result from the effect 
that changes in interest rates have on government expenditures. Moreover, we cyclically 
adjust the primary deficit to leave aside variations of the fiscal variables induced by 
business cycle fluctuations
52. Hence, episodes selected through this technique should 
not result from the automatic response of fiscal variables to economic growth or 
monetary policy changes, but they should reflect discretionary policy choices of fiscal 
authorities. Needless to say, there can still be an endogeneity issue related to the 
occurrence of fiscal contractions and expansions, because, in principle, discretionary 
policy choices of fiscal authorities can be affected by countries' macroeconomic 
conditions. However, note that the budget for the current year is approved during the 
second half of the previous year and, even though additional measures can be taken 
during the course of the year, they usually become effective with some delay, generally 
toward the end of the fiscal year. Hence, the assumption that the cyclically adjusted 
                                                 
52 The cyclical adjustment is based on the method proposed by Blanchard (1993) and follows the 
application in Alesina and Perotti (1995). 
  93primary deficit does not depend on GDP is likely to be a reasonable approximation to 
reality. 
Definition 1 selects 86 periods of fiscal contractions listed in Table 5.1. The majority of 
the episodes are well known in the literature and several alternative definitions of fiscal 
episodes select them. The inclusion of other periods in the samples, instead, is sensitive 
to the rule used to identify the episodes. 
We are interested in two outcomes of very tight fiscal policies: whether they are 
associated with an expansion during and in their immediate aftermath and whether they 
are successful in solving fiscal unbalances. Thus, a "tight episode" is defined 
expansionary according to definition 2 and successful according to definition 3 below. 
Definition 2: A period of tight fiscal policy is expansionary if the average growth rate 
of GDP, in difference from the G7 average (weighted by GDP weights), in the period of 
the tight policy and in the two years after is greater than the average value of the same 
variable in all episodes of tight policy. 
Definition 3: A period of tight fiscal policy is successful if three years after the tight 
period, the ratio of the debt-to-GDP is 5 percent of GDP below its level in the year of 
the tight period. 
There is of course some degree of arbitrariness in these definitions. However, our 
results are not "knife hedge" and very sensitive to the exact criteria used. Definition 2 
isolates 41 (39) episodes of expansionary (contractionary) fiscal adjustments, while 
definition 3 identifies 23 (37) episodes of successful (unsuccessful) fiscal episodes.
53 
5.2.1 Fiscal policy in expansionary and successful fiscal consolidations 
We begin by investigating the characteristics of the fiscal manoeuvre in expansionary 
and successful fiscal adjustments. Results are in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. The 
period "before" the adjustment is the two year period preceding the adjustment year(s). 
The period "after" is the two year period following the last year of the adjustment. The 
period "during" is, of course, the year(s) of the adjustment. All the variables in the table 
are yearly averages. 
Several interesting observations emerge from these tables. There does not seem to be 
much evidence that the expansionary episodes are those which occur when debt is high 
or more rapidly raising. Second, expansionary adjustments are not much larger than 
contractionary ones: during the expansionary adjustments, the primary deficit falls by 
2.80 per cent of GDP, against 2.65 in contractionary cases and these numbers become 
equal to 2.59 and 2.67 respectively when we measure the size of the fiscal adjustment 
using the cyclically adjusted primary deficit-to-GDP ratio. This observation on the 
"size" is not consistent with econometric results by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996). In their 
work on private consumption, they argue that a large adjustment, by inducing a 
permanent change of fiscal regime, can be expansionary through an effect on 
expectations, which would not be present in a small adjustment. Third, larger 
                                                 
53 Note that we are not able to classify all the 86 episodes of fiscal adjustments in 
expansionary/contractionary for two reasons: i) for some country-years data on the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
not available, ii) some episodes occur at the end of the sample period and, hence, we do not have 
evidence on the future dynamic of GDP growth and of the public debt. 
  94adjustments are more expenditure based. As Figure 5.1 shows, spending are cut more 
during expansionary episodes and revenues are increased less. Specifically, more than 
79% of the improvement in the primary balance-to-GDP ratio is due to expenditures 
cuts and less than 21% comes from increases in taxes. These numbers are equal to 59% 
and 41% respectively in contractionary fiscal adjustments. Third, when we consider the 
changes to the individual budget items, there is also a noticeable difference across the 
two types of episodes. For example, while in expansionary fiscal consolidations, the 
percentage of the reduction of the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio due to reductions in 
transfer payments, the government wage bills is of the same order of magnitude 
(between 22% and 26%), in contractionary episodes, almost 40% of the improvement in 
the primary deficit is due to cuts to public investment, only 10% comes from a 
reduction in the government wage bill and cyclically adjusted transfer payments 
actually increase. Similarly, on the revenue side of the budget, while we observe a 
reduction in income taxes and a modest increase in social security contributions in 
expansionary fiscal adjustments, the contribution of income taxes to the deficit 
reduction is equal to 17% in contractionary fiscal stabilizations. 
Let's now analyze successful and unsuccessful fiscal adjustments (see Table 5.3 and 
Figure 5.2). Contrary to the evidence in Table 5.2, in successful fiscal episodes the 
fiscal situation is worse than in unsuccessful cases: the debt to GDP ratio is higher, 
although it is not growing faster, immediately before successful episodes. Second, the 
size of the adjustment much larger in successful fiscal adjustments than in unsuccessful 
ones as we observe an improvement of the primary cyclically adjusted deficit of 3.25 
during successful adjustments, versus 2.17 during unsuccessful cases. Third, the 
composition of the adjustment is as much different as the one we observe when we 
contrast expansionary with contractionary episodes. Successful adjustments are almost 
exclusively expenditure based (i.e.: 75% of the improvement in the primary balance-to-
GDP ratio is due to expenditures cuts and 25% comes from increases in taxes), 
unsuccessful adjustments are more evenly relying on a combination of spending cuts 
and tax increases ((i.e.: 54% of the improvement in the primary balance-to-GDP ratio is 
due to expenditures cuts and 46% comes from increases in taxes). Particularly sizeable 
are the differences in the behavior of transfers. In successful cases, the cyclically 
adjusted transfers-to-GDP ratio is cut for a total of 0.69 percentage points (from after to 
before). In unsuccessful cases, cyclically adjusted transfers increase by 0.26 percent of 
GDP. 
5.2.2 Macroeconomic outcomes in expansionary and successful fiscal     
consolidations 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the evidence on the macroeconomic outcomes associated with 
expansionary/contractionary and successful/unsuccessful fiscal stabilizations. 
Macroeconomic variables also behave very differently across the different types of 
fiscal adjustments. The rate of growth relative to G7 increases during and after 
expansionary and successful episodes. It decreases during and after contractionary 
episodes and after unsuccessful ones. Note, however, that growth relative to G7 was 
higher immediately before successful cases, which can suggest that initial growth 
determines the success of the tight policy. Expansionary adjustments experience an 
investment boom during and immediately after, contrary to the contractionary cases. 
The differences in the growth rates of private consumption from before to after the 
expansionary/contractionary adjustment periods are not as remarkably different as the 
ones in private investment. Also, contrary to the statistical evidence shown in Alesina 
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in Table 5.5, unsuccessful fiscal adjustments are characterized by a larger increase in 
private investment than successful episodes. The trade balance improves in all types of 
fiscal adjustments. 
Interestingly contractionary and unsuccessful fiscal stabilizations, experience larger 
nominal devaluations of the exchange rate in the two years before the fiscal tightening 
than expansionary and successful episodes. This observation casts doubt on the claim 
that fiscal stabilizations that "work" are those anticipated by episodes of sharp exchange 
rate depreciations and suggests that the stance of monetary policy alone is not a critical 
factor making the difference. However, the rate of devaluation is only one of the many 
possible indicator of the monetary stance, although particularly important in small open 
economies. The evidence on the behavior of inflation also does not indicate a 
particularly loose monetary stance in successful and expansionary versus unsuccessful 
and contractionary cases. 
Finally, in line with the results in Ardagna et al. (2007), real long-term interest rates 
relative to the G7 average decrease more during expansionary and successful fiscal 
adjustments than in unsuccessful and contractionary ones, providing some evidence that 
fiscal discipline reduces the cost of serving the public debt. 
5.3.  Econometric analysis 
In this section we describe the methodology applied for the econometric analysis, which 
follows the one in Ardagna (2004). We discuss the single equation approach, which we 
use to estimate the ability governments have to solve fiscal imbalances. We calculate 
agents' expectations that the fiscal contraction will lead, within a few years, to the 
stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Then, we use this variable as a regressor in the 
GDP growth equation to capture the effect of agents' expectations on the future course 
of fiscal policy. Next, we also present a simultaneous equations approach, which takes 
into account a potential problem of simultaneity between governments' ability to solve a 
fiscal imbalance and GDP growth. 
5.3.1 Single equation approach 
The ability/propensity of a government to solve a fiscal imbalance, , is a latent 
variable not directly observed. We, instead, assume that we observe a discrete variable 
s. s indicates whether or not governments undertake discretionary cuts in the deficit-to-
GDP ratio and obtain, within a few years, a reduction in the debt as a share of GDP.
* s
54 
Thus, we estimate the following probit model for : 
* s
                                                 
54 As discussed in Ardagna (2004), there are two reasons one may want to follow this approach. First, the 
literature on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal adjustments is not concerned with small and continuous 
changes in the debt as a share of GDP. Rather, it looks at the impact of large and persistent reductions in 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio that result from discretionary improvements in the budget. Second, whether 
a fiscal adjustment has a positive effect on the economy may depend on agents' perception that the 
stabilization leads to a change in the fiscal regime. A small and continuous change in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio that does not result from any improvement in the budget can hardly be interpreted as a change in 
fiscal policy regime that eliminates the need for future tightening. 
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and  
e
it s  = E [ ⏐It] = Z1itδ1                                       [3] 
*
it s
where  i={1,....,I} indicates the countries in the sample; t={1,....,T} the annual 
observation; y measures the real per capita GDP growth rate; ΔG measures the change 
in the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure as a share of GDP; ΔT the change in 
cyclically adjusted tax revenue as a share of GDP; DEF and DEB are the ratios of 
government deficit and public debt to GDP respectively; Left and Centre are dummy 
variables equal to one if the government in office is left or centre oriented and zero 
otherwise; Major is a dummy variable equal to one if a single party has the majority in 
the Parliament and zero otherwise, and u1it ~ N(0,δ
2). From equation (2), we observe a 
successful fiscal adjustment if sit
* > 0. Equation (3) describes agents' expectations about 
sit
*  and assumes that the variables on the right-hand side of (1) belong to agents' 
information set at time t. 
In the econometric analysis, a successful fiscal stabilization (sit = 1) is defined as an 
episode in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves, and, two years after, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is at least three percentage points lower than in the year of the 
fiscal tightening. This rule is less stringent than the one in definition 3 above. It allow us 
to conduct the econometric investigation in a larger sample and without loosing 
valuable information from country-years in which fiscal discipline is a problem, but 
governments do not undertake discretionary and substantial deficit cuts. Such 
information is likely to be valuable to consumers and investors because governments' 
inaction can also influence agents' expectations about the stance of future fiscal policy. 
We expect agents' expectations about governments' ability to solve a country's fiscal 
imbalance to depend both on the size of the improvement in the primary deficit and on 
the way in which the improvement is obtained. In fact, the larger the cut in the deficit, 
the more people expect that the current fiscal package can stabilize the debt-to-GDP 
ratio and, hence, remove the need for further fiscal tightening in the future, (see 
Feldstein (1982)). Moreover, agents can believe that governments that reduce spending, 
especially the "untouchable" items of the budget (transfers, government wages, public 
employment), are more serious and committed to solve the fiscal imbalance than 
governments that increase taxation. They are willing to undertake unpopular policy 
measures, which, most likely, will have more permanent effects on the budget. This 
suggests that we should observe a11  < 0: for given changes in taxes, larger cuts in 
government spending increase the probability of a success implying both a tighter fiscal 
policy and a fiscal policy composition based on spending cuts. Instead, the sign of a12 
(the coefficient of tax variable) is in theory ambiguous. Suppose, in fact, that the change 
in the primary balance is the only characteristic of fiscal policy that matters for 
governments' ability to obtain a reduction in the debt-to GDP ratio. In this case, the 
higher the increase in taxation, the higher the probability that the debt-to-GDP ratio 
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the size, matters, then, for given changes in government spending, larger increases in 
taxes should have a negative effect on s
*. 
We also control for countries' initial conditions (the initial level of the deficit and debt 
to GDP ratios, and the lagged GDP growth rate), political variables describing the type 
and the ideology of the government in office, and country fixed effects. The literature 
on episodes of fiscal adjustments suggests that successful stabilizations are more likely 
to occur in "bad" rather than in "good" times (see, for example, Alesina et al. (2006), 
Obstfeld (1998), and Sutherland (1997)). Political characteristics of the government in 
office can also play a role beyond their effect on the size and composition of fiscal 
policy. For example, agents might believe that left-wing governments have more 
chances to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio than right-wing ones. Because of the left's 
support from unions and from pensioners, they can communicate the need for the 
adjustment and stick to their policy in the future more easily. Similarly, agents might 
think that single-party majority governments are less likely to abandon the program in 
the future than are coalition or minority cabinets. 
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where: sit
e is generated using equation [3] and the estimates from equation [1]; y, s
e, ΔG, 
ΔT, DEF, and DEB are defined as in Section 3.1.1, y
G7 measures the weighted average 
(with GDP weights) real per capita GDP growth rate of the G7 countries, and u2it ~ 
N(0,σ2
2). Equation [4] is estimated by OLS.  
A positive and statistically significant coefficient of the variable measuring agents' 
expectations (i.e.: γ2) shows evidence in favour of the expectation view. The more 
agents perceive that the government is able to solve the fiscal imbalance, the more they 
expect that future fiscal policy does not need to be as tight as current fiscal policy, and 
both private current consumption and investment can increase, leading to higher GDP 
growth. As for effect of changes to primary spending and government revenues on GDP 
growth, once we control for the expectation channel including s
e among the regressors 
in [4], ΔG and ΔT can affect the macroeconomy through other channels. Decreases in 
taxes have a positive effect on the economy both according to the labor market view and 
in a standard Keynesian model. Decreases in public spending have negative effect on 
growth in a Keynesian model. Instead, according to the labor market view decreases to 
government spending and, especially to the government wage bill and welfare 
payments, boost growth. Similarly, decreases in public investment can lead to higher 
private investment and growth if public investment is a substitute for private investment 
and the former is less productive than the latter. 
 
5.3.2 Simultaneous equations approach 
The single equation approach assumes that GDP growth influences governments' ability 
to solve a fiscal imbalance only with a lag. If, instead, s
* depends also on current GDP 
  98growth, then, there is a problem of simultaneity in the procedure described in section 
5.3.1. In fact, if s
* and y are endogenous, estimates of the effects of s
e on GDP growth 
without controlling for the effect of current growth on s
* are biased. To address this 
issue, we also estimate the equation describing governments' ability to solve countries 
fiscal imbalances and the growth equation simultaneously. The basic model is described 
by equations [5] and [6]: 
it it it
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where [u1it u2it]′ ~ N(0,Ω) and s and s
e are defined respectively by equations [2] and [3] 
above.
55 The coefficients γ1 and γ2 now take into account the contemporaneous effect 
among s
*, s
e and y. a11 – a17, and a21 – a26  measure the impact of the exogenous 
variables described in Section 5.3.1. Because s
* is a latent variable, I estimate equations 
[5] and [6] applying Amemiya's (1978) generalized least square technique (AGLS). 
Newey (1987) shows that AGLS is asymptotically equivalent to the minimum χ² 
estimation procedure, and that, in overidentified systems, AGLS is efficient relative to 
2IV estimators.
56 
To estimate [5] and [6], the system needs to be identified. The identification of the 
system requires that at least one exogenous variable in the equation for s* is not 
included in the equation for growth and vice-versa. In the benchmark model, political 
variables do not enter the growth equation directly. The literature on political business 
cycles shows that the type and the ideology of the government in office affect fiscal 
policy variables. Through the latter, political variables can influence the 
macroeconomy. Moreover, Section 5.3.1 argues that political characteristics of the 
government in office can also affect agents' expectations. Because the rhs of equation 
[5] already includes both fiscal policy variables and the variable capturing agents' 
expectations, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that Left, Centre, and Major do 
not influence GDP growth directly. The identification of the system also assumes that 
the lagged real per capita GDP growth rate and the lagged real per capita GDP-weighted 
growth rate of the G7 countries influence governments' ability to stabilize successfully 
only indirectly, through their effect on current GDP growth. The AGLS technique 
allows easily to test the overidentifying restrictions of the system and the empirical 
analysis will show that the model does not reject the overidentifying restrictions at 
conventional confidence levels. 
                                                 
55 The specification assumes that agents know current growth when they form their expectations on 
governments' ability to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. Alternatively, one can argue that agents do not 
know the contemporaneous growth rate but they use the forecast data on GDP growth. In this case, one 
introduces a forecast error in (6). The estimates are still consistent because the estimation method allows 
for cross-equations correlation between the errors in (5) and (6). 
56 See Ardagna (2004); Amemiya (1978); Newey (1987) and Londregan and Poole (1990) for details on 
the AGLS estimation procedure. 
  995.4.   Empirical results 
Table 5.6 shows the results from the single equation approach; Table 5.7 presents the 
results from the simultaneous equation approach. More specifically, in columns 1-2 of 
Table 5.6 we estimate the empirical models described in Section 5.3.1 and in columns 
1-2 of Table 5.7 those described in Section 5.3.2; in columns 3-4 of both tables we 
present results for a reparametrized version of the equations estimated in the other 
columns. The reparametrization allows us to measure the effect of the size and that of 
the composition of the fiscal manoeuvre very easily and involves the following steps. 
Rather than including the terms ΔG and ΔT among the regressors, we add the terms 
(ΔG-ΔT) and (ΔG+ΔT), where the former term captures the effect of the size and the 
latter the effect of the composition of the fiscal adjustment. A negative value for the 
estimated coefficient of the term (ΔG-ΔT) indicates that larger improvements in the 
primary balance increase the probability of a success or GDP growth. A negative value 
for the estimated coefficient of the term (ΔG+ΔT) is evidence of a "right" fiscal policy 
composition. In fact, the variable (ΔG+ΔT) assumes negative values when both 
government spending and taxes are cut (the "best" fiscal policy in terms of composition) 
and positive values when both variables increase (the "worst" fiscal policy in terms of 
composition).
57 
Let's now discuss the determinants of a successful fiscal stabilization, starting with 
column 1 of Table 5.6. First of all, both larger decreases in government spending and 
larger increases in taxes have a positive effect on governments' ability to implement a 
fiscal contraction and induce within a few years a decrease of the debt-to-GDP ratio. A 
one percentage point decrease in government spending as a share of GDP increases the 
likelihood of a success from 0.19 to 0.27 and a one percentage point increase in taxes 
raises the probability of a success from 0.19 to 0.30.
58 These effects are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Second, the success of a fiscal adjustment depends on the 
size of the fiscal contraction and not on its composition (see column 3). On the one 
hand, the coefficient of the change in the primary deficit as a share of GDP, (ΔG-ΔT), is 
statistically significant at the 5% level and its magnitude implies that, ceteris paribus, a 
one percentage point improvement in the primary balance-to-GDP ratio increases the 
probability of success from 0.19 to 0.28. On the other hand, the coefficient of the 
variable that measures the effect of the composition (ΔG+ΔT) is not statistically 
significant. This result contrasts with the evidence from the existent literature that 
suggests that fiscal consolidations are also more likely to be successful if they rely 
sharply on spending cuts. Results in column 3, instead, show that increases in taxes 
have a stronger effect on s
* than decreases in government spending. Among the other 
regressors, past economic growth has a positive and statistically significant impact on 
s
*, but its effect is small: a one percentage point increase in lagged GDP growth 
                                                 
57 See Ardagna (2004) for a more detailed analysis of the restrictions implied by the reparametrized 
models. 
58  To calculate the effect of a 1% change in a continuous variable on s*, we consider the difference 
between the average probability of success using the estimated coefficients and the data in the sample and 
the value of this same variable calculated assuming that the continuous variable is 1% higher (or lower) 
than in the actual data. The effect of a change of a dummy variable from 0 to 1 is measured as the 
difference between the average probability calculated if the dummy variable is equal to zero and the 
average probability calculated if the dummy variable is equal to one. We evaluate the average probability 
of success using the estimated coefficients and the data in the sample. We adopt this method throughout 
the paper. Alternatively, we could have measured the probability evaluating it at the average value of the 
explanatory variables. 
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0.19 to 0.21. Countries' initial fiscal conditions have, instead, an ambiguous effect. On 
the one hand, a higher level of the deficit-to-GDP ratio decreases governments' 
likelihood to stabilize public debt. On the other, a higher stock of public debt increases 
the chances of a success. Finally, left-wing and majoritarian governments are more 
likely to stabilize the debt than right-wing and coalition or minority governments. 
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 5.6 show the results for the growth equation estimated with 
the single equation approach. Larger cuts to public spending increase GDP growth and 
the magnitude of the coefficient is such that if governments reduce the share of primary 
spending-to-GDP by one additional percentage point, GDP growth increases by 0.23 
percentage point. This effect is, however, only significant at the 10% level. Tax 
reductions, instead, do not have a statistically significant effect on GDP growth, while 
agents' expectations about governments' ability to solve a fiscal imbalance are 
statistically significant at the 10% level, but the magnitude of the coefficient is such that 
the effect of expectations on growth is negligible. Results of the estimation of the 
reparametrized model suggest that the composition of fiscal policy is the only 
characteristic of the fiscal adjustment that matters for growth, while the change in the 
primary balance-to-GDP ratio has no effect, once we control for the effect that agents' 
expectations about governments' ability to solve countries' fiscal imbalances have on 
GDP growth. 
Results from the simultaneous equations approach are in Table 5.7. They are very 
similar to the ones obtained in the single equation approach. The effect of current real 
GDP growth on s
* is larger than that of past economic growth. The probability that 
governments are able to solve a fiscal imbalance increases by 6 percentage points from 
0.20 to 0.26 when real GDP growth is one percentage point higher. Previous studies 
have been criticized because they failed to take into account the feedback effects from 
GDP growth on the likelihood of a successful stabilization. Results in Table 5.7 show 
that the coefficient of current growth is significant but that high economic growth does 
not drive the success of a consolidation. In fact, controlling for current growth, fiscal 
policy variables have the same effect on s
* than in Table 5.6. Note, also, that the χ² tests 
of the overidentifying restrictions do not reject the estimated models at least at the 10% 
confidence level. 
In summary, i) the probability that tight fiscal policies lead to a decrease in the debt-to-
GDP ratio depends on the size of the improvement in the primary balance and not on its 
composition; ii) higher GDP growth favors the success of a fiscal contraction but it is 
not the only important determinant of governments' ability to solve countries' fiscal 
imbalances; iii) controlling for the impact that fiscal policy characteristics have on GDP 
growth through their effects on expectations, the paper finds that GDP growth is higher 
the larger the decrease in public spending. There is no evidence that the change in the 
primary balance per se affects economic activity. The size of a fiscal contraction has a 
positive effect on growth only through its effect on agents' expectations about future 
fiscal policy. In fact, agents' beliefs about governments' ability to solve a fiscal 
imbalance have a positive effect on growth, although the effect is very little and 
statistically significant only at the 10% level. 
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Fiscal stabilizations rarely happen in isolation; they are often part of broader policy 
packages. Even in a standard IS-LM model, a fiscal contraction that is accompanied by 
an expansionary monetary policy can lead to a boom in the economy. The specifications 
in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 do not control for the stance of monetary policy. Suppose, for 
example, that the fiscal tightening is accompanied by a lax policy, or that exchange rate 
devaluations systematically anticipate the fiscal adjustments that turn out to be 
successful and expansionary. In this case, the coefficients of fiscal policy variables can 
be biased capturing the effect of monetary rather than fiscal policy. This paper explicitly 
controls for the stance of monetary and exchange rate policies providing a further check 
that the conclusions reached so far are sound. We reestimate the models in columns 3 
and 4 of Table 5.7 including as regressors in the GDP growth equation lagged values of 
the change in the short-term nominal interest rate and of the rate of growth of the 
nominal exchange rate.
59 Results are in Table 5.8. While a decrease in the short-term 
nominal interest rate increase GDP growth, there is no evidence that changes in the 
nominal exchange rate have a statistical significant effect on economic activity. There is 
mixed evidence in the literature on the link between fiscal consolidations and exchange 
rate devaluations as well. Some studies present evidence that stronger devaluations 
anticipate some expansionary fiscal adjustments, some find the opposite result.
60 This 
paper is not concerned with whether or not monetary policy affects the economy. What 
matters here is that the coefficients of fiscal policy variables do not capture the impact 
of monetary rather than fiscal policy. Indeed, the coefficients of fiscal policy variables 
and of se and the t-statistics in Table 5.8 are very similar to those in Table 5.7. 
5.5.  Conclusions 
Using a panel of OECD data from 1970 to today, this paper provides additional 
evidence on the determinants of the different macroeconomic outcomes observed during 
and a few years after many episodes of fiscal consolidations in the OECD countries. 
The paper finds that the probability that tight fiscal policies lead to a decrease in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio increases the larger the cut in the deficit. As for the effect of changes 
to fiscal policy on GDP growth, the paper, instead, suggests that the composition of 
fiscal policy is a crucial element for growth and that the labor market is an important 
channel for the transmission of fiscal policy shocks. In fact, controlling for the impact 
that fiscal policy changes have on GDP growth through their effects on expectations, 
GDP growth is higher the larger the decrease of public spending. Agents' expectations 
about governments' ability to solve countries' fiscal imbalances are statistically 
significant only at the 10% level and the magnitude of the coefficient is, in general, not 
economically significant. Hence, the evidence on the effect of fiscal policy on economic 
activity through its effect on agents' expectations about future fiscal policy is not strong. 
                                                 
59 Data availability and comparability across countries constraints the choice of the indicators of the 
monetary   policy's stance. 
60 Bradley and Whelan (1997), for example, claim that the increase in export due to the devaluation of the 
nominal exchange rate determined the boom during the Irish stabilization in 1987-1989. Lambertini and 
Tavares (2001) also find evidence that devaluations matter for the success of a fiscal contraction. Alesina 
and Ardagna (1998) show that devaluations are important elements of the policy package, but that 
devaluations alone are not sufficient to drive a boom in the economy. 
  102Finally, the paper shows that successful and expansionary fiscal contractions are not the 
result of expansionary monetary policies or of exchange rate devaluations. 
The paper does not address some interesting issues that a recent literature on fiscal 
adjustments as considered. For example, the paper does not investigate the determinants 
and consequences of fiscal adjustments of different duration or the effect of fiscal rules 
on the likelihood and success of fiscal adjustments programs. Moreover, the paper does 
not study the interaction between fiscal policies, income policies, structural reforms of 
the product and labor markets, and privatizations. These topics certainly deserve to be 
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Table 5.1  Episodes of fiscal adjustments 
Austria 1996,  1997 
Belgium 1982,  1984 
Canada  1981, 1986, 1987, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 
Czech Republic  1994, 1996, 1999, 2004 
Denmark  1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 2004, 2005 
Finland  1976, 1988, 1994, 1996, 2000 
Germany 1976,  2000 
Greece 1986,  1991,  1994, 2005, 2006 
Hungary 1995,  1996,  1999 
Ireland  1976, 1987, 1988, 1989 
Italy  1976, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1997 
Japan 2006 
Netherlands  1972, 1973, 1983, 1991, 1996 
New Zealand  1987, 1989 
Norway  1979, 1980, 1983, 2000, 2004, 2005 
Portugal  1982, 1983, 1986, 2006 
Slovak Republic  1995, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2003 
Spain 1986,  1987 
Sweden  1979, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 

















  104  Table 5.2  Expansionary and contractionary fiscal adjustments-size and composition 
Before During After Diff Diff Before During After Diff Diff
(a) (b) (c) (b) - (a)  (c) - (a) (a) (b) (c) (b) - (a)  (c) - (a)
Debt 60.07 59.73 59.14 -0.34 -0.93 65.56 68.35 69.00 2.79 3.44
3.86 3.99 3.86 4.56 4.72 5.17
Change in debt 2.38 -0.29 -1.11 -2.67 -3.49 3.92 1.35 1.73 -2.57 -2.18
0.99 0.57 0.55 0.84 0.83 0.91
Primary deficit 2.94 0.14 -0.56 -2.80 -3.50 3.30 0.65 0.38 -2.65 -2.91
0.56 0.57 0.60 0.52 0.56 0.56
Primary expenditures 44.71 42.49 41.60 -2.22 -3.11 46.35 44.80 44.57 -1.55 -1.78
1.28 1.15 1.05 1.45 1.35 1.33
Transfers 18.60 17.99 17.57 -0.62 -1.03 18.97 19.09 19.16 0.12 0.19
0.79 0.71 0.62 0.76 0.69 0.66
Government wage expenditures 12.72 11.99 11.79 -0.74 -0.93 13.36 13.08 12.71 -0.28 -0.65
0.45 0.41 0.39 0.64 0.61 0.59
Government non wage expenditures 8.61 8.56 8.61 -0.04 0.00 8.66 8.51 8.56 -0.15 -0.10
0.37 0.37 0.37 0.43 0.40 0.39
Public investment 2.41 1.72 1.67 -0.69 -0.75 2.90 1.86 1.95 -1.04 -0.95
0.26 0.24 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.25
Total revenue 41.77 42.35 42.16 0.58 0.39 43.05 44.15 44.19 1.09 1.14
1.13 1.06 1.05 1.44 1.37 1.42
Income taxes 11.32 11.09 11.07 -0.23 -0.25 13.47 13.93 13.86 0.46 0.39
0.72 0.73 0.74 1.10 1.12 1.13
Social security contributions 10.23 10.34 10.27 0.11 0.04 11.49 11.46 11.38 -0.04 -0.11
0.65 0.62 0.61 0.84 0.87 0.86
Business taxes 3.01 3.67 3.85 0.66 0.84 2.49 2.62 2.61 0.13 0.12
0.25 0.33 0.34 0.18 0.16 0.15
Indirect taxes 13.72 13.71 13.57 -0.01 -0.14 12.97 13.33 13.43 0.37 0.47
0.36 0.30 0.31 0.38 0.39 0.38
Primary deficit adj. 2.78 0.19 -0.44 -2.59 -3.22 3.25 0.57 0.39 -2.67 -2.86
0.51 0.58 0.59 0.53 0.54 0.54
Primary expenditures adj. 44.60 42.65 41.86 -1.96 -2.74 46.35 44.77 44.62 -1.58 -1.73
1.23 1.15 1.06 1.47 1.33 1.34
Transfers adj. 18.50 18.14 17.84 -0.36 -0.66 18.95 19.06 19.20 0.11 0.25
0.75 0.72 0.65 0.77 0.68 0.68
Total revenue adj. 41.82 42.46 42.30 0.64 0.48 43.10 44.20 44.23 1.10 1.13
1.13 1.06 1.06 1.48 1.37 1.42
Expansionary Contractionary
Notes: 
Variables are in share of GDP. Primary deficit adj., Primary expenditures adj., Transfers adj., Total 
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Before During After Diff Diff Before During After Diff Diff
(a) (b) (c) (b) - (a)  (c) - (a) (a) (b) (c) (b) - (a)  (c) - (a)
Debt 72.02 70.68 65.54 -1.34 -6.48 57.74 61.38 65.66 3.64 7.93
4.08 4.38 4.58 4.04 4.36 4.61
Change in debt 2.13 -1.67 -3.45 -3.80 -5.58 3.75 1.98 3.00 -1.78 -0.75
0.85 0.73 0.31 1.02 0.63 0.58
Primary deficit 2.11 -1.33 -2.70 -3.43 -4.81 3.41 1.13 1.12 -2.29 -2.29
0.64 0.64 0.60 0.60 0.65 0.56
Primary expenditures 47.18 44.62 43.70 -2.57 -3.48 46.61 45.37 45.38 -1.24 -1.22
1.65 1.57 1.51 1.46 1.39 1.26
Transfers 19.59 19.09 18.87 -0.50 -0.72 19.32 19.29 19.36 -0.03 0.04
0.90 0.83 0.79 0.84 0.80 0.70
Government wage expenditures 14.11 13.61 13.20 -0.50 -0.91 13.35 12.93 12.72 -0.42 -0.63
0.71 0.67 0.66 0.58 0.54 0.53
Government non wage expenditures 9.07 8.86 8.91 -0.20 -0.16 8.73 8.80 8.90 0.08 0.17
0.33 0.35 0.33 0.38 0.38 0.36
Public investment 2.11 0.97 0.79 -1.14 -1.32 2.73 1.95 2.16 -0.79 -0.57
0.33 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.25
Total revenue 45.08 45.94 46.40 0.87 1.33 43.19 44.24 44.27 1.05 1.07
1.40 1.51 1.59 1.24 1.16 1.15
Income taxes 14.12 14.39 14.65 0.27 0.53 12.74 12.80 12.74 0.06 0.00
1.19 1.25 1.36 0.73 0.76 0.75
Social security contributions 10.32 10.19 9.98 -0.13 -0.34 11.82 12.17 12.27 0.35 0.44
1.01 1.00 0.98 0.76 0.75 0.74
Business taxes 2.78 3.41 3.57 0.63 0.79 2.78 3.20 3.20 0.41 0.41
0.16 0.24 0.28 0.25 0.31 0.28
Indirect taxes 14.19 14.36 14.66 0.18 0.48 12.91 12.98 13.04 0.07 0.13
0.41 0.45 0.47 0.35 0.31 0.30
Primary deficit adj. 2.11 -1.14 -2.47 -3.25 -4.58 3.18 1.01 1.13 -2.17 -2.05
0.65 0.62 0.61 0.56 0.65 0.55
Primary expenditures adj. 47.53 44.92 44.04 -2.60 -3.49 46.36 45.27 45.37 -1.10 -0.99
1.69 1.57 1.54 1.39 1.38 1.27
Transfers adj. 19.90 19.39 19.21 -0.50 -0.69 19.08 19.19 19.34 0.12 0.26
0.93 0.84 0.84 0.78 0.80 0.72
Total revenue adj. 45.42 46.07 46.50 0.65 1.09 43.18 44.26 44.24 1.08 1.05
1.43 1.50 1.58 1.24 1.15 1.16
Successful Unsuccessful
 
Notes: Variables are in share of GDP. Primary deficit adj., Primary expenditures adj., Transfers adj., 







   
  106  Table 5.4  Expansionary and contractionary fiscal adjustment-macroeconomic 
performance  
Before During After Diff Diff Before During After Diff Diff
(a) (b) (c) (b) - (a)  (c) - (a) (a) (b) (c) (b) - (a)  (c) - (a)
GDP growth rate (G7) -0.18 0.89 1.08 1.07 1.26 -0.24 -0.84 -1.21 -0.60 -0.97
0.28 0.19 0.22 0.28 0.25 0.26
Unemployment rate (G7) 3.09 2.98 2.40 -0.11 -0.69 0.05 0.09 0.50 0.04 0.45
0.76 0.74 0.69 0.46 0.46 0.52
Business Investment 3.09 8.54 7.64 5.45 4.55 10.66 4.34 7.26 -6.31 -3.40
1.53 1.18 1.24 5.03 3.13 1.72
Private Consumption 2.14 3.56 3.75 1.42 1.61 2.18 2.43 1.69 0.25 -0.49
0.36 0.31 0.27 0.34 0.45 0.34
Trade balance/GDP 1.36 2.42 2.18 1.07 0.82 -1.77 -1.22 -0.13 0.56 1.64
0.63 0.78 0.89 0.81 0.75 0.62
Long term real interest rates (G7) 0.19 -0.50 0.31 -0.69 0.12 0.43 0.23 0.49 -0.20 0.05
0.36 0.49 0.42 0.43 0.60 0.26
Inflation rate (G7) 2.99 3.25 2.09 0.26 -0.90 3.95 4.40 3.57 0.45 -0.38
0.82 0.77 0.53 0.90 1.06 0.92
Exchange rate -0.92 -0.21 1.44 0.71 2.36 -1.40 -2.26 -1.76 -0.86 -0.37




GDP growth rate (G7), Unemployment rate (G7), Long term real interest rates (G7), Inflation rate (G7) 
are in difference from the weighted average for the G7 countries. Exchange rate, Business investments, 
Private consumption are growth rates. Standard deviation of the mean in italics. 
Source: OECD. 
 
Table  5.5  Successful and unsuccessful fiscal adjustments-macroeconomic 
performance   
Before During After Diff Diff Before During After Diff Diff
(a) (b) (c) (b) - (a)  (c) - (a) (a) (b) (c) (b) - (a)  (c) - (a)
GDP growth rate (G7) 0.21 0.33 0.41 0.12 0.20 -0.38 -0.01 -0.41 0.38 -0.03
0.26 0.28 0.35 0.30 0.26 0.22
Unemployment rate (G7) 1.66 1.29 0.63 -0.37 -1.03 0.81 1.12 1.34 0.31 0.52
1.02 1.00 0.93 0.52 0.54 0.60
Business Investment 7.93 9.16 8.67 1.23 0.74 3.72 6.58 5.70 2.85 1.98
1.66 1.80 1.14 2.26 1.27 1.50
Private Consumption 2.59 3.84 3.30 1.25 0.71 1.95 2.59 2.20 0.64 0.25
0.32 0.38 0.36 0.42 0.30 0.32
Trade balance/GDP 1.02 1.71 1.69 0.69 0.67 -0.03 0.73 1.28 0.77 1.31
0.73 0.78 0.76 0.64 0.84 0.83
Long term real interest rates (G7) 0.67 0.11 -0.47 -0.57 -1.14 0.46 0.36 1.03 -0.10 0.57
0.26 0.40 0.39 0.46 0.65 0.32
Inflation rate (G7) 2.22 1.49 1.71 -0.73 -0.51 1.92 2.42 1.44 0.50 -0.48
0.71 0.47 0.42 0.66 0.71 0.48
Exchange rate -0.20 1.89 0.98 2.09 1.18 -1.04 -0.47 0.61 0.57 1.65




GDP growth rate (G7), Unemployment rate (G7), Long term real interest rates (G7), Inflation rate (G7) 
are in difference from the weighted average for the G7 countries. Exchange rate, Business investments, 
Private consumption are growth rates. Standard deviation of the mean in italics. 
Source: OECD. 
 
  107Table 5.6  Success and growth – single equation approach 
Dependent variables  S
* Growth S
* Growth 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
S
e   0.002     
   (1.79)     
Growth       0.002 
       (1.79) 
ΔG  -100.03 -0.23     
 (-7.58)**  (-1.88)**     
ΔT  104.9 -0.18     
 (7.05)**  (-1.36)     
(ΔG - ΔT)     -102.5  -0.027 
     (8.12)**  (-0.22) 
(ΔG + ΔT)     2.45  -0.203 
     (0.39)  (-5.05) 
Growth (t-1)  13.4  0.42  13.4  0.42 
 (1.95)**  (8.17)  (1.95)**  (8.17) 
Growth G7 (t-1)    0.001    0.001 
   (0.002)    (0.002) 
Deficit/GDP (t-1)  -26.04  0.047  -26.04  0.047 
 (-5.32)**  (1.18)  (-5.32)**  (1.18) 
Debt/GDP (t-1)  5.09  -0.004  5.09  -0.004 
 (5.80)**  (-0.53)  (5.80)**  (-0.53) 
Left government  1.45    1.45   
 (4.24)**    (4.24)**   
Centre government  -0.03    -0.03   
 (-0.05)    (-0.05)   
Majority government  0.75    0.75   
 (2.40)**    (2.40)**   
Number of observations  417  417  417  417 
Notes:  
Probit specification in columns 1 and 3. OLS regressions in columns 2 and 4. Dependent variables: 
Success (S
*) in columns 1, 3, and real per capita GDP growth rate (Growth) in columns 2, 4. S
e= variable 
measuring agents’ expectations about S
*. ΔG = change in cyclically adjusted primary spending as a share 
of GDP. ΔT = change in cyclically adjusted government revenue as a share of GDP. Growth G7 = 
average real per capita GDP growth of the G7 countries. Deficit/GDP = government deficit as a share of 
GDP. Debt/GDP = public debt as a share of GDP. Left = 1 if government in office is left oriented, and 
zero otherwise. Centre = 1 if government in office is center oriented, and zero otherwise. Majority = 1 if a 
single party has the majority in the Parliament, and zero otherwise. Country fixed effects are included. t-




  108Table 5.7  Success and growth – simultaneous equation approach 
Dependent variables  S
* Growth S
* Growth 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
S
e   0.002    0.002 
   (1.86)*    (1.86)* 
Growth 31.75    31.75   
 (1.98)**    (1.98)**   
ΔG  83.86 -0.23     
 (-5.96)**  (-1.86)*     
ΔT  103.05 -0.19     
 (6.62)**  (-1.34)     
(ΔG - ΔT)     -93.4  -0.022 
     (-7.16)**  (-0.17) 
(ΔG + ΔT)     9.6  -0.21 
     (1.36)  (-4.99)** 
Growth (t-1)    0.42    0.42 
   (8.23)**    (8.23)** 
Growth G7 (t-1)    -0.006    -0.006 
   (-0.09)    (-0.09) 
Deficit/GDP (t-1)  -24.59  0.04  24.59  0.04 
 (-4.95)**  (1.04)  (4.95)**  (1.04) 
Debt/GDP (t-1)  4.67  -0.003  4.67  -0.003 
 (5.15)**  (-0.44)  (5.15)**  (-0.44) 
Left government  1.32    1.32   
 (3.84)**    (3.84)**   
Centre government  -0.06    -0.06   
 (-0.10)    (-0.10)   
Majority government  0.69    0.69   
 (2.22)**    (2.22)**   
Number of observations  417  417 
χ
2 test of over. restrictions  7.29 7.29 
Notes:  
Simultaneous equations approach. Estimation by AGLS technique. Dependent variables: Success (S
*) and 
real per capita GDP growth rate (Growth). S
e variable measuring agents’ expectations about S
*. ΔG = 
change in cyclically adjusted primary spending as a share of GDP. ΔT = change in cyclically adjusted 
government revenue as a share of GDP. Growth G7 = average real per capita GDP growth of the G7 
countries. Deficit/GDP = government deficit as a share of GDP. Debt/GDP = public debt as a share of 
GDP. Left = 1 if government in office is left oriented, and zero otherwise. Centre = 1 if government in 
office is center oriented, and zero otherwise. Majority = 1 if a single party has the majority in the 





  109Table 5.8  Success, growth and monetary policy – simultaneous equation approach 
Dependent variables  S
* Growth S
* Growth 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
S
e   0.002    0.002 
   (2.04)**    (1.86)** 
Growth 29.7    31.84   
 (1.81)*    (2.57)**   
(ΔG - ΔT)  -90.8 -0.03  -96.15  -0.03 
 (-6.74)**  (-0.23)  (-7.16)**  (-0.29) 
(ΔG + ΔT)  8.98 -0.21  11.03  -0.17 
 (1.22)  (-4.91)**  (1.48)  (-4.28)** 
Growth (t-1)    0.42    0.47 
   (8.28)**    (10.3)** 
Growth G7 (t-1)    -0.01    0.04 
   (-0.17)    (0.56) 
Deficit/GDP (t-1)  -23.5  0.04  -24.9  0.02 
 (-4.52)**  (1.03)  (-4.97)  (0.67) 
Debt/GDP (t-1)  4.54  -0.003  4.66  -0.006 
 (4.62)**  (-0.44)  (4.89)**  (-0.95) 
Left government  1.27    1.32   
 (3.53)**    (3.76)**   
Centre government  -0.05    -0.28   
 (-0.08)    (-0.44)   
Majority government  0.66    0.77   
 (2.05)**    (2.18)**   
ΔEXCH (t-1)   -0.003    
   (-0.22)     
ΔRIRS (t-1)      -0.37 
       (-9.01)** 
Number of observations  417  402 
χ2 test of over. restrictions  15.77 12.13 
Notes:  
Simultaneous equations approach. Estimation by AGLS technique. Dependent variables: Success (S
*) and 
real per capita GDP growth rate (Growth). S
e variable measuring agents’ expectations about S
*. ΔG = 
change in cyclically adjusted primary spending as a share of GDP. ΔT = change in cyclically adjusted 
government revenue as a share of GDP. Growth G7 = average real per capita GDP growth of the G7 
countries. Deficit/GDP = government deficit as a share of GDP. Debt/GDP = public debt as a share of 
GDP. Left = 1 if government in office is left oriented, and zero otherwise. Centre = 1 if government in 
office is centre oriented, and zero otherwise. Majority = 1 if a single party has the majority in the 
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  112Discussion 
Paul van den Noord 
Since Silvia's presentation was very clear there is no point in summarising her paper in 
much detail. It may suffice to highlight the two main aspects of observed fiscal 
consolidations – their success in bringing down the public debt to GDP ratio on a 
durable basis and their degree of contraction or expansion of economic activity they 
entail – along with the two main channels that lead fiscal consolidations to be 
expansionary, which I dub here the 'bringing forward' effect and the ' quality of public 
finance' effect. The latter two terms are not used by Silvia, but I introduce them here in 
an attempt to make a bridge to other, parallel, strands of economic research.  
 
The 'quality of public finance' effect refers to the capacity of fiscal consolidations to 
establish a better mix of expenditure and taxation and thereby improve the functioning 
of labour markets and boost economic growth. This is a policy orientation that is always 
useful to pursue, but the point could be made that it would be particularly useful in 
fiscal consolidation episodes to sweeten the bitter pill of deficit reduction and indeed 
make it beneficial for economic growth.  The 'bringing forward effect' refers to the 
ability of economic agents to be forward looking and realise that successful fiscal 
consolidations will raise their permanent income and wealth and thereby contribute to 
the expansionary effect of fiscal consolidation. 
 
The main findings of the paper – based on a thorough econometric analysis of a pooled 
time-series cross-country database – are that: 
 
•  The 'quality of public finance' effect is pretty powerful. Although consolidations 
per se have little effect on contemporary growth, those that are based on 
expenditure cuts (as opposed to tax increases) are clearly expansionary. The more 
fiscal consolidation is based on spending cuts, the more credible it is, the better 
labour markets perform, and hence the more money people have to spend. 
•  The 'bringing forward ' effect is pretty weak. A fiscal expansion that according to a 
probit regression model is 'successful' (i.e. producing a sustainable decline in the 
debt to GDP ratio in later years) is not necessarily accompanied by a contemporary 
expansion of economic activity. This is of course somewhat disappointing for those 
who believe in non-Keynesian (or counter-Keynesian) effects of fiscal 
consolidation. 
 
The paper does not dwell extensively on the possible explanations for the lack of a 
'bringing forward' effect. Is it because of the way in which expectations of future 
effects of fiscal consolidations is modelled? Perhaps so, but I do not have any 
alternative suggestion. Or is it because the assumption of uniformity in the response of 
growth to the 'bringing forward' effect across countries? I have a suspicion that this 
may indeed be the case and that the development of financial markets play a key role 
here. Financial markets, if well developed, are instrumental in transmitting information 
on the future functioning of the economy to the present. They render the whole 
economic system more forward looking and possibly also facilitate consumption 
smoothing and the alignment of consumption to permanent (as opposed to current) 
  113income. As a result, a fiscal consolidation may produce powerful permanent income 
effects and as such be expansionary. However, in a country where financial markets are 
less well developed, financial markets are less instrumental in this regard, and the 
'bringing forward' effect may not emerge.  
 
I would therefore suggest that Silvia in a next paper interact her expectations variable 
with a variable that gauges the (country- and time-specific) degree of financial market 
development. I would expect statistically significant results, with the 'bringing forward' 
effect turning out powerful in countries where financial markets are well developed. 
My hope that this will be the case is rooted in our own research results (Buti et al., 
2008), which point to a strong analogous 'bringing forward' effect of structural policy if 
financial markets are well developed. The mechanisms behind it are similar: structural 
reform raises future income and if financial markets are well developed they 'bring 
forward' this information into, first, permanent income and, next, current consumption 
and possibly investment.  
 
  114Part III - Response of Fiscal Policy to 
the Cycle 
  1156 The cyclical response of fiscal policies in the euro area. Why do 
results of empirical research differ so strongly? 
Roberto Golinelli and Sandro Momigliano
∗ 
 
6.1.  Introduction 
Whether discretionary fiscal policies in industrialized countries act counter- or 
pro-cyclically and whether their reaction is symmetric or asymmetric over the cycle are 
still largely unsettled questions. They are important for a variety of reasons. First, 
answering them would enhance our understanding of past developments and, more 
generally, of macroeconomic fluctuations, with potential implications on the debate 
concerning the right model to account for them. Second, clarifying the actual behaviour 
of governments would offer a useful reference point for the theoretical debate, which is 
on-going since at least the Thirties but has become intense in recent years, on the need 
and scope for counter-cyclical stabilization policies. Finally, these answers represent a 
necessary starting point for proposals concerning fiscal rules and institutional reforms. 
The latter point is particularly relevant in the European context, where fiscal policy 
remains the only instrument against asymmetric shocks, since national monetary and 
exchange rate policies are no longer available. 
Over the last decades, several empirical works have analysed the behaviour of 
budgetary policies over the cycle in industrialized countries. Focusing on relatively 
recent works and excluding studies concerned with individual economies, we reviewed 
a group of 21 studies, all either assessing the fiscal behaviour of EMU countries or 
presenting results for a group of countries where EMU countries are prominent.
61 While 
many studies conclude that policies tended to be pro-cyclical, there are almost as many 
pointing to a-cyclicality and a few suggest that policies were counter-cyclical. 
Furthermore, little consensus seems to exist on whether the behaviour has been 
symmetrical over good and bad times. 
We then restricted our analysis to a more homogeneous subset of 12 studies that share 
the following characteristics: they include the output gap in levels as indicator of 
cyclical conditions and they measure discretionary policies (implicitly or explicitly) on 
the basis of the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance. 
                                                 
∗ A preliminary version of the paper was presented at the 9
th Banca d’Italia Workshop on Public Finance, 
Perugia, March 29-31 2007. We wish to thank Xavier Debrun, Francesco Lippi, Carlos Martinez Mongay, 
Piero Tommasino, Jean-Pierre Vidal, and the participants in the workshops for very useful comments. 
The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of Bank of Italy. 
61 We restricted our attention to the studies that focus on industrialized countries. The prominent role of 
EMU countries in the sample is also a reflection of the availability of the data. The identification of these 
studies is just a starting point for our analysis. While we have not intentionally excluded any relevant 
research, it is likely that we have overlooked some, given the vastness of the literature. We apologise to 
the authors for these unintentional omissions. Still, we do not think it likely that a more comprehensive 
survey would modify our analysis and conclusions. 
  116On the basis of the first condition, we excluded from our analysis 7 studies
62 that 
include growth or similar measures (change in the output gap, difference between 
growth and trend growth) as indicators of cyclical conditions. The choice of the output 
gap in levels focuses on whether the position of the economy is above or below its trend 
(potential) level and on its distance from it, while the reference to growth or similar 
measures focuses on whether the economy is in an upturn or in a downturn and its 
intensity. It is outside the scope of this paper to judge which cyclical indicator is 
preferable.
63 We restricted our attention to the first group of studies as they represent 
the majority view in the literature on this issue.
64 On the basis of the second condition 
we excluded two studies,
65 which rely on a different concept of discretionary action. 
                                                
Even this set of 12 studies shows results that fully span the range of positions expressed 
in the whole literature. Table 6.1 reports, for each of these 12 studies, the indication 
concerning the sign and the symmetry of the reaction of discretionary policies to 
cyclical conditions and some characteristics of the specific regression we refer to. 
There are many factors that could plausibly explain the differences in the results. The 
studies differ in several respects: the model of used policy decisions, the estimation 
procedures, the countries included in the sample, the analyzed periods of time, the 
sources of data (including different vintages of data from the same source). 
In this paper we try to disentangle the relative role of these factors. However, we do not 
examine the role of slight variations in the specific countries included in the different 
samples. We base our analysis on data for a group of 11 EMU countries (only 
Luxembourg and Slovenia are excluded for lack of data).
66 
In Section 6.2 we assess the impact of the different choices in modelling fiscal 
behaviour. Abstracting from a number of specific characteristics pertaining to the 
individual analyses, in the 12 studies we find three basic specifications of the fiscal 
policy reaction function. We show that these three fiscal rules – which include among 
regressors only the initial conditions of public finances (debt and deficit) and the output 
gap – embody different notions of fiscal policy cyclicality and may lead to different 
interpretations of the policy behaviour. In our opinion, there is often insufficient 
 
62 Fatás and Mihov, 2002; von Hagen et al., 2002; Hallerberg and Strauch, 2002; Lane, 2003; Melitz, 
2000; Mink and De Haan, 2006 and OECD, 2003. 
63 Both indicators carry useful information. In our opinion, they largely complement each other. 
64 The literature on the cyclicality of US budgetary policies generally focuses on the output gaps in levels 
or on similar indicators (Auerbach, 2002; Bohn, 1998; Cohen and Follette, 2003; Taylor, 2000). 
65 Buti and van den Noord (2004) construct an indicator for discretionary policies which aims to control 
for errors in forecasting. Giuliodori and Beetsma (2006), in a paper largely devoted to gauge the 
relevance of fiscal policy interdipendence in the European Union, estimate a fiscal rule that uses real-time 
data for the regressors. Concerning the dependent variable, instead of focusing on the effects of actual 
policies (proxied by the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, CAPB henceforth, measured 
ex post) the authors point out that the latter are “polluted” with the reactions to events that take place after 
the budget is finalized and focus on government plans (proxied by the OECD forecast one-year-ahead for 
the CAPB). 
66 In Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) we find that the fiscal behaviour over the cycle of the group of 
OECD countries outside EMU for which data of sufficient time length are available (US, Japan, 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, Sweden and Denmark) is significantly different from that of EMU 
countries. 
  117awareness of these issues when the estimates of the output gap parameter of the 
different studies are used in the policy debate.
67 
In the following Sections 6.3-6.4 we focus on the first model, having shown that it is 
possible to approximately recover from its estimates those based on the other two 
models. In Section 6.3 we examine the impact of time period, source and type of data 
(real-time or ex post) on the estimates of the fiscal reaction to cyclical conditions. We 
estimate rolling regressions with a fixed 15-year window over the period 1978-2006 for 
four alternative datasets: three are based on ex post data sources (OECD, AMECO, 
OECD data for primary deficit and debt with Hodrick-Prescott filter estimates of the 
output gap) and the fourth largely on real-time data (taken from Golinelli and 
Momigliano, 2006), available only for the reduced 1988-2006 period. Results show that 
the different data sources, even within the ex post data sets, determine sizeable shifts in 
the estimates of the output gap parameter. Independently of the data source, a slight 
tendency towards a pro-cyclical (or a less counter-cyclical) behaviour emerges over 
time. 
In Section 6.4 we examine the impact of the same factors (time period, source and type 
of data) on determining whether fiscal policies have been symmetrical or asymmetrical 
over the cycle. We find contrasting results, depending on both ex post data sources and 
sample periods. Results suggest that the asymmetric behaviour of the discretionary 
policy, when present, entails shifts in all the parameters of the rule and not only in the 
output gap parameter. 
In Section 6.5 we extend the basic fiscal rule adding, when feasible, the additional 
variables found significant in the 12 studies we focus on. While there is a remarkable 
increase of the explanatory power of the model, the results broadly confirm the 
conclusions reached in Sections 6.3-6.4. The only important differences are the 
following: a) policy asymmetry is found for all data sources; b) the evidence of counter-
cyclical behaviour with real-time data becomes clearer. Section 6.6 concludes. 
6.2.  Modelling choices 
If we focus on the “core” components of the fiscal rule – the dependent variable and the 
initial conditions of public finances – in the restricted set of 12 studies, we find three 
basic specifications of fiscal behaviour. None of the three specifications do justice to the 
richness of the studies we review, which often devote large part of their attention to 
determinants different from cyclical conditions. Nevertheless the analysis of the three 
models contributes significantly, in our opinion, to understand why there is no 
consensus on this issue in the literature. 
6.2.1 The three models 
Most studies estimate what we call a “CAPB Model” fiscal rule, in which the 
discretionary fiscal action, measured by the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary 
balance (Δ CAPB),
68 is explained by the initial state of public finances (measured by 
                                                 
67 The same modelling choices are also followed in other areas of the literature on fiscal policy behaviour, 
for example that focusing on developing countries. 
68 Some authors, among which Galí and Perotti (2003), use as dependent variable the level of the CAPB, 
instead of its change. This specification is equivalent to that of eq.[1], as it gives the same estimates for 
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cyclical conditions (measured by the level of the output gap): 
   Δ CAPBi t = φ
C
capb CAPB i t–1 + φ
C
debt DEBT i t–1+ φ
C
gap GAPi (t or t–1) + ui t            [1] 
A positive value of φ
C
gap indicates a counter-cyclical policy, while a negative value 
points to pro-cyclicality. Some of the studies include the simultaneous output gap (i.e. at 
time t, the year in which budgetary actions have their effects); others include the lagged 
output gap (i.e. at time t–1, the year in which budgetary decisions are taken). The two 
variants of the CAPB Model (henceforth “CAPB-s Model” and “CAPB-l Model”, 
respectively) lead to similar results (as we show in Section 3) since the values of the 
output gap are highly persistent.
69 Finally, the unobservable term ui t = μi + λt + εi t may 
include (depending on the study) individual (μi), time (λt) and random (εi t) components. 
In a few studies authors estimate a broadly similar model, but assume that policy-
makers react with a lag to the primary balance (PB  t–1) rather than to the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance (CAPB t–1), as in the CAPB Model. Henceforth, we call this 
fiscal rule “CAPB/PB Model”: 
  Δ CAPB i t = φ
C/P
pb PB i t–1 + φ
C/P
i debt DEBTi t–1 + φ
C/P
gap GAP i (t or t–1) + ui t         [2] 
The CAPB Model and the CAPB/PB Model are probably equally plausible. The CAPB 
Model is consistent with a fiscal rule where automatic stabilizers are left to operate fully 
(as discretionary actions do not react with a lag to their impact on the balance). This 
policy indication is very common in policy documents at the European level, especially 
after 1997, when the Stability and Growth Pact was introduced. Furthermore, the CAPB 
Model can be explicitly derived by a fiscal rule which assumes a target value for the 
level of the CAPB and inertia in policy processes (Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 
2002). The CAPB/PB Model may be seen as more realistic, as policy-makers may be 
more concerned with headline figures; moreover, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, 
data on cyclically-adjusted balances were not available and even the concept of cyclical 
adjustment was not widespread. 
Finally, other studies, which essentially focus on the issue of asymmetry in budgetary 
reactions, adopt a fiscal rule in which, compared with the CAPB/PB Model, the 
                                                                                                                                               
all coefficients except for that of the lagged dependent variable, for which its estimate is equal to 1 plus 
the estimate obtained with eq.[1]. It is largely a presentational issue, but we tend to prefer the 
specification in changes (eq. [1]) mainly because the explanatory power of the model and of the statistical 
significance of the coefficient of the lagged deficit are not artificially inflated by the component 
attributable to inertia (which, in turn, is largely an unexplained phenomenon). Note also that all the 
variables included in the models of this section are expressed in terms of ratios to potential and nominal 
GDP.  
69 The variable GAPi t–1 is a plausible alternative to GAPit, as policy-makers may react to current cyclical 
conditions or use them to forecast cyclical conditions in the following year. The inertia and complexity of 
the decision-making process may also justify the reference to the lagged output gap. A purely statistical 
reason for preferring GAP i t–1 instead of GAP i t is that the latter requires recourse to instrumental 
variables, as the output gap is affected by fiscal policy, which opens up a number of equally acceptable 
alternatives with potential effects on the results. 
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70 Henceforth, we call this 
specification “PB Model”: 
 
  Δ PBi t = φ
P
pb PBi t–1 + φ
P
debt DEBTi t–1 + φ
Pgap GAPi (t or t–1) + ui t                                     [3] 
The PB Model assumes a behaviour of fiscal authorities significantly different from that 
of the other two models, as the policy decision (dependent variable) includes the effects 
of both the discretionary actions and the automatic stabilizers.
71 This is shown by 
identity [4], in which the primary balance is decomposed into the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance and in a cyclical component, equal to the product of the output gap and 
a coefficient ωi t capturing the effects of automatic stabilizers. 
PBi t ≡ CAPBi t + ωi t GAPi t                                                    [4] 
The results in these studies have been used to identify the cyclical reaction of 
discretionary policies by subtracting from the estimated coefficient of the output gap 
(φ
P
gap) an average value (ω) of the individual coefficients ωi t (which is generally 





gap − ω                                              [5] 
The use of an average value is justified by evidence of a limited variability across 
countries and time of the coefficients capturing the effects of the automatic stabilizers 
(see, e.g., Girouard and André, 2006). 
6.2.2 Estimating the three models 
In Table 6.2 we present estimates for a group of 11 EMU countries (only Luxembourg 
and Slovenia are excluded for lack of data) of the three models for the two variants 
(which include, respectively, the simultaneous and the lagged output gap). As most of 
the reviewed studies, we use ex post data. The source is OECD for all data except for 
public debt; for this variable, as OECD data are incomplete, the source is the AMECO 
database.
72 The full 1978-2006 sample is used. 
Since all specifications are dynamic panels and embody fixed country effects (μi), their 
parameters are estimated by one-step GMM-sys (see Blundell and Bond, 1998), using 
only a subset of the potentially available instrument matrix: the t–2 and t–3 lags of the 
                                                 
70 In the studies, the level of the PB, instead of its change, is used as dependent variable. As already 
mentioned in the case of the CAPB Model, this specification is equivalent to that of equation [3], as it 
gives the same estimates for all coefficients except for that of the lagged dependent variable, for which its 
estimate is equal to 1 plus the estimate obtained with equation [3]. 
71 There is an important difference between CAPB and CAPB/PB Models on one side and the PB Model 
on the other concerning the dependent variable, which suggests more caution when interpreting the results 
of the PB Model in terms of behaviour of fiscal authorities when ex post data are used. In the CAPB and 
CAPB/PB Models it can be assumed that budget authorities are able to predict fairly accurately the effects 
of their discretionary actions, as the latter are in principle largely independent of cyclical conditions. In 
Model PB, instead, the change in the balance is not independent from the output gap. 
72 Primary borrowing and debt are expressed as ratios of potential GDP. 
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73 The use of GMM-sys, compared to 
OLS, avoids estimation biases. Compared to other instrumental-variable estimators, 
such as the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM-dif, GMM-sys is potentially less affected 
by the problem of weak instruments, i.e. scarcely correlated with the variables to be 
instrumented, as is typical with persistent data such as debt or the output gap (see 
Celasun and Kang, 2006, for a thorough discussion of alternative estimators in the 
context of fiscal reaction functions).
74 Our preference for GMM-sys is also supported 
by the results reported in the Appendix, where the performance of alternative estimators 
is reported. 
                                                
Contrary to the most common practice of the reviewed studies, time effects (λt) are 
allowed (in all regressions presented in Table 6.2 they are found to be jointly 
significant). We include the time dummies (accounting for effects that are almost 
invariant to all countries and change over time) as, hopefully, they can reduce the 
omitted-variable bias stemming from the very simple specifications we are using.
75 
Four results stand out, which are largely independent of the sample used and the source 
of data: 
(a)  The estimates of the cyclical reaction using the CAPB/PB Model tend to indicate a 
more counter-cyclical behaviour than those of the CAPB Model. 
(b)  The estimates of the cyclical reaction based on the PB Model are relatively close to 
those of the other two models. This result is rather surprising. We would expect a 
large difference (close to 0.5) because the estimated coefficient of the PB Model 
should include, in principle, also the effects of automatic stabilizers. 
(c)  The estimates of the parameters of the initial fiscal conditions (debt and deficit) are 
largely constant across the three models, notwithstanding the fact that only in the 
CAPB Model the lagged deficit is cyclically adjusted. 
(d)  The estimates of almost all parameters are not significantly affected by the choice 
between the simultaneous and the lagged output gap (this emerges by comparing 
the coefficients in columns 1-3 with the corresponding ones in columns 4-6); the 
only (partial) exception is the estimate of the cyclical reaction measured by the PB 
Model. 
 
73 Omitting from the instruments the more distant lags does usually entail a limited loss of information. 
On the other side, it has been often pointed out that using too many instruments can significantly reduce 
the power of the Sargan test in finite samples (see, e.g., Bond, 2002). 
74 In Hayakawa (2007), it is analytically shown that in finite samples GMM-sys is less biased than GMM-
dif, even though it uses more instruments. However, as shown by the simulations reported in Bun and 
Kiviet (2006), the ranking of the alternative estimators depends on the specific model and characteristics 
of data. 
75 Allowing time dummies determines a non-negligeable shift of all estimates of the cyclical reaction 
towards counter-cyclicality (Table 6.2 reports the results of the specifications without time dummies). We 
interpret this result, in line with the argument stated in the main text, as reflecting an omitted variable bias 
in the coefficient of the output gap. This interpretation is supported by the fact that broadly the same shift 
towards counter-cyclicality in the estimates of the cyclical reaction occurs when we add additional 
variables (see Section 6.5). 
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following two sections we explain the other results. 
6.2.3 Comparing Model CAPB and Model CAPB/PB 
Starting from the CAPB-l Model (i.e. equation [1], in the variant which includes the 
lagged output gap) we subtract and add φ
C–l
capb ωi t–1 GAPi t–1 on the right side of the 
expression. Using also identity [4], we obtain the following equation, in which the 
CAPB/PB-l Model is expressed in terms of the CAPB-l Model parameters: 
Δ CAPBi t = φ
C–l
capb PB i t–1 + φ
C–l




capb × ωi t–1) GAPi t–1 + ui t 
[6] 
By comparing equation [6] with the CAPB/PB-l Model (i.e. equation [2], in the variant 
which includes the lagged output gap), we identify the following three relationships 










debt                                                  [7b] 











pb × ω)                    [7c] 
The first two equivalences indicate that in the CAPB and CAPB/PB Models the effects 
of the initial fiscal conditions (notwithstanding the different choice regarding the 
balance) are measured by the same parameters. The third relationship, which is not 
exact because we substitute the time- and country-specific coefficients measuring the 
effects of the automatic stabilizers ωi t–1 with their average value ω, indicates that the 
reaction to cyclical conditions estimated in the CAPB/PB Model is approximately equal 
to φ
C–l
gap (which measures the estimate of the reaction in the CAPB Model) minus the 
product of ω and the coefficient for the lagged deficit. 
This latter component is negative, since ω > 0 (otherwise, the automatic budgetary 




capb < 0 (otherwise, we would 
observe exploding deficits). Therefore, the estimates of the coefficient of the output gap 
in the CAPB/PB-l Model are systematically more counter-cyclical than those obtained 
using the CAPB-l Model. On the basis of the estimated parameters of the regression for 
the CAPB/PB-l Model in Table 6.2, the difference stemming from the modelling choice 
is 0.08, about twice the standard deviation of the estimate for the coefficient. A similar 
difference can be found when comparing the CAPB-s Model with the CAPB/PB-s 
Model. 
The explanation of the result obtained above is rather intuitive. Compared to the CAPB 
Model, in the CAPB/PB Model discretionary policies react to the lagged effects of the 
automatic stabilizers on the budget (with the same coefficient of their reaction to the 
lagged cyclically-adjusted deficit). This additional reaction, which is stabilizing with 
respect to public finances, is pro-cyclical and determines (compared to the CAPB 
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coefficient of the output gap. 
Summing up, CAPB and CAPB/PB Models are basically a re-parameterization of one 
another (as such, data cannot discriminate between them) and lead to different estimates 
only for the parameter of the output gap. The differences in the latter can be attributed 
to a different notion of cyclicality (net or gross of the reaction to the lagged effects of 
automatic stabilizers). In the lower part of Table 6.2 we present the estimate of φ
C–l
gap 
obtained using the parameters estimated with the CAPB/PB Model and the 
approximated relationship [7c]. The results are almost identical to the estimates based 
on the CAPB Model, suggesting that actual data fail to reject that relationship. 
6.2.4 Interpreting the cyclical reaction parameter in Model PB 
We add to both sides of the CAPB/PB-s Model (i.e. eq. [2] in the variant that includes 
the simultaneous output gap) the effects of the automatic stabilizers (Δ [ωi t GAPi t]). 
Using also identity [4], we obtain the following equation: 
Δ PBi t = φ
C/P
pb PB i t–1 + φ
C/P
i debt DEBTi t–1 + (φ
C/P
gap + ωi t) GAPi t – ωi t-1 GAPi t–1 + ui t 
[8] 
Eq. [8] differs from the PB-s Model by the presence of the last term (– ωi t-1 GAPi t–1). It 
shows that if we could omit that term, directly estimating the discretionary cyclical 
reaction in the CAPB/PB-s Model would be approximately equivalent to subtracting ω 
from the estimate of the cyclical reaction in the PB-s Model (the two alternatives are not 
exactly equivalent because we treat ω as a constant). 
We can disregard the last term of eq. [8] only if we can assume that it is uncorrelated 
with all the other regressors. However, the very notion of economic cycle implies the 
correlation over time of the output gap. If we assume the autocorrelation coefficient ρ = 
1, so that GAPi t = GAPi t–1 + vi t and ωi t = ωi t–1, we obtain the following equation: 
  Δ PB i t = φ
C/P
pb PB i t–1 + φ
C/P
i debt DEBTi t–1+ (φ
C/P
gap) GAPi t + ui t + ωi t vi t    [9] 
Eq. [9] shows that under these assumptions the estimate of the output gap parameter of 
the CAPB/PB-s Model is identical to that of the PB-s Model.
76 
As noted, the output gap is highly persistent, with values of the autocorrelation 
coefficient ρ for the different data sources ranging between 0.8 and 0.9. This behaviour 
(a quasi random walk) intuitively explains our findings in Section 2.2 that the estimates 
of the cyclical reaction in the PB model are relatively close to those of the CAPB/PB 
Model. 
Sustituting GAPi t with ρ GAP i t–1, with a few simple manipulations we can obtain 
approximate relationships between the parameters of the PB Model and those of the 
CAPB Model. The effects of the initial fiscal conditions are measured by approximately 
the same parameters (an exact equivalence was found in Section 2.3 for the CAPB and 
CAPB/PB models). The approximate relationship between the coefficients measuring 
                                                 
76 If the output gap behaves as a random walk, adding (or subtracting) the effects of the automatic 
stabilizers from the dependent variable has no impact on the estimates because in that case Δ (ωi t GAPi t) 
collapses into the unpredictable noise ωi t vit, which simply inflates the random component ui t. 
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pb × ω) + ((1 – ρ) × ω)                                       [10]
 
In the lower part of Table 6.2 we present the estimate of φ
C–l
gap obtained using the 
parameters estimated with the PB Model and eq. [10]. As in the similar exercise 
described in Section 6.2.3, the results are very close to the estimate based on the CAPB 
Model, suggesting that eq. [10] is validated by actual data. 
Summing up, if the output gap has low autocorrelation the estimate of the output gap 
parameter of the PB Model differs from that of the CAPB/PB Model by approximately 
the value of ω. The two estimates are therefore consistent, taking into account eq. [5]. If 
the output gap has high autocorrelation, which is our case, the two estimates are instead 
relatively close. In this case, using eq. [5] (i.e. subtracting ω from the PB Model 
estimate) leads to a large difference in the cyclical reaction attributed to discretionary 
policy, with the PB Model suggesting a much more pro-cyclical (or a much less 
counter-cyclical) policy than the CAPB/PB Model (or the CAPB Model). The 
difference can be as large as 0.5, or twelve times the standard deviation of the estimates. 
It is hard to judge, and it is outside the scope of this paper, whether the PB model is a 
better description of policy choices than the other two. In particular, all the three models 
lack a fully satisfactory theoretical underpinning. Nevertheless, the first two models 
appear to be more direct solutions for the specific aim of gauging the cyclicality of 
discretionary policies and they are used in most of the works covered in our review of 
the literature. We therefore refer to them in assessing the cyclicality of fiscal policies in 
the rest of the paper. 
6.3.  Time periods and sources of data 
In this section we assess to what extent the estimates of the fiscal rule depend on the 
source of data (OECD against European Commission, henceforth EC), on the data 
vintage (ex post against real-time), and on the estimation period. We focus on the CAPB 
Model. In the initial part of the analysis we provide additional evidence of the broad 
equivalence between the results based on the CAPB-s and CAPB-l Models. Henceforth, 
we present results mainly based on the CAPB-l Model. We include, when jointly 
significant, fixed time effects. 
To avoid repetitions we do not estimate the CAPB/PB and PB Models. The results for 
these models are approximately equal to those of the CAPB Model for all parameters 
except for the one assessing the cyclical reaction. To recover the estimates of the output 
gap parameter of the CAPB/PB-l Model, (using the approximate relationship [7c]) those 
of the CAPB-l Model need to be shifted upward (toward counter-cyclicality) by 
approximately 0.1. As for the PB-l Model, the estimates of the coefficient (using the 
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the other two models.
77 
Figure 6.1 compares across different samples (obtained by rolling regressions with a 
fixed window of 15 years over 1978-2006) the GMM-sys estimated (see Section 6.2.2) 
parameters using the CAPB-s Model with those using the CAPB-l Model, obtained with 
OECD ex post data. In this figure, four graphs are reported. The two in the upper row 
and the one in the lower left-hand allow us to assess the estimates of the parameters of, 
respectively, the lagged deficit (upper-left), the lagged debt (upper-right), and the output 
gap (lower-left). The points of each graph are marked with labels indicating the model 
used in the estimation (CAPB-s or CAPB-l). Each point corresponds to an estimate 
obtained over the sub-sample ending in the year indicated on the horizontal axis and 
starting 15 years before. For each estimation period, the 95% confidence interval of the 
estimate obtained with the CAPB-s Model is plotted. The confidence interval shown in 
the lower right-hand graph is an average of the two confidence intervals based on the 
CAPB-s and CAPB-l Models; it is centred on zero: approximately, the φ
A
gap point 
estimates falling inside this zero-interval are not significantly different from zero. 
As we found in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, the estimated parameters of both lagged deficit and 
debt, plotted, respectively, in the first row of graphs, are indistinguishable. The φ
C
gap 
point estimates of the CAPB-l Model (in the lower left-hand graph) are always 
relatively close to those of the CAPB-s Model and fall well inside their confidence 
interval. This supports the view (based on the high persistence of the output gap) that 
the two variants are interchangeable. Finally, in the lower right-hand graph, φ
C
gap 
estimates with the CAPB-s and CAPB-l Models both fall inside the average 95% 
confidence interval, indicating that by using ex post OECD data the hypothesis of an a-
cyclical policy cannot be rejected for all periods. 
Figures 6.2-6.4 compare the CAPB-l Model parameter estimates across different 
samples (again obtained by rolling regressions with a fixed 15 year window) for four 
different data sources: OECD ex post data (labelled OECD), OECD ex post data for 
fiscal variables and estimates of the output gap based on ex post GDP and the Hodrick-
Prescott filter applied to GDP in log-levels (labelled HP), AMECO ex post data 
(labelled EC) and the real-time data computed in Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) on 
the basis of various issues of the OECD Economic Outlook (labelled RT).
78 Due to data 
unavailability, the starting point of the estimates based on real-time data is 1988, which 
corresponds to 2002 as final year. The structure of Figures 6.2-6.3 is the same as the one 
for Figure 6.1 Figure 6.4 focuses only on the parameter estimates of the cyclical 
reaction. 
From Figures 6.2-6.3 it emerges that the φcapb and φdebt point estimates are not 
statistically different for all samples and across different data sources and vintages. 
Instead, differences emerge for φ
C–s
gap point estimates. As shown in Figure 6.4, OECD 
and HP based estimates suggest an a-cyclical behaviour; EC and RT estimates point to a 
weak, generally not significant, counter-cyclicality. To translate these results in terms of 
the notion of cyclicality embodied in the CAPB/PB Model, all φ
C–s
gap estimates would 
                                                 
77 As for the variants with simultaneous output gap, there is approximately the same difference (0.1) 
between the coefficient of the CAPB Model and the CAPB/PB Model, while the estimate of the 
coefficient of the PB Model tend to be close to that of the CAPB/PB Model. 
78 As OECD data for public debt are incomplete, for this variable we always use AMECO data. 
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case, most EC and RT estimates would become significant. 
Changes in the time span do not seem to significantly influence the estimates. As the 
sample moves forward over time, excluding the furthest years and including the most 
recent ones, the estimates shift slightly in the direction of pro-cyclicality. This result 
contrasts with other papers, which find a shift from pro-cyclicality to a-cyclicality after 
the Maastricht Treaty (Wyplosz, 2006; IMF, 2004; Galí and Perotti, 2003). 
In Table 6.4 we report the estimation results of the CAPB-l Model over the fixed 
1988-2006 period
79 for the four different data sources and vintages. In all cases, the 
usual over-identifying restrictions and residuals’ autocorrelation tests are always largely 
not rejected, while the time effects are always significant. The results broadly confirm 
the indications emerging from Figures 6.1-6.4. 
Summing up, the results included in this section suggest the following remarks. 
The significance of the fixed time effects is a common feature in all cases under 
scrutiny. This fact highlights the need of always including them in order to prevent 
biased estimates due to the omission of relevant factors influencing all countries at the 
same time (e.g. fluctuations in the prices of stocks and oil). 
Independently of model, sample period, data source and vintage, the initial fiscal 
conditions (lagged borrowing and debt) always matter. This evidence suggests caution 
when using inferences on the cyclical response of fiscal policies based on models 
omitting these two regressors. 
Findings about cyclical conditions do not enjoy a comparable robustness. Point 
estimates of the cyclical reaction of discretionary policies tend to be influenced (and the 
sign reversed) by the use of alternative data sources and/or vintages. The sample 
selection is generally less important. The overall picture is that of a-cyclicality in ex 
post data and counter-cyclicality (significant with the CAPB/PB Model and not 
significant with the CAPB Model) with real-time data. 
6.4.  Policy asymmetries 
Two approaches can be followed when testing for asymmetries in fiscal behaviour. The 
sample can be split into two sub-samples (corresponding to “good” and “bad” times) 
and two distinct sets of estimates for the parameters of the fiscal rule are obtained. 
Alternatively, only the φgap parameter can be allowed to vary across the two states of 
nature. In what follows, we refer to the practice of splitting the sample as the “two-
sample approach” (2SA) and to that of splitting only the φgap parameter as the “two-
parameter approach” (2PA). 
The first approach (2SA) is more general. If all parameters change across states, 2SA 
leads to consistent and efficient estimates of all the parameter shifts, while 2PA 
estimates are biased and inconsistent. If only the parameter φgap shifts, 2SA leads to still 
consistent but inefficient estimates, while 2PA is consistent and efficient. 
                                                 
79 The period 1988-2006 corresponds to the largest sample available for real-time data. 
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invalid symmetry restrictions to φcapb and φdebt parameters and to the deterministic 
components of the model, we follow two sequential steps. First, the sample is split, 
following 2SA, and the joint significance of the shifts between states of nature in all 
model parameters except φgap  is assessed. Second, if the null (i.e. parameters are 
symmetrical) of the previous test is rejected, the symmetry of the policy reaction to the 
economic cycle is assessed with the same test but including all model parameters. If the 
null is not rejected, the more efficient 2PA is carried out, and the symmetry of the 
policy reaction to the economic cycle is assessed by testing for the significance of the 
φgap shift between “good” and “bad” times. 
In Figure 6.5 we present the results for the CAPB-l Model
80 of these two sequential 
steps across data sources and vintages and sample periods. In the upper part, we show 
whether the null of symmetry of all model parameters except φgap is rejected (black 
boxes) or not (grey boxes). In the lower part we show whether the null of policy rule 
symmetry is rejected (black boxes) or not (grey boxes) by using the most appropriate 
approach (either 2SA or 2PA, depending on the outcome of the upper part). The two 
diagrams are identical, indicating that, if the first test is not rejected, asymmetry in the 
cyclical reaction is never found and, if the first test is rejected, asymmetry for all 
parameters, including φgap, is always found. In other terms, when asymmetry exists, it 
always depends on a general shift in parameters of the rule and not on a specific shift of 
φgap. Indeed, when we restrict our attention to the final φgap parameters, independently of 
the result of the first test, they are never significantly different. This is shown for the 
specific period 1988-2006 in Table 6.5. Another indication emerging from Figure 6.5 is 
that the answer to whether policies are symmetrical or asymmetrical varies, with ex post 
information, across data sources and time periods. With real-time data, the indication is 
of symmetrical behaviour. 
Figure 6.6 plots the differences between the φ
C
gap parameter in good and bad times. 
Though not significant, such differences are always positive in all the samples ending 
later than 1995. A similar indication is also conveyed by the analysis of the constant 
term across states of nature. These results seem at odds the usual interpretation of 
asymmetry, i.e. that it arises because government action is pro-cyclical in good times.
81 
In order to give an insight into the level of the alternative φ
C
gap estimates, Figure 6.6 
also reports two splines representing the yearly average of the φ
C
gap parameters in good 
and bad times for the three sources of ex post data (from 1992) and for real-time data 
(from 2002). 
To integrate the analysis carried out in Figures 6.5 and 6.6, in Table 6.5 we report the 
GMM-sys estimates of the CAPB-l Model for four alternative data sources and vintages 
over the same 1988-2006 period. For each source the final outcome of the general-to-
                                                 
80 CAPB-l and CAPB/PB-l Models have the advantage, over CAPB-s and CAPB/PB-s Models, of 
avoiding the risk of biased parameter estimates linked to an endogenous selection of good and bad times. 
In fact, in order to split either the whole sample or only the gap parameter, a zero-one indicator variable Ii 
t must be defined. When the cyclical indicator is the output gap in levels, the usual practice is to set Ii t = 1 
if GAPi t > 0 (“good times”), and Ii t = 0 if GAPi t ≤ 0 (“bad times”). However, this selection risks being 
endogenous, given the possible simultaneity between the idiosyncratic policy shock εi t (see equations [1] 
to [3] of Section 6.2) and the actual GAPi t realisation that drives Ii t. If such endogeneity occurs, the 
selection based on the sign of the output gap at time t entails biased parameter estimates. 
81 See European Commission (2006a, Part IV). 
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reported in two columns (for good and bad times), while if 2PA proves to be valid, a 
single column suffices. 
The lower part of Table 6.5, at the “no-switch” row, reports the p-value of the test 
whose null admits the restriction from 2SA to 2PA. Results clearly reject the null with 
EC data and with HP data.
82 Results with OECD and RT, instead, do not reject 2PA as a 
valid reduction of 2SA. Alone, the shift in the output gap effect is never the main cause 
of symmetry rejection, as shown by high p-values of the “no-shift” hypothesis, never 
rejected in the last row of the table. 
Results in the upper part of Table 6.5 confirm the findings of Section 6.3: the data 
source affects the estimates of the policy reaction to cyclical conditions. With OECD, 
HP and EC the policy is weakly a-cyclical, while with RT it is weakly counter-cyclical. 
 
6.5.  Extending the “core” model 
In Sections 6.2-6.4 we abstracted from a number of specific variables included in our 
sample of 12 studies, in order to focus on what we called “core” components of the 
fiscal rule – the dependent variable and the initial conditions of public finances. In this 
Section we add, when feasible, the additional variables used and found significant in 
this group of studies. The aim is to understand, in a common framework, how important 
these variables are and to what extent they modify the conclusions reached in Sections 
6.3-6.4. 
In this version of the paper, we are able to include, in addition to the variables used in 
the regressions presented in Table 6.5, four groups of explanatory variables. First, in 
order to capture the impact of European fiscal rules on the behaviour of the countries in 
excessive deficit, we introduce a regressor, φm (referred to as the Maastricht variable) 
which defines a benchmark correction of the primary balance which is essentially a 
function of the excessive deficit and the number of years in which the latter needs to be 
eliminated.
83 Second, the relevance of the electoral cycle is assessed by using three 
dummy variables. They are equal to 1, respectively, in the year of regular elections 
(φe1), defined as those held at the end of a full term, in the year before (φe2), and in the 
year of unexpected (snap) elections (φe3).
84 Third, the ex ante real interest rate 
(measured by the nominal three-month interest rate minus the expected rate of inflation) 
is added in order to allow for the interaction of fiscal and monetary policies. In fact, this 
variable (labelled φmonpol) can be considered as a simple proxy of the monetary 
conditions under the assumption that central banks control short-term interest rates (see, 
                                                 
82 The lack of significance of time effects in good times and their significance in bad times may 
contribute to the no-switch rejection with EC and OECD-HP. 
83 The Maastricht variable is set equal to zero in the years before 1992 or if the deficit is below the 3% 
threshold. For the years 1992-96, it is equal to the difference between the deficit and 3% of GDP, divided 
by the number of years leading up to 1997 and then reduced by the expected change in interest 
expenditure in the following year. After 1996, the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact (in 
principle, also of its 2005 version) require countries to correct an excessive deficit in the year after its 
official recognition, which usually occurs with a one-year lag. Therefore, in the first year that an 
excessive deficit occurs, the excess deficit is divided by the constant 2 and, in the following years, by one. 
See Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) for further details. 
84 Details concerning the election dummies are in Golinelli and Momigliano (2006). 
  128e.g., Faini, 2006). Finally, two dummy variables, for “commitment states” and 
“delegation states” (φcom and φdel), refer to a well known classification of budgetary 
institutions (as set out in Hallerberg, 2004), and a synthetic indicator (φrule) captures the 
overall set of national-level numerical fiscal rules.
85 
Table 6.6 presents a set of estimates analogous to that of Table 6.5, but includes the 
additional variables mentioned above. The results broadly confirm the conclusions 
drawn on the basis of Table 6.5. The main differences are: 
(a) The evidence of asymmetric fiscal behaviour becomes stronger; the null of policy  
symmetry is rejected for all data sources. 
(b) We find large asymmetries (often individually significant) in the coefficients of 
many of the additional explanatory variables. This strengthens the conclusion, 
already reached on the basis of the “core” model, that the asymmetric cyclical 
effects operate through a general shift of the model parameters. 
(c) The evidence of counter-cyclical behaviour with real-time data becomes clearer. 
(d) The (stabilizing) reaction to the lagged debt with ex post data is weaker. 
(e) Time effects are less significant (except for the results with real-time data). 
Overall, though the inclusion of eight additional parameters in the splitted samples may 
entail some inefficient estimates, there is a remarkable increase of the explanatory 
power of the enriched rule, as documented by the increase of about 20-30% in all the 
measures of goodness-of-fit. In order to improve the readability of the results, Table 6.6 
reports in bold the estimates that are 10% significantly different to zero. The increase to 
10% of the significance level of the t-tests tries to take in account the loss of efficiency 
due to the inclusion in the model of a number of (possibly) irrelevant explanatory 
variables. We refrained from “fine-tuning” the model specifications to allow full 
comparability between the enlarged specification adopted in this section with the “core” 
model used above. 
More in detail, the significance of the inclusion of the regular electoral dummies 
(prevalently affecting policies in good times) is warranted by the results of a joint test 
for the presence of an electoral cycle; this finding is independent from the data used. 
Snap elections seem to exert some relevant effects only using ex post data. 
The Maastricht variable is significant only in case of bad times; however, the limited 
number of cases of excess deficit in good times does not allow for valid inferences.
86 
Table 6.7 reports the detail about data availability in good and bad times. Note that 
negative estimates of the Maastricht variable parameter suggest that a country in excess 
of deficit further adjusts its finances with respect to what would be implied by the 
parameters of the fiscal initial conditions. 
                                                 
85We wish to thank Alessandro Turrini and Laurent Moulin for kindly supplying the data concerning the 
overall index used in the regression. For information concerning the original source and the aggregation 
methodology, see Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2007). 
86 The same can be said for the snap elections. Note also that the shift towards counter-cyclicality would 
also emerge by simply adding the Maastricht variable, alone, to the “core” model. 
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in significance across different sources of data. The prevalently negative sign suggests 
(as in IMF, 2004 and in Galí and Perotti, 2003) that fiscal and monetary policies are 
substitutes: when monetary policy is tight, discretionary fiscal policy loosens with 
respect to what it would otherwise be. The small magnitude of the estimates implies that 
the fiscal policy is only a very slight substitute for monetary policy. 
The results for the variables capturing the role exerted by budgetary institutions and 
fiscal rules seem to suggest that “commitment” strategies may be relatively more 
successful in solving the common pool problem inherent in budget preparation, but only 
in bad times. 
6.6.  Conclusions 
Whether discretionary fiscal policies act counter- or pro-cyclically and whether their 
reaction is symmetric or asymmetric over the cycle are still largely unsettled questions. 
The different results obtained by the empirical literature may in principle depend on the 
model of policy decisions used, the estimation procedures adopted, the countries 
included in the sample, the periods of time analyzed, or the source of data selected 
(including different vintages of data from the same source). 
In this paper we restrict our attention to a subset of relatively homogeneous papers 
presenting econometric evidence on the euro-area countries and assess the role of all the 
factors mentioned above in a common empirical context in order to disentangle their 
relevance. 
In the first part of the paper we assess the impact of different choices in modelling fiscal 
behaviour. We focus on the “core” components of the fiscal rule – the dependent 
variable and the initial conditions of public finances – finding in the studies reviewed 
three basic specifications of fiscal behaviour. We show that these fiscal rules – whose 
regressors are only the initial conditions of public finances (debt and deficit) and the 
output gap – lead to significant differences in the estimates of the parameter measuring 
the reaction to cyclical conditions. In particular, comparing the first model (CAPB) – 
used in most empirical studies – with the second (CAPB/PB), the latter suggests a 
slightly more counter-cyclical behaviour. The difference can be ascribed to the different 
notions of fiscal policy cyclicality embodied in the fiscal rules (net or gross of the 
reaction to the lagged effects of automatic stabilizers). 
For the third model (PB), the assessment of the cyclical reaction of discretionary 
policies based on eq. [5] reflects a third notion of cyclicality. The use of this 
specification, depending on the characteristics of the series of the output gap, may give 
results vastly different from those based on the first or second model. 
This part of the paper shows the need for extreme caution in comparing empirical 
results based on different models. In our opinion, there is often insufficient awareness of 
these issues when the estimates of the output gap parameter of the different studies are 
used in the policy debate. 
In the second part of the paper we focus on the first of the three models and examine the 
impact of time period and source of data on the estimates. In particular, we estimate 
  130rolling regressions with a fixed window of 15 years over the period 1978-2006 for four 
alternative datasets: three of them are based on ex post data sources and the fourth 
largely on real-time data, available only for the reduced 1988-2006 period. The results 
suggest that: 
(a) The different data sources have sizeable effects on the estimates of the reaction of 
fiscal policy to cyclical conditions. In particular, real time data indicate weakly 
counter-cyclical policies while ex post data sources broadly suggest a-cyclicality. 
Overall, we do not find support for the frequently upheld notion of pro-cyclical 
fiscal policies.
87 
(b)   Independently of the data source, changes in the time span do not seem to 
significantly influence the estimates. This result contrasts with other papers, which 
find a shift from pro-cyclicality to a-cyclicality after the Maastricht Treaty 
(Wyplosz, 2006; IMF, 2004; Galí and Perotti, 2003). 
(c) The effect of the fiscal initial conditions (lagged debt and deficit) on policies is 
strongly significant. This evidence suggests caution when using inferences on the 
cyclical response of fiscal policies based on models omitting these regressors. 
(d) Testing for asymmetries in fiscal behaviour, we find contrasting results, depending 
on both ex post data sources and sample periods. We also find that the asymmetric 
behaviour of the discretionary policy, when present, entails shifts in all the 
parameters of the rule and not only in the output gap parameter. 
In the final part of the paper we extend the basic model to include the additional 
variables found significant in the group of studies we reviewed. This was possible only 
for some regressors, due to data limitations. This extension determines a substantial 
increase in the explanatory power, but the conclusions reached on the basis of the 
“core” fiscal reaction function are generally confirmed. The only important differences 
are that policy asymmetry is now found for all data sources and that the evidence of 
weakly counter-cyclical behaviour with real time data is clearer. 
                                                 
87 An example is the following statements, from OECD (2007): “Fiscal policy has not contributed to 
stabilising the cycle in the euro area. When the economy was above potential at the start of the decade 
several fiscal authorities did not allow the automatic stabilizers to operate fully as they used cyclical tax 
receipts to finance tax cuts and expenditure increases…[ ] More systematic investigations using longer 
time series confirm the observation that fiscal policy tends to act pro-cyclically in euro area countries”. 
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Results based on GMM-sys and alternative estimators 
GMM estimators are typically used to obtain consistent parameter estimates in the 
context of dynamic single equations with panel data. However, GMM may be subject to 
large finite-sample biases when available instruments are weak (see e.g. Bond, 2002). 
Specifically, this problem occurs using GMM-dif when data are highly persistent. 
All variables used in the core specifications of our study show relevant persistence: the 
autoregressive parameters of primary balance, output gap and debt are in the range 0.7-
0.9 (details are available upon request). Therefore, we expect that pooled OLS, within-
groups and GMM-dif estimates be biased. In particular, Blundell and Bond (1998) 
suggests that the lagged dependent variable parameter OLS estimate is likely to be 
upward biased, while the within group and GMM-dif estimates are likely to be 
downwards biased. As a consequence, also the other parameter estimates (i.e. those of 
the output gap and the debt) will be biased in a direction that depends on the 
covariances of model variables. 
Table 6.8 reports the estimates of the CAPB-s Model using the following approaches: 
GMM-sys, pooled OLS, within group and GMM-dif.
88 Data used are ex post measures. 
All GMM estimates are one-step, which is a standard practice in the empirical literature 
in view of the very modest efficiency gains from two-step estimators and of the lower 
reliability of their asymptotic distribution approximations. Regarding the choice of the 
instruments, GMM estimates in the columns 5-8 use the subset spanned by lags from t–
2 to t–3 (the same as that used in Tables 6.2 and 6.3), while columns 9-12 report 
estimates from the alternative subset spanned by lags from t–2 to t–4. 
The validity of the additional moment conditions exploited by GMM-sys with respect to 
GMM-dif is subject to the condition that the means of the relevant series be constant 
within each country. This assumption is more acceptable in models with time effects, as 
their presence entails means that are constant once the series are expressed as deviations 
from period-specific averages, i.e. that the country-means evolve over time in a 
common way. This is another reason to add the time dummies in our models, beyond 
those given in the main text. Estimation results in Table 6.8 are in line with the main 
predictions found in the literature, see e.g. Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond (2002). 
In fact, pooled OLS present the highest estimate of the autoregressive parameter 
(defined as φcapb+1, and equal to about 0.81), while the within group persistence 
estimate is lower (about 0.75). GMM-sys estimate stay in the middle (about 0.8) of the 
overestimating pooled OLS and underestimating within group. Such range is small, 
reflecting: the low individual-effects variability (only about 10% of the total 
unexplained heterogeneity)
89 and the relatively long time span. Indeed, our span of 
about 30 years is probably enough to prevent large negative biases, as the bias of the 
within groups estimates in dynamic panel models is inversely proportional to the 
number of time periods (see Nickell, 1981; Judson and Owen, 1999; and Attanasio et 
                                                 
88 Qualitatively similar outcomes could be reported for all the other models used in this study. 
89 If the individual-effects variability had been high, we would have expected the pooled OLS residuals to 
be positively autocorrelated because of the individual effects omission, while here the autocorrelation 
tests never reject the hypothesis of white noise residuals (see the results in the first column of Table 6.8). 
  132al., 2000).
90 Due to the data persistence noted above, GMM-dif estimates of the 
autoregressive parameter are heavily underestimated, because they rely on weak 
instruments. 
Other parameter estimates are consistent with the assessment above: for example, 
GMM-dif debt parameter estimates seem unreasonably high and this fact may be related 
to their underestimation of the autoregressive parameter, which measures policy 
persistence. 
The output gap parameter estimates in models without time dummies are always 
significantly pro-cyclical. As also shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, the introduction of time 
dummies shifts all the estimates towards counter-cyclicality (but does not involve 
significant changes in the other model estimates and in model diagnostics). We interpret 
this result as reflecting an omitted variable bias in the coefficient of the output gap. This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that the inclusion of additional regressors (see 
Section 6.5) weakens both the significance of time dummies and the policy pro-
cyclicality. 
The choice of instrument subsets does not affect estimates (the last four columns of 
Table 6.8 report estimates that are almost undistinguishable from those in the previous 
four columns) but it influences outcomes of the Sargan overidentification restriction 
test.
91 Therefore, the estimation results in Table 6.2 and 6.3 can be considered not 
largely affected by mild 5% (but almost never 1%) overidentifying restrictions 
rejections. In addition, note also that the differences Sargan statistics, testing for the 
validity of the additional moment conditions of the GMM-sys, accepts their validity 
with high p-values: lagged first-differences are informative instruments for the 
endogenous variables in levels. 
Overall, main results in this appendix can be summarised as follows. 
First, the estimation method matters for the parameter outcomes. Biases in the 
estimation of the autoregressive parameters (here, they are badly underestimated by 
GMM-dif) induce biases in the other model parameter estimates. Estimates in Table 6.8, 
interpreted in the light of the basic results of the literature, lead to the presumption that 
GMM-sys estimator is the best performing method. 
Second, notwithstanding the mild rejection of overidentifying restriction tests, we find 
that the choice of instrument subsets does not affect estimates. Therefore, we set the 
lags from t–2 to t–3 as instruments for all the estimates in the present paper. In this 
                                                 
90 We also use shorter samples (only 15 years). In these cases the bias of within group estimator may be 
larger. 
91 Therefore, the rejection of the Sargan test using lags t–2 and t–3 as instruments cannot be ascribed to 
lag t–2, as it enters both subsets of instruments. Instrumenting with only the subset t–3 and t–4, i.e. 
omitting lag t–2 as if it was not valid because of measurement errors (see Blundell and Bond, 1999), 
delivers results (not reported) that are very similar to those with instruments from t–2 to t–4. 
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regard, note that Sargan tests for shorter time spans or for more complex models (e.g. 
allowing for policy asymmetries or for more regressors) never reject the null of valid 
instruments.  
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Table 6.1  The Cyclical Reaction of Fiscal Policies in a Homogeneous Group of Recent Studies 
(1) 
Studies  Countries  Period  Data  Additional variables  Asymmetry   Cyclicality  
Annett (2006)  EMU-11  1980-2004 (272)  OECD  Fiscal governance & elections n.a.  Pro-cyclical (ante-Maastricht) 
a-cyclical (post-Maas.) 
(2) 
Debrun & Kumar (2006)  OCSE-13  1990-2004 (224)  OECD  Fiscal rules & political v.  n.a.  Pro-cyclical (some specifications) 
(3) 
European Commission (2006)  EMU-11  1980-2005 (251)  EC (AMECO)  dummies: >91 e >98  asymmetry 
(4) A-cyclical (o.gaps<0) pro-cyclical (o. gaps>0) 
(4) 
Golinelli & 
Momigliano(2006)  EMU-11  1988-2006 (209)  real time   Maastricht var. & elections  symmetry  Counter-cyclical  
Wyplosz (2006)  EMU-10  1980-2005  OECD  none 
(5) n.a.  Pro-cyclical (ante-Maastricht) 
a-cyclical (post-Maast.) 
CEPII (2005)  EMU-10  1981-2005  OECD  none  symmetry  Acyclical 
Balassone & Francese (2004)  EU,USA,JAP  1970-2000  EC (AMECO)  none  symmetry 
(6) Pro-cyclical 
Forni & Momigliano (2004)  EMU-10  1993-2003 (110)  real time   Maastricht var.  asymmetry   Counter-cyclical (o.gaps<0) a-cyclical (o. gaps>0) 
IMF (2004)  EMU-11  1982-2003 (242)  OECD  Monetary gaps 
(7) symmetry  Pro-cyclical (ante-Maastricht) 
a-cyclical (post-Maast.) 





EMU-10  1979-1998  EC (AMECO)  none  n.a.  A-cyclical (overall assessment of individual reg.) 
Brunila & 
Martinez-Mongay (2002)  EU 1970-1997  EC  (AMECO)  none 
(8) n.a.  Pro-cyclical 
(1) We refer to the 5 percent level of significance in our assessment of the reported results. 
(2) We refer to the specification which includes country dummies in Table 5 of the 
paper. 
(3) We refer to Table 3 of the paper; other results presented by the authors tend to indicate, for most specifications, a-cyclicality. 
(4) The evidence of asymmetric 
behaviour and the assessment concerning cyclicality, in line with the conclusions drawn in the paper, take into account both the estimates for the constant and for the 
coefficient of the output gap. The coefficient for the output gap has roughly the same value irrespective of cyclical conditions (good or bad) and would indicate a-cyclicality 
(5) 
We refer to column 3 of Table 2a of the paper. The specification does not include the lagged deficit. 
(6) Balassone and Francese (2004) conclude in favour of asymmetry on the 
basis of an equation with the overall balance as dependent variable. For the sake of comparability with the other studies we use the results of the equation with the primary 
balance (also reported by the authors), where the asymmetry is not significant. 
(7) We refer to the results of the upper part of Table 2.8 of the Appendix 2.4. The study 
examines the role of other regressors in separate analyses. 
(8) We refer to Figure 6.7 (also published in European Commission, 2001) which shows the results of a regression 
involving, as dependent variable, the changes in CAPB, and as regressors, a constant and the output gap. The analysis refer only to episodes where over at least three years the 
absolute values of the annual average output gap and of the annual average change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance were bigger than 0.25% of trend GDP.  
Table 6.2  Estimates of Alternative Fiscal Rules with Time Effects 
(1) 
  Explanatory output gap in t  Explanatory output gap in t–1 
Model: CAPB-s  CAPB/PB-s  PB-s CAPB-l  CAPB/PB-l PB-l 
Dependent variable:  ΔCAPBit  ΔCAPBit  ΔPBit  ΔCAPBit  ΔCAPBit  ΔPBit 
–0.203     –0.203    
(0.035)     (0.035)    
φcapb 
–5.81     –5.73    
 –0.195  –0.206   –0.198  –0.191 
 (0.036)  (0.037)   (0.036)  (0.037) 
φpb 
 –5.40  –5.55   –5.52  –5.14 
0.009 0.009  0.010  0.009 0.009 0.009 
(0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
φdebt 
3.48 3.35  3.60  3.47 3.45 3.32 
–0.042     –0.031    




–1.06     –0.79    
 0.034     0.054  




 0.85     1.39  
   0.093     –0.001 




   2.24     –0.02 
–0.145 –0.214  –0.092  –0.156 –0.179 –0.132 
(0.394) (0.397)  (0.407)  (0.396) (0.396) (0.410) 
average μi 
(2) 
–0.37 –0.54  –0.23  –0.39 –0.45 –0.32 
Observations = N×T  300 300  300  300 300 300 
T   27.27 27.27  27.27  27.27 27.27 27.27 
Sargan’ test 
(3)  0.0127 0.0138  0.0055  0.0152 0.0117 0.0036 
Autocorrelation 
(4)    0.3921 0.3726  0.4032  0.3765 0.3954 0.3996 
R-squared 
(5)  0.2971 0.2817  0.1584  0.2906 0.2900 0.1659 
Time effects significance 




(7)         –0.042 
(7) –0.036 
(8) 
         (0.040)  (0.041) 
(1) GMM-sys estimates, see Blundell and Bond (1998), over the 1978-2006 period. Below each point estimate, the 
corresponding standard error is in brackets and the Student’s t is in italics. 
(2) Average of the 11 country-effects 
estimates. 
(3) Over-identifying restrictions test, p-values. 
(4) Residuals’ 2
nd order autocorrelation test, p-values. 
(5) Proxied by the squared correlation between actual and fitted values. 
(6) Test for the null hypothesis that all the 28 
time dummies are jointly zero, p-values. 





above, and ω = 0.4825, i.e. the sample average of ωit (the semi-elasticity of primary balance w.r.t. the output gap 
stemming from automatic stabilizers; source, see Girouard and André, 2007). 





pb estimated above, and ω = 0.4825, i.e. the sample average of ωit (the semi-elasticity of 
primary balance w.r.t. the output gap stemming from automatic stabilizers; source, see Girouard and André, 2006). 
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Table 6.3  Estimates of Alternative Fiscal Rules without Time Effects 
(1) 
  Explanatory output gap in t  Explanatory output gap in t–1 
Model: CAPB-s  CAPB/PB-s  PB-s CAPB-l  CAPB/PB-l PB-l 
Dependent variable:  ΔCAPBit  ΔCAPBit  ΔPBit  ΔCAPBit  ΔCAPBit  ΔPBit 
–0.201     –0.217    
(0.032)     (0.032)    
φcapb 
–6.35     –6.73    
 –0.207  –0.223   –0.219  –0.170 
 (0.034)  (0.036)   (0.033)  (0.035) 
φpb 
 –6.17  –6.11   –6.67  –4.83 
0.011 0.011  0.014  0.011 0.011 0.011 
(0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
φdebt 
4.24 4.09  4.79  4.23 4.24 3.88 
–0.105     –0.096    




–3.53     –3.18    
 –0.030      0.001   




 –0.93      0.03   
   0.069     –0.073 




   1.95     –2.15 
–0.559 –0.550  –0.669  –0.547 –0.556 –0.626 
(0.173) (0.175)  (0.190)  (0.176) (0.176) (0.188) 
average μi 
(2) 
–3.23 –3.15  –3.53  –3.12 –3.16 –3.33 
Observations = N×T  300 300  300  300 300 300 
T   27.27 27.27  27.27  27.27 27.27 27.27 
Sargan’ test 
(3)  0.0261 0.0288  0.0080  0.0391 0.0331 0.0048 
Autocorrelation 
(4)  0.4293 0.3856  0.5207  0.3644 0.3737 0.5018 
R-squared 




(6)         –0.105 
(6) –0.085 
(7) 
         (0.031)  (0.032) 
(1) GMM-sys estimates, see Blundell and Bond (1998), over the 1978-2006 period. Below each point estimate, the 
corresponding standard error is in brackets and the Student’s t is in italics. 
(2) Average of the 11 country-effects 
estimates. 
(3) Over-identifying restrictions test, p-values. 
(4) Residuals’ 2
nd order autocorrelation test, p-values. 
(5) Proxied by the squared correlation between actual and fitted values. 
(6) See footnote 7 to Table 6.2. 
(7) See 
footnote 8 to Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.4  CAPB–l Model Estimates with Alternative Data Sources 
(1) 
Source: OECD  HP 
(2) EC RT 
(3) 
–0.220 –0.205 –0.158 –0.167 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.047) 
φcapb 
–4.88 –4.59 –3.75 –3.60 
0.011 0.011 0.009 0.010 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
φdebt 
3.51 3.63 2.93 3.18 
–0.054 0.007  0.086  0.141 




–1.22  0.12 1.34 1.54 
–0.555 –0.425 –0.384 –0.140 
(0.404) (0.396) (0.454) (0.414) 
avg. μi 
(4) 
–1.37 –1.07 –0.85 –0.34 
N×T  209 209 200 209 
T   19.00 19.00 18.18 19.00 
R-squared 
(5)  0.2832 0.2836 0.2653 0.2910 
(1) GMM-sys estimates, see Blundell and Bond (1998), over the 1988-2006 period. Below each point 
estimate, we report the corresponding standard error (in brackets) and the Student’s t. 
(2) Data for the initial 
conditions are from OECD; data for output gap are obtained using HP filtered GDP levels. 
(3) Real-time data 
based on OECD Economic Outlook, see Golinelli and Momigliano (2006). 
(4) Average of the 11 
country-effects estimates. 
(5) Proxied by the squared correlation between actual and fitted values. 
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(2):  bad good bad good bad good bad good 
–0.216 –0.161  –0.171  –0.238 –0.186  –0.169 
(0.039)  (0.056) (0.054)  (0.072) (0.055)  (0.047) 
φcapb 
–5.56 –2.85  –3.16  –3.30  –3.38 –3.62 
0.012 0.011  0.009  0.016  0.011 0.011 
(0.003)  (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.003) 
φdebt 
3.75  2.49 1.67  3.43 2.07  3.17 
–0.062  0.036  0.037 0.142  –0.047 0.09  0.105 0.214 




–1.24  0.38  0.46 1.20  –0.70  0.88  0.90 1.25 
–0.384  –0.107 1.016  –0.630 0.560  –0.222 
(0.413)  (0.431) (1.460)  (0.419) (1.363)  (0.445) 
avg. μi 
(3) 
–0.93 –0.25  0.70  –1.50  0.41  –0.50 
N×T  209  110 90  113 96  209 
T   19.00 10.00  8.18  10.27  8.73  19.00 
R-squared
 (4)  0.2856  0.3015 0.2767  0.3290 0.3046  0.2906 
Time eff. 
(5)  0.0372  0.0080 0.2447  0.0034 0.3650  0.0038 
No switch 
(6)  0.0985 0.0002 0.0236 0.0709 
    
No shift 
(7)  0.3953 0.4632 0.2638 0.8259 
(1) GMM-sys estimates, see Blundell and Bond (1998), over the 1988-2006 period. Below each point estimate, we 
report the corresponding standard error is (in brackets) and the Student’s t. 
(2) Bad times: when GAP ≤ 0; good 
times: when GAP > 0. 
(3) Average of the 11 country-effects estimates. 
(4) Proxied by the squared correlation 
between actual and fitted values. 
(5) Test for the null hypothesis that all the 18 time dummies are jointly zero, 
p-values. 
(6) P-values of the test for parameters (excluding  ) being equal in the two sub-samples of good and 
bad times, i.e. for the restrictions collapsing 2SA to 2PA. (
7) P-alues of the test for the difference in   
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(2): bad  good bad good bad good bad good 
  Explanatory factors of the “core” model (initial fiscal conditions and output gap): 
–0.158 –0.206  –0.165  –0.178  –0.176 –0.173 –0.217 –0.160 
(0.053)  (0.056) (0.053) (0.058) (0.057) (0.050) (0.057) (0.052) 
φcapb 
–2.98  –3.70 –3.11 –3.06 –3.08 –3.44 –3.83 –3.09 
0.010  0.002  0.009  0.004  0.012  0.008  0.012 0.013 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) (0.005) 
φdebt 
2.48  0.44  2.36  0.79  2.84  1.58  3.12 2.74 
–0.041  –0.084 0.065  0.037 –0.033 0.036  0.169 0.315 




–0.83  –0.81 0.82  0.30 –0.52 0.37  1.94 1.78 
  The effect of the electoral cycle (regular and snap elections) 
(3): 
–0.479 –1.274  –0.465  –1.065  –0.312  –1.102  –0.300  –1.251 
(0.232) (0.338)  (0.256)  (0.333)  (0.258)  (0.294)  (0.227)  (0.340) 
φe1 
–2.06 –3.76  –1.82  –3.20  –1.21  –3.75  –1.32  –3.68 
–0.320  –0.624  –0.045 –0.509 –0.258 –0.540  –0.109  –0.652 
(0.229)  (0.331)  (0.252) (0.327) (0.241) (0.311)  (0.221)  (0.307) 
φe2 
–1.40  –1.88  –0.18 –1.56 –1.07 –1.74  –0.49  –2.12 
–0.336 –0.519  –0.453  –0.416 –0.365 –0.378 –0.084 –0.339 
(0.277) (0.487)  (0.269)  (0.560) (0.277) (0.417) (0.273) (0.441) 
φe3 
–1.21 –1.07  –1.68  –0.74 –1.32 –0.91 –0.31 –0.77 
  The effect of the “Maastricht variable” 
(4): 
–0.652  –1.153  –0.611  –0.717  –0.658  –0.456  –0.574  0.329 
(0.143)  (0.849)  (0.143)  (0.542)  (0.139)  (0.329)  (0.140)  (0.877) 
φm 
–4.54  –1.36  –4.28  –1.32  –4.71  –1.39  –4.09  0.38 
  The effect of the monetary conditions 
(5): 
–0.050  –0.122 0.032 –0.014  –0.033  –0.148 –0.112 –0.048 
(0.054) (0.077)  (0.060)  (0.104)  (0.053)  (0.076) (0.058) (0.066) 
φmonpol 
–0.92  –1.58 0.54 –0.13  –0.62  –1.94 –1.93 –0.72 
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  The role of fiscal institutions 
(6): 
0.688  –0.176  0.582  0.059  0.639  –0.128 0.300 –0.066 
(0.249)  (0.339)  (0.290)  (0.379)  (0.253)  (0.339) (0.249) (0.312) 
φcom 
(6) 
2.77  –0.52  2.01  0.16  2.52  –0.38 1.20 –0.21 
0.110  –0.760  0.172 –0.579 0.169 –0.570  –0.137 –0.041 
(0.239)  (0.331)  (0.256) (0.385) (0.246) (0.339)  (0.240) (0.336) 
φdel 
(6) 
0.46  –2.30  0.67 –1.50 0.69 –1.68  –0.57 –0.12 
0.181 0.164  0.257  0.163 0.127 0.189 0.135 0.029 
(0.116) (0.167)  (0.119)  (0.178) (0.115) (0.157) (0.105) (0.165) 
φrule 
(6) 
1.56 0.98  2.16  0.92 1.11 1.20 1.29 0.18 
  Other statistics: 
–0.769  0.643 –0.491 1.154 –0.852 0.654 –0.448 0.842 
(0.474)  (1.139) (0.479) (1.689) (0.440) (1.441) (0.447) (1.626) 
avg. μi 
(7) 
–1.62  0.56 –1.02 0.68 –1.94 0.45 –1.00 0.52 
N×T  127  82 110 90 113 96 108  101 
T   11.55  7.45 10.00 8.18 10.27 8.73  9.82  9.18 
R-squared 
(8)  0.427  0.435 0.472 0.368 0.471 0.416 0.533 0.371 
Time eff. 
(9)  0.109  0.186 0.017 0.453 0.086 0.199 0.001 0.081 
  Asymmetry tests outcomes: 
No switch 
(10)  0.0112  0.0001 0.0115 0.0035 
–0.043 –0.028  0.069  0.146  Shift 
(11) 
0.708  0.847 0.557 0.459 
(1) GMM-sys estimates, see Blundell and Bond (1998), over the 1988-2006 period. Below each point estimate, we 
report the corresponding standard error (in brackets) and the Student’s t. In bold, estimates that are significantly 
different to zero at 10%. 
(2) Bad times: when GAP ≤ 0; good times: when GAP > 0. Details about data availability 
over the cycle are in Table 6.7. 
(3) Election explanatory dummy variables: e1it = 1 occurred in t; e2 it = 1 in t+1; 
e3it = 1 snap elections. 
(4) Explanatory Maastricht variable, see Golinelli and Momigliano (2006). 
(5) Explanatory 
real short-term ex ante interest rate. 
(6) Fiscal governance form dummy variables: comit = 1 committment; delit = 1 
delegation. Overall Index of national-level fiscal rules (φrule), see Ayuso-i-Casals et al. (2007). 
(7) Average of the 11 
country-effects estimates. 
(8) Proxied by the squared correlation between actual and fitted values. 
(9) Test for the null 
hypothesis that all the 18 time dummies are jointly zero, p-values. 
(10) P-values of the test for parameters (excluding 
) being equal in the two sub-samples of good and bad times, i.e. for the restrictions collapsing 2SA to 2PA. 
(
11) First row: estimate of the difference  in good and bad times; second row: p-values of the test for 
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Table 6.7  Size of Sub-samples Across Data Sources (Full Sample: 1988-2006) 








Total observations, of which:  209  200  209  209 
- in good times  82  90  96  101 
- in bad times  127  110  113  108 
Regular elections in t,  of  which:  33 32 33 33 
- in good times  13  19  18  17 
- in bad times  20  13  15  16 
Regular elections in t+1, of which:  38  36  38  38 
- in good times  16  17  17  19 
- in bad times  22  19  21  19 
Snap elections in t,  of  which:  19 18 19 19 
- in good times  6  4  6  9 
- in bad times  13  14  13  10 
Excess deficit cases, of which:  55  52  55  55 
- in good times  7  8  13  2 
- in bad times  48  44  42  53 
Negative ex ante real interest rates, of which:  28  28  28  28 
- in good times  13  15  12  9 
- in bad times  15  13  16  19 
Governance commitment cases, of which:  67  67  67  67 
- in good times  23  31  27  31 
- in bad times  44  36  40  36 
Governance delegation cases, of which:  68  68  68  68 
- in good times  24  25  30  30 




Table 6.8  CAPB-s Model Estimates Using Alternative Approaches 
(1) 
Instruments:     from  t–2 to t–3 from  t–2 to t–4 
Estimator:  Pooled OLS  Within Group  GMM-dif  GMM-sys  GMM-dif  GMM-sys 
Time  dummies:  no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
φcapb  –0.186 –0.188 –0.251 –0.251 –0.506 –0.439 –0.201 –0.203 –0.409 –0.350 –0.202 –0.203 
  (0.027) (0.030) (0.032) (0.036) (0.060) (0.059) (0.032) (0.035) (0.049) (0.047) (0.029) (0.031) 
  –7.01 –6.22 –7.97 –7.05 –8.36 –7.40 –6.35 –5.81 –8.37 –7.38 –6.92 –6.44 
φdebt  0.010 0.008 0.020 0.019 0.080 0.078 0.011 0.009 0.063 0.060 0.011 0.009 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) 
  3.82 2.93 4.57 3.51 6.84 5.21 4.24 3.48 6.98 5.77 4.17 3.28 
φ
C
gap  –0.119 –0.069 –0.097 –0.035 –0.059  0.082  –0.105 –0.042 –0.077  0.037  –0.110 –0.069 
  (0.028) (0.038) (0.029) (0.040) (0.030) (0.048) (0.030) (0.040) (0.029) (0.043) (0.028) (0.037) 
  –4.31  –1.81  –3.38  –0.86  –1.98 1.70 –3.53  –1.06  –2.66 0.86 –3.86  –1.85 
average μi 
(2)  –0.498 –0.572 –1.066 –1.485      –0.559 –0.145      –0.543 –0.131 
  (0.172)  (0.526)  (0.269)  (0.532)    (0.173)  (0.394)    (0.172)  (0.393) 
  –2.89 –1.09 –3.96 –2.79      –3.23 –0.37      –3.15 –0.33 
Sargan test 
(3)          0.0000 0.0003 0.0261 0.0127 0.0007 0.0021 0.1045 0.0434 
Dif-Sargan 
(4)         0.9999  0.9292     0.9875  0.9725 
1
st order AC 
(5) 0.8569 0.7605      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2
nd order AC 
(5) 0.1364 0.1827      0.3871 0.4018 0.4293 0.3921 0.4166 0.4190 0.4309 0.3957 
(1) Time period: 1988-2006, N×T = 300 (=289 for GMM-dif because the first observation is lost), T = 27.3 (26.3 for GMM-dif). Below each point estimate, the standard 
error (in brackets) and the Student t. 
(2) Average of the 11 country-effects estimates (except for the estimates in differences, i.e. for GMM-dif). 
(3) Overidentifying restrictions 
test, p-values. 
(4) Difference Sargan test for additional moment conditions embodied by GMM-sys, p-values. 
(5) Residuals autocorrelation test, p-values (not appropriate with 
within group transformed residuals). 
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Figure 6.1  CAPB-s and CAPB-l Models Estimates with OECD Ex Post Data in Rolling Samples 
(1) 
























1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Lower 95% est. Of CAPB-s Upper 95% est. of CAPB-s




























1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Lower 95% est. of CAPB-s Upper 95% est. of CAPB-s s l
















1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
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final year of the rolling window
Output gap effect
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Lower avg. a-cyclicality bound Upper avg. a-cyclicality bound




(1) The CAPB-s and CAPB-l Models estimates are indicated by s and l respectively. The first point estimates correspond to the 1978-1992 sample, the last to 1992-2006. All 
the sub-samples cover a fixed 15-year period. In the first three graphs the 95% confidence intervals refer to the point estimate of the CAPB-s Model corresponding parameter. 
The fourth graph reports the zero-interval for both point estimates with the CAPB-s and CAPB-l Models (as such, it cannot use the standard error of only one model’s 
estimate, but the average standard errors of both CAPB-s and CAPB-l Model estimates). 
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(1) The first point estimates correspond to the 1978-1992 sample, the last to 1992-2006. All the sub-samples cover a fixed 15-year period. In the first three graphs the 95% 
confidence intervals refer to the corresponding parameter point estimate with OECD data. The lower right-hand graph reports the zero-interval for point estimates with both 
OECD and EC data sources (as such, it cannot use the standard error of only one estimate from one source, but the average standard error of the estimates with both sources). 
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(1) The first point estimates correspond to the 1988-2002 sample, the last to 1992-2006. All the sub-samples cover a fixed 15-year period. In the first three graphs the 95% 
confidence intervals refer to the corresponding parameter point estimate with ex post OECD data. The lower right-hand graph reports the zero-interval for point estimates 
with both ex post and real-time data (as such, it cannot use the standard error of only the estimate using ex post data, but the average standard error of the estimates with both 
ex post and real-time data). 
 
   Figure 6.4  Estimates of φ
C–l
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(1) The first point estimates correspond to the 1978-1992 sample, the last to 1992-2006. All the sub-samples 
cover a fixed 15-years period. The 95% confidence intervals refer to φ
C–l
gap estimates with ex post OECD data. 
OECD = OECD ex post data; HP = OECD ex post data for initial fiscal conditions and HP-filtered GDP for the 
output gap; EC = EC ex post data; RT = real-time OECD data. 
 
  148 
 
Figure 6.5  Policy Asymmetry over the Cycle in Rolling Samples - CAPB-l Model 
(1) 
 
(a)  Selection of the most appropriate approach: either two-samples switch (2SA) or 
two-parameters shift (2PA) 
(2) 
 
 OECD data ex post
 OECD data with HP-filtered GDP
 EC data ex post
 OECD data real time
 Final year of the rolling window 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
 The two-samples switch is preferred (2SA)
 The two-parameters shift is preferred (2PA)
 not available  
 
(b)   Policy symmetry test outcomes using the more appropriate approach, 2SA vs 2PA 
(3) 
 
 OECD data ex post
 OECD data with HP-filtered GDP
 EC data ex post
 OECD data real time
 Final year of the rolling window 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
 rejects the null of symmetry 
 does not reject the null of symmetry 
 not available  
 
Notes: 
(1) The first point estimates correspond to the 1978-1992 sample, the last to 1992-2006. All the sub-samples 
cover a fixed 15-years period. 
(2) The 2SA approach is appropriate at 5% (then preferred) when the shifts in both initial fiscal conditions and all 
the model’s deterministic components (country and time fixed effects) are jointly significant. 
(3) The 5% rejection of symmetric policies (under the null hypothesis) is based on the p-value of the most 
appropriate approach (either two-samples switch, 2SA, or two-parameters shift, 2PA, see panel above) using the 
indicated data source over the sample period ending in the corresponding year and starting 15 years before. 
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   Figure 6.6  Estimates of Parameter Difference in Good and Bad Times with Alternative 





















































1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
final year of the rolling window  
 
Notes: 
(1) The first point estimates correspond to the 1978-1992 sample, the last to 1992-2006. All the sub-samples 
cover a fixed 15-years period. The lower spline (since 1992) measures the average of the φ
C–l
gap estimates with ex 
post data, the upper spline (since 2002) measures the average of the φ
C–l
gap estimates with real-time data. 
OECD = OECD ex post data; HP = OECD ex post data for initial fiscal conditions and HP-filterd GDP for the 
output gap; EC = EC ex post data; RT = real-time OECD data. 
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Discussion 
Carlos Martinez Mongay 
The paper by Roberto Golinelli and Sandro Momigliano addresses an EMU-relevant question 
that is frequently asked in the literature on fiscal policy, namely if discretionary fiscal policies 
in industrialised countries, and especially in the euro area, tend to be counter- or pro-cyclical. 
An ancillary question relates to the extent to which fiscal authorities react symmetrically over 
the cycle, so that the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy might be different in upturns and 
downturns. To answer these questions Golinelli and Momigliano first look at the existing 
empirical literature. After considering an initial set of 21 studies, the authors conclude that the 
literature review, which focuses on 12 contributions in particular, does not give a conclusive 
answer to the central question of the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. Some of the 
contributions would suggest that fiscal policies tend to be pro-cyclical, while other pieces of 
empirical research would indicate that fiscal policies have been overall a-cyclical or even 
counter-cyclical. The same applies to possible behavioural asymmetries of fiscal policies over 
the cycle. On this basis, the authors try to identify the reasons behind the large differences 
across the various empirical analyses. To that end, they carry out an exhaustive empirical 
research programme of their own, working with a sample of 11 euro-area countries, namely 
all the members of the area except Luxembourg, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta, over a time 
span approximately covering the latest three decades.  
Cyclicality is measured through the estimate of the coefficient of the output gap in a function 
of the form: 
Y = α + βX + F(Z) + ε         ( 1 )  
where Y is a fiscal-policy indicator, X is an indicator of the cyclical position and F(Z) is a 
function of a vector Z of other variables, while ε is the error term. Y and X are measured in 
such a way that β>0, β=0 and β<0 imply counter-cyclical, a-cyclical and pro-cyclical fiscal 
policies, respectively. Two alternative fiscal policy indicators are considered, namely the 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) and the primary balance (PB), while the cycle is 
measured through the output gap in levels. The authors consider alternative methods to 
calculate the output gap (H-P, production function), different data sources (AMECO, OECD), 
different observational timings for the output gap (real-time, ex post), and different time lags 
with respect to the fiscal-policy indicator (contemporaneous or lagged output gap). Moreover, 
in order to test the robustness of the results with respect to the inclusion of additional 
observations, models are estimated for rolling samples of 15-year windows. 
While aware that this does not do full justice to the excellent work done by Golinelli and 
Momigliano, I would summarise their conclusions as follows: models for PB tend to show 
counter-cyclical fiscal-policy behaviour in the euro area, while CAPB models would point to 
a-cyclical behaviour in most cases and to pro-cyclical fiscal policies in a few. These basic 
results may change depending on data sources and time spans. AMECO data tend to show 
more counter-cyclicality than the economic series from the OECD databanks. Analogously, 
counter-cyclical behaviour is detected more frequently if the output gap is measured in real 
time than if it is measured ex post, as available in AMECO or the OECD. Interestingly, there 
seems to be some evidence of pro-cyclicality in the rolling samples regressions including the 
most recent 15-year sub-sample. Where symmetry is concerned, the authors conclude that all 
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the parameters of the equation, and not only that of the output gap, change when fiscal 
authorities exhibit asymmetric behaviour over the cycle. Overall, there seems to be some 
evidence of counter-cyclical policies in good times, while fiscal policy in the euro area may 
be pro-cyclical in bad times. However, the conclusions on symmetry seem to depend on 
statistical sources. Overall, as pointed out above, AMECO and real-time estimates of the 
output gap tend to more often show counter-cyclical policies, while the output gap series of 
the OECD, as well as those calculated with the H-P filter would tend towards the conclusion 
that pro-cyclical policies prevail. Finally, these results seem broadly robust with respect to the 
inclusion of certain institutional and policy indicators such as the electoral cycle, the 
Maastricht Treaty, monetary conditions, and fiscal governance. 
These conclusions appear to be based on an exhaustive revision of the literature, as well as on 
a detailed comparison of relevant specifications, while using main, standard data banks. 
Moreover, the authors apply sound, state-of-the-art econometric techniques and carry out 
exhaustive robustness checks, which can be replicated relatively easily by other researchers. 
All these are desirable properties of good empirical analyses and, indeed, have made the life 
of this discussant very difficult. Fortunately, even good papers such as Golinelli and 
Momigliano's, are short pieces of research and, therefore, they always leave out of their scope 
a series of more or less relevant issues. In this particular case, I see three main interrelated 
topics which could deserve some consideration: (1) fiscal rules versus fiscal-reaction 
functions, (2) panel versus intra-country analyses (including the importance of the country 
sample), and (3) assessing fiscal behaviour in extended models. I will finally discuss the 
extent to which the question of the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policies in the euro area 
remains unsettled. 
Golinelli and Momigliano refer to their specifications sometimes as fiscal rules and 
sometimes as fiscal-reaction functions, as if these two concepts were overall neutral for the 
empirical analysis. In my view, they are not. Moreover, I think that explicitly considering 
whether the paper works on fiscal rules or on fiscal reaction functions would have rendered 
the discussion in Section 2 more systematic and straightforward. In the relevant literature, the 
bulk of which is referenced in the paper, fiscal rules are considered as mirroring monetary 
rules à la Taylor. Fiscal rules refer to a discretionary fiscal target, S*, usually the CAPB, and 
assume that fiscal policy aims to stabilise the economy at around its potential and debt at 
around a debt target, d*. This would basically respond to two main challenges of fiscal policy, 
namely stabilisation and sustainability.   
A typical formulation of a fiscal rule would be: 
S
*
t = α + δ(dt-1 – d*) + γ E(Xt/Ωt)         ( 2 )  
where dt-1 is the debt existing at the beginning of t,  and E(Xt/Ωt)  is the expected output gap 
(Xt) given the information available at the beginning of t, Ωt.  Generally, fiscal rules like (2) 
are not observable in the real world. Attaining S
*
t can be difficult due to, among other things, 
inertia in the budgetary process (viz. problems to fully adjust taxes and/or expenditures as 
planned over the budgetary year) and unexpected events (viz. a wrong assessment of 
budgetary impacts). This can be represented by a partial adjustment mechanism: 
St = (1-ρ) S
*
t + ρ St-1   + νt   0  <  ρ < 1    νt    iid (0, σ
2)    (3) 
which implies 
  152 
St = (1-ρ)(α−δd*) +(1-ρ) δdt-1 + (1-ρ) γ Xt + ρ St-1   + εt     (4) 
and 
εt = (1-ρ) γ (Xt – E(Xt/Ωt)) + νt        ( 5 )  
The ‘observable’ fiscal rule, which is a particular form of (1), is dynamic (inertia) and 
includes an error term that can be correlated with the output gap, which would justify using 
GMM methods, as Golinelli and Momigliano do. Note that the intercept in the fiscal rule and 
the debt target in (2) cannot be identified.    
Within this approach, the equivalence of the CAPB and PB as specified in Section 2 of the 
paper seems straightforward. After reformulating expression [4] in terms of the expected 
output gap,  
PB* = CAPB* + ω E(Xt/Ωt)      ( ω>0)     (6) 
plugging it in (2) (with Y=CAPB as the fiscal target) gives 
PB
*
t = α + δ(dt-1 – d*) +( γ+ω) E(Xt/Ωt)       (7) 
In other words, given ω, CAPB and PB models are equivalent. Models using PB will tend 
show a more counter-cyclical (less pro-cyclical) policy if ω is positive, as it is expected to be. 
Model (4) also suggests that the inertia indicator would coincide with the fiscal target, which 
would rule out CAPB/PB models of the type [2] in Section 6.2 of the paper. Another 
implication of the ‘fiscal-rule’ framework is that, in panel data models, which assume the 
same fiscal rule (2) (same α, β, γ) over time and across countries, time/country effects might 
be interpreted in terms of across-time/country differences in debt targets, d*. This would call 
for a more exhaustive exploitation of the corresponding estimates in fixed effects models. 
Talking of estimates, it is interesting to note that the appropriate estimation methods depend 
on the hypotheses one makes about E(Xt/Ωt). For instance, if the relevant output gap is the 
lagged gap, thus fully known in t, Xt = Xt-1 and E(Xt/Ωt)= Xt-1. Then       
εt =  νt   with     νt ----- iid (0, σ
2)       ( 8 )  
and there would not seem to be much need to apply GMM. 
Critically, some commentators would argue that, unlike monetary rules, fiscal rules à la 
Taylor are not well established empirically (see, for instance, Roeger, 2003). Consequently, it 
would be difficult to interpret the estimated coefficients of econometric specifications like (4) 
as reflecting the intentional behaviour of governments. The alternative to the fiscal-rule 
approach would be to specify a purely empirical relationship for PB or CAPB with respect to 
debt levels and cyclical conditions (see, for instance, Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2007), 
such as 
St = α + δdt-1 + γXt   + εt         ( 9 )  
Typical specification tests applied to this baseline model would provide guidance for the 
analyst to determine the extent to which the model requires an inertia term (add ρSt-1 to (9)) or 
what output gap, whether contemporaneous or lagged, fits better with the data, and, therefore, 
what the most appropriate estimation method would be. Within this framework, models à la 
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CAPB/PB might also be ruled out. Moreover, an inertia term would be introduced if there 
would be evidence of a wrong dynamic specification of the model, thus requiring the 
inclusion of the lagged endogenous variable, rather than imposing it at the outset. 
A second aspect of Golinelli and Momigliano's paper that I see as problematic is that it does 
not discuss the appropriateness of panel data methods. Without much justification, they go for 
panel data and disregard intra-country analyses. Although this is quite common in the 
empirical literature on fiscal rules or fiscal reaction functions, it seems clear that, as 
mentioned above, within a fiscal rule framework, panel data models imply that all the 
governments use the same fiscal rule all the time. They also imply that all the governments 
face the same budgetary inertia and shocks. In the fixed effects model, debt targets would 
change across countries and over time. 
Working with fiscal reaction functions would constrain the interpretation of the coefficients 
less, since the aim of the research would be to estimate the 'average' fiscal policy behaviour 
across countries and time. Therefore, panel data models would seem to provide the researcher 
with lots of degrees of freedom. However, this points, in turn, to the need to test the null 
hypothesis of constant coefficients in the panel. In this context, there appears to be some 
empirical evidence pointing to large differences across countries in terms of the parameters in 
(9). These cross-country differences also apply to the dynamic specification of the model, not 
only in terms of the size of ρ, but also in terms of its statistical significance (see, for instance, 
Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2007). Needless to say, a discussion on the appropriateness 
of using panel data methods would also bring the issue of the robustness of the results to 
changes in the sample of countries, which is not addressed in the paper. If there are significant 
cross-country differences in terms of, let us say, the cyclical response, panel data estimates of 
the average cyclical response would be sample-dependent. However, this may be less relevant 
if the question on the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy is circumscribed to the euro area.  
The same fiscal rules versus fiscal reaction functions framework could shed some light on the 
specification and interpretation of models including institutional, policy and other variables, 
such as the electoral cycle, the EMU fiscal framework, or fiscal institutions. The authors 
assume that these variables do not interact with the other parameters of the model. Their 
specification is of the type: 
St = α0 + β1Z1t + β2Z2t + .....+ βκ Zκt  + δdt-1 + γXt  + ρSt-1 + εt    (10) 
Within a fiscal reaction function framework, (10) is actually a null hypothesis with respect to 
an alternative in which institutional and policy variables interact with other parameters of the 
model. Therefore, this null should have been tested, in the same way that the authors have 
tested the extent to which asymmetric behaviour affects all the parameters of the reaction 
function or just the coefficient of the output gap. 
Discussing the implications of using model (10) goes beyond econometrics. It seems to have 
implications in terms of the goals one attributes to fiscal governance. Within a fiscal rule 
framework, specification (10) implies that things like changes in fiscal institutions or the 
introduction of the EMU fiscal-policy framework would not change the cyclical response of 
fiscal policy, the sustainability parameter (i.e. the reaction of the primary balance to debt 
accumulation) or the budgetary process, which could in turn have some implications for 
inertia. According to this specification, fiscal institutions or rules would only have an impact 
on the intercept of (2) or on the debt target. The intercept of (2) is the CAPB (or PB) that 
would be targeted when the actual GDP would coincide with the potential and the debt level 
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would have attained the debt target. In other words, α would be the CAPB or PB consistent 
with zero debt accumulation (stable debt), while leaving the level of output at potential. 
Within this framework, it seems to me that the intercept of the fiscal rule appears to be 
determined by potential growth and other structural features of the economy, rather than by 
fiscal governance. An alternative interpretation would be that fiscal institutions and rules only 
affect the debt target. In other words, and this also applies to the reaction function approach, 
specification (10) would imply that fiscal institutions or rules would not change the reaction 
of fiscal policy to debt accumulation, even if the debt target were changed in a significant 
way, which is not easy to understand. It would also imply that fiscal institutions and rules 
would not change cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. However, one of the main goals pursued 
when governments introduce certain fiscal institutions and rules is to tackle pro-cyclical 
biases (European Commission, 2006a). Interestingly, Golinelli and Momigliano's empirical 
results conclude that the consideration of institutional and policy variables do not alter the 
reaction of fiscal policy to the cycle. Nevertheless, the validity of this conclusion seems to me 
an open issue until it is tested in a model allowing impacts of the fiscal governance setting on 
fiscal behaviour.     
Finally, I wonder to what extent the paper really settles its core question. Taking at face value 
the empirical estimates in the paper and considering the typical 5% significance threshold, my 
tentative conclusion would be that the average discretionary fiscal policy across the euro area 
and over the last three decades has been a-cyclical. I would also add that automatic stabilisers 
have operated in the expected counter-cyclical direction and that there is little evidence of 
discretionary pro-cyclical fiscal policies. My tentative conclusion is based on the estimates in 
tables 6.2-6.6, where I have found only 3 cases of pro-cyclical behaviour with a confidence of 
about 95%. In line with other empirical studies, the parameter capturing the relationship 
between the CAPB and the cycle is statistically insignificant in most cases. However, given 
the caveats expressed above on the use of panel data methods and the way institutional and 
policy variables have been specified, it seems to me that the question at the origin of the paper 
is still unsettled. I leave the reader the final judgement, while acknowledging that this 
conclusion is actually good news for some people, like this discussant, who are still working 
on related issues.   
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7  Uncertainty in Measuring the Underlying Budgetary Position and 
Fiscal Stance 
Matthias Mohr, Richard Morris
∗  
 
7.1.  Introduction  
In order to properly assess the underlying budgetary position and the fiscal stance, it is 
necessary to distinguish between cyclical and transitory influences on the budget balance on 
the one hand and the impact of policy measures (tax reforms, expenditure cuts etc) on the 
other hand. Budget balance estimates corrected for the economic cycle are therefore an 
important part of the fiscal policy maker's toolkit. They have also come to play an 
increasingly prominent role in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Firstly, 
Member States' compliance with their "medium-term budgetary objectives" (MTOs) is 
assessed in terms of the "structural balance", defined as the cyclically adjusted balance net of 
one-off and temporary measures.
92 Second, if the MTO is not achieved, Member States are 
required to take steps towards its achievement, with a 0.5% of GDP annual improvement of 
the structural balance taken as a benchmark. And thirdly, also in the context of the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure, while the 3% of GDP deficit ceiling applies to the actual (not cyclically 
adjusted) budget balance, fiscal policy requirements for countries in excessive deficit and the 
assessment of compliance also focus increasingly on annual changes of the structural budget 
balance.  
The estimation of cyclically adjusted budget balances is, however, subject to considerable 
measurement uncertainty. The aim of this paper is to discuss the importance of these sources 
of uncertainty for assessing the underlying budgetary position and fiscal stance. Section 2 
briefly describes the method of cyclically adjusting the budget balance applied by the OECD 
and the European Commission, as this is the “official” methodology underlying the 
assessment of fiscal policies in the context of the SGP. Sections 7.3 to 7.5 then consider the 
main measurement problems related to the measurement of the output gap, the impact of 
changes in the composition of output and the behaviour of tax revenues in relation to their 
assumed bases. It should be noted that while in this paper we focus on measurement 
uncertainty mainly in relation to the OECD/Commission cyclical adjustment methodology, 
other methodologies generally suffer from comparable measurement problems. 
                                                 
∗ We thank Ad van Riet, P. Rother and L. Schuknecht and members of the ECB Fiscal Policies Division for 
valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the European Central Bank. 
92 The cyclically adjusted budget balance (or the structural budget balance – netting out one-off and temporary 
measures) is essentially a measure of the underlying budgetary position. The fiscal stance is traditionally 
measured by the change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance. In recent years, however, the ratio of 
interest payments to GDP has been relatively stable in euro area countries, so that the change in the cyclically 
adjusted balance is approximately equal to the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance.  
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7.2.  A few words on the OECD / Commission method of cyclical adjustment  
In a nutshell, the cyclically adjusted budget balance 
CA B  is defined as the actual budget 
balance B minus the cyclical component of the budget balance C.  The latter is equal to the 
output gap, i.e. the gap between actual and (trend or) potential output 
93 ) (
P
R R Y Y −  scaled by 
the sensitivity of the budget balance with respect to output  :  y , b e
 
94  ) ( ,
P
R R y b
CA Y Y e B C B B − − = − =
In the OECD / Commission cyclical adjustment methodology, the sensitivity of the budget 
balance with respect to output takes a fixed value, which is estimated independently for each 
country to take account of country-specific differences in the responsiveness of revenues and 
expenditure to output.
95 It is defined as the difference between the sum of the cyclical 
sensitivities of the four main revenue categories (personal income taxes, corporate income 
taxes, indirect taxes and social security contributions) and the cyclical sensitivity of 
unemployment related expenditure, all weighted by their respective shares in GDP   
    ∑ − =
4
, , , ) / ( ) / (
i
y g y t i y b e Y G e Y T e
i
where  is the ith revenue category, G is unemployment related expenditure and  and   
are the respective elasticities of revenues and expenditure with respect to (real) output. For 
unemployment related expenditure, a unit elasticity with respect to output is assumed, so that 
the cyclical sensitivity of expenditure is simply equal to the share of unemployment related 
spending in GDP. The elasticities of tax revenues with respect to output are estimated as the 
sum of the elasticity of each revenue category with respect to its base  and the elasticity of 
the tax base with respect to output :   
i T y ti e , y g e ,
i i r t e ,
y ri e ,
    y r r t y t i i i i e e e , , , =
For personal income taxes and social security contributions the relevant tax base is 
compensation of employees and the elasticity is determined by the structure of the tax system. 
The tax base for corporate income taxes is the operating surplus and for indirect taxes it is 
private consumption expenditure with both of these taxes assumed to have unit elasticities 
with respect to their bases. The elasticities of the tax bases with respect to output are 
estimated econometrically.  
Hence, there are three principal sources of measurement uncertainty involved in the 
estimation of the cyclically adjusted budget balance. These are related to: (i) the measurement 
of the output gap ; (ii) the responsiveness of revenue and expenditure bases to 
output  and  ; and (iii) the behaviour of tax revenues in relation to their bases  .  
) (
P
R R Y Y −
y , y ri e , g e
i i r t e ,
                                                 
93 Since 2003 the European Commission has estimated the output gap as the difference between actual and 
potential output estimated on the basis of a production function. For an explanation of this approach see Denis et 
al. (2002). 
94 The subscript R is used to make clear when we are referring to variables in real terms as opposed to nominal 
terms (i.e. YR = real output and Y = nominal output). 
95 For a description of this methodology see Girouard and André (2005) and before this van den Noord (2000).  
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  Figure 7.1  Structure of the OECD/European Commission Cyclical Adjustment 
Methodology 
         
       
Personal income taxes 
  
Compensation of employees 
      
       
         
Social security contributions 
           




Corporate income taxes 
           





           




Unemployment related expenditure 
7.3.   Data revisions and the measurement of the output gap 
A major source of uncertainty in the measurement of cyclically adjusted budget balances 
pertains to ex-post revisions of past data used in their computation. Firstly, observable 
variables such as GDP and nominal budget balances are regularly revised ex-post owing to 
time lags in the collection of national accounts data and because of statistical re-definitions
96. 
Secondly, even in the absence of changes in observable data, unobservable variables such as 
potential output and the output gap are constantly revised since their estimation in any given 
year depends not only on past but also on expected future output. Hence, new data give rise to 
ex-post changes in the assessment of past (and future) structural economic developments
97.  
                                                 
96 Statistical revisions, which on average are sizeable, are often the result of desirable improvements in the 
quality of government finance statistics (see Mora and Martins (2007)).  
97 This is a general issue in the estimation of potential output which does not only concern the 
OECD/Commission approach. See, for instance: Orphanides (2002), Rünstler (2002), Camba-Méndez and 
Palenzuela (2003), and Gruen et al. (2005). 
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Implications for assessing the underlying fiscal position  
The reliability of cyclically adjusted budget balance estimates can be measured by observing 
their evolution for a given year over time (i.e. over different database vintages). As an 
example, Figure 7.2 shows the impact that different kinds of revisions have had on 
measurements of the euro area cyclically adjusted balance for the year 2000. In autumn 2000, 
a cyclically-adjusted deficit of 0.7% of GDP was estimated. In the following years, the 
cyclically adjusted deficit was revised upwards step by step, to eventually obtain the value of 
just below 2% of GDP in the autumn 2005 data vintage. As regards the origins of these 
revisions, it can be seen that these largely mirrored revisions of the cyclical component of the 
budget balance (exclusively determined by the output gap), whereas the impact of revisions of 
the nominal balance (which would also capture the impact of statistical revisions) was 
marginal.
98 The story underlying these revisions is that the strong upturn in economic growth 
in 2000 was initially identified as an improvement in trend output rather than a cyclical 
improvement. This led to a relatively favourable estimate of the cyclically adjusted balance. 
However, when r/eal GDP growth in the euro area slowed down in the years after 2000, the 
cyclical component of the 2000 deficit was revised upwards ex post, and, consequently, the 
cyclically adjusted budget balance was revised downwards.  
Figure 7.2     The euro area cyclically adjusted balance in 
the year 2000 in different estimation vintages 
 
Figure 7.3     Errors in real time estimates of the output 
gap in the period 1996-2003
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Note: The figures exclude negative capital expenditure 
from the sale of UMTS licences. 
Source: European Commission AMECO database and 
authors' computations. 
Source: European Commission and authors' 
computations. 
 
The year 2000 was exceptional in terms of economic growth and the following growth 
slowdown. Nevertheless, the initial mis-measurement of the cyclically ad.justed balance in 
2000 would appear to reflect a general systematic measurement bias, which is particularly 
severe around turning points of the business cycle. If the output gap measured in real time 
were an unbiased estimator of the final measure of the output gap, the measurement error 
                                                 
98 Note that the output gap estimates considered in this exercise represent the difference between actual and trend 
output according to the previous HP filter method applied at the time by the European Commission. Real time 
estimates of the output gap using the production function approach are not available for the time period 
considered. 
99 The data points refer to 12 euro area countries (excluding Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia) for the period 1996-
2003. The error is defined as the difference between the estimate of the output gap three years later (i.e. the 
estimate of the output gap of year t in year t+3) and the real time estimate of the output gap (i.e. the estimate of 
the output gap of year t in year t). Positive values of the error indicate an underestimation of the output gap in 
real time compared with the estimate three years later. 
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should not be related to the final output gap. This is not the case, as Figure 7.3 shows: there is 
a systematic, positive relationship between the error (approximated as the output gap 
measured after three years minus the real time value of the output gap) and the final output 
gap (approximately defined as the output gap measured after three years). This implies that in 
absolute terms, output gaps are systematically underestimated
100. 
Since bias in the measurement of the output gap generally carries over to the cyclically 
adjusted balance, one would expect that the latter are systematically overestimated in real 
time during economic good times while during bad times initial cyclically adjusted balance 
estimates are systematically too low. A regression over the time period 1996-2003 confirms 
this assumption (see Table 7.1)
101: a positive output gap of 1% triggered an overestimation of 
the cyclically adjusted balance by 0.34% of GDP on average in the 12 euro area countries. 
Thus, cyclically adjusted budget balance estimates in real time are liable to give a distorted 
picture of the actual underlying fiscal position, particularly around the peaks and troughs of 
the business cycle.  
  Table 7.1  Panel regression of errors in cyclically adjusted budget balance ratios on output 
gaps and errors in budget balances 
Dependent variable  Error in CAB level 
Independent variables  Error in budget balance  Output gap  Constant 
Coefficient  0.854 -0.337 -0.065 
Std.  Err.  0.054 0.028 0.046 
T 15.930  -12.200  -1.410 
P>⎜t⎜  0.000 0.000 0.162 
R
2  overall: 0.771 (within: 0.858, between: 0.595) 
F test  F(2,81) = 244.13, Prob > F = 0.000 
Hausman test  Chi
2: 9.53, Prob > Chi
2:  0.0085 
Number of observations: 95. Number of euro area countries: 12. Years 1996-2003. 
Notes: All variables are in % of GDP and are defined as year t values obtained in year t+3. Errors are computed 
by subtracting year t values obtained in year t. Parameter estimates significant at the 5% level are set in bold 
face.  
Source: European Commission. 
 
                                                 
100 In other words: in good times, when the output gap is positive, its initial estimate is too low while in bad 
times, when the output gap is negative, the initial measurement is too high. 
101 The error in the budget balance is included as an independent variable as well in order to control for the 
impact of statistical revisions. The regression results are robust against other definitions of “final” outcomes. The 
panel regressions use fixed effects. Random effects, which the Hausman specification test rejects, would provide 
slightly different estimates but not change the basic results and conclusions. 
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Implications for the assessment of the fiscal stance 
To what extent do the reliability problems in the measurement of cyclically adjusted balances 
carry over to measured annual changes in cyclically adjusted balances (i.e. affecting the 
assessment of the fiscal stance)? Figure 7.4 replicates Figure 7.2 but this time showing the 
annual change in the euro area budget balance and cyclically adjusted balance in 2000 as 
reported in different database vintages.  
Figure 7.4     Change in the euro area cyclically adjusted 
balance in the year 2000 in different estimation vintages. 
 
Figure 7.5     Errors in real time estimates of the 
annual change in the output gap in the period 1996-
2003
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Note: The figures exclude negative capital expenditure 
from the sale of UMTS licences. 
Source: European Commission and authors' calculations. 
Source: European Commission and authors' 
calculations. 
 
The change in the euro area cyclically adjusted balance in the year 2000 was estimated in 
autumn 2000 to amount to an increase of 0.1% of GDP. This was revised to a zero change in 
autumn 2001 and then to a decline of about 0.2-0.3% of GDP in the following vintages (up 
until autumn 2005). Again, the annual change in the nominal budget balance was not revised 
much. The revisions of changes in cyclically adjusted balances derived primarily from 
revisions to the change in the cyclical component. The graph implies that ex post revisions 
also affect estimated changes in the cyclically adjusted budget balance, but to a lesser extent 
than revisions in terms of levels. A similar picture also emerges when plotting the error in the 
annual changes in the output gap against the output gap level (see Figure 7.5). There is still a 
systematic bias, but it is less pronounced for changes in the output gap than for levels. 
Table 7.2  reports the results of a regression of measurement errors in terms of annual changes 
in the cyclically adjusted balance on measurement errors in budget balance changes and on 
the output gap level.  The coefficient of the output gap level turns out to be close to zero and 
statistically insignificant. Thus, the reliability of the change in the cyclically adjusted balance 
as an indicator of the fiscal stance is not much affected by the cyclical position
103. 
                                                 
102 The data points refer to 12 euro area countries (except Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia) for the period 1996-2003. 
The error is defined as the difference between estimate of the change in the output gap three years later (i.e. the 
estimate of the change in the output gap of year t in year t+3) and the real time estimate of the change in the 
output gap (i.e. the estimate of the change in the output gap of year t in year t). Positive values of the error 
indicate an underestimation of the output gap in real time compared with the estimate three years later. 
103 This fits well with the general finding in the literature that estimates of changes in output gaps are often more 
reliable than levels. 
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Table 7.2  Panel regression of errors in changes in cyclically adjusted balances on the 
output gap and errors in budget balance changes 
Dependent variable  Error in change in CAB 
Independent variables  Error in budget balance change  Output gap  Constant 
Coefficient  0.972  -0.043 -0.103 
Std. Err.  0.061  0.026  0.046 
T 16.040  -1.670  -2.250 
P>⎜t⎜  0.000 0.100  0.027 
R
2  overall: 0.766 (within: 0.768, between: 0.890) 
F test  F(2,81) = 131.65, Prob > F = 0.000 
Hausman test  Chi
2: 5.44, Prob > Chi
2: 0.066 
Number of observations: 95. Number of euro area countries: 12. Years 1996-2003. 
Notes: All variables are in % of GDP and are defined as year t values obtained in year t+3. Errors are computed 
by subtracting year t values obtained in year t. Parameter estimates significant at the 5% level are set in bold 
face.  
Source: European Commission. 
 
Even though errors in the measurement of the change in the cyclically adjusted balance due to 
data revisions appear to be limited and less biased than measurement errors in levels, they 
may still be sizeable enough to invalidate the real time assessment of fiscal policy, for 
example regarding the assessment of whether or not the fiscal stance is loosening or 
tightening. One way to check this is again to compare real time assessments against “final” 
assessments, defined as the outcomes measured three years later. 
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  Table 7.3   Errors in measurement of the fiscal stance as loosening/ tightening due to ex 
post revisions of the output gap 
     
Measured in year t+3  Change in the cyclically adjusted balance 
(fiscal stance)  Neutral or 
tightening  Loosening Total 
Neutral or tightening  47  19  66  Measured 
in year t  Loosening  7  23  30 
                                    Total  54  42  96 
Note: The sample consists of annual changes in the cyclically adjusted balance for the period 1996-2003 in 12 
euro area countries (excluding Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia). 
Source: European Commission and authors' computations. 
As Table 7.3 shows, 42 (out of 96) cases were identified in the period 1996-2003 in which the 
fiscal stance, as measured by the change in the cyclically adjusted balance, worsened. Of 
these cases, 23 were correctly identified in real time, whereas in 19 of them, the initial 
assessment had pointed to a neutral or tightening fiscal stance.
104 Thus, in around one fifth of 
all observations, the signal the fiscal indicator provided in real time was too optimistic. In the 
rules based EU fiscal framework with defined budgetary objectives, it is particularly 
important to avoid such errors towards optimism as they will eventually widen the gap 
between budgetary targets and outcomes. On the other hand, in 7 out of a total of 54 cases the 
final outcome pointed to a neutral or tightening fiscal stance while in real-time the fiscal 
stance was assessed to be loosening.   
7.4.  The budgetary effect of changes in the composition of output  
If the cyclical behaviour of the macroeconomic bases for revenues and expenditure is not in 
phase with overall GDP, such situations give rise to "composition effects". This is because 
certain components of GDP, notably private consumption and compensation of employees are 
fiscally more "high powered" than other components, notably exports and certain types of 
investment (which are subject to zero or lower tax rates). Hence, for example, in episodes of 
export-driven output growth, the effective cyclical impact on general government finances 
can fall short of and may lag behind the impact one would derive from the contemporaneous 
output gap multiplied by the budgetary output sensitivity. 
In contrast to the OECD/Commission methodology, the method of cyclical adjustment 
employed within the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) does not make use of an 
output gap or a trend deviation of output in calculating cyclically-adjusted budget balances.
105 
Rather, government revenue and expenditure categories are adjusted individually on the basis 
                                                 
104 Of course in practice, a change in the cyclically adjusted balance close to zero (e.g. less than 0.2% of GDP) 
may simply be assessed as a “broadly neutral” fiscal stance. However, this exercise serves to illustrate the 
problems associated with an excessively precise interpretation of cyclically adjusted balance indicators. 
105 The ESCB cyclical adjustment methodology is explained in Bouthevillain et al (2001). 
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of the deviation from trend of their respective macroeconomic bases. In this way, the ESCB 
approach seeks to capture effects originating from variations in the composition of output.
106 
In the following exercise we seek to gauge the impact of such composition effects by 
replicating the ESCB methodology for euro area countries, but in a simplified fashion 
applying standard OECD tax elasticities and bases.
 107 More formally, we calculate the impact 
of changes in the composition of GDP as follows:  
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where: 
  is the percentage deviation of the base of tax category   with respect to 
trend; and 
T
Ri Ri R R ln ln − i
108  
  is the percentage deviation of unemployment from trend. 
T U U ln ln −
Thus  is the cyclical component of the budget 
balance obtained in a disaggregated manner, while  is the cyclical component of 
the budget balance calculated in an aggregate fashion. The difference between the two is 
interpreted as the composition effect, i.e. the effect on the budget balance of changes in the 
composition of output among the macroeconomic bases.  
∑ − − −
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106 This does not mean that the ESCB method of cyclical adjustment is superior to that of the 
OECD/Commission. One limitation of the ESCB approach is that the HP filtering method used to detrend the 
macroeconomic bases is a statistical tool that lacks micro-foundations. This critique of the HP filtering method 
was a major reason for the decision of the European Commission to move from HP filtering to a production 
function approach for estimating the output gap. It should be noted, however, that the calculation of the output 
gap according to the production function approach continues to rely partially on statistical filtering, for example 
to calculate trend factor productivity. Kiss and Vadas (2004) and (2005) have proposed a cyclical adjustment 
methodology, which combines a production function with a disaggregated approach and thus seeks to exploit 
comparative advantages of both the OECD/Commission and ESCB approaches.  
107 In this regard, following the OECD, we employ overall compensation of employees as the tax base for 
personal income taxes, whereas in the ESCB methodology the tax base is split into total employment (with unit 
elasticity) and average compensation of employees. Furthermore, we do not distinguish between the private and 
public sector components of personal income taxes and social contributions. A strict application of the ESCB 
approach would cyclically adjust the former, but not the latter. More generally, it should be noted that some EU 
national central banks apply variations to the standard ESCB methodology, in particular allowing for a better 
alignment of tax revenues to their bases, thereby exploiting available data and knowledge of tax systems at the 
national level (see, for example, Rodrigues Braz (2006) for Portugal). For these reasons, our estimates will differ 
from those computed by EU national central banks.  
108 Trend components are obtained using an HP filter (λ=30) applied to the macroeconomic bases in real terms. 
In this context, output and operating surplus are deflated by the GDP deflator, while compensation of employees 
and private consumption are deflated by the private consumption deflator.  
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Figure 7.6     Estimated effect of the composition of output 
on the euro area budget balance (1995-2006) 
Figure 7.7         Composition effects and the output gap in 
euro area countries










































Sources: European Commission and ESCB for underlying 
data. Authors' calculations. 
Sources: European Commission and ESCB for underlying 
data. Authors' calculations. 
 
Figure 7.6 shows the estimated composition effects for the euro area for the period 1995 to 
2006 and Figure 7.7 plots the composition effects for the individual euro area countries 
against the output gap. It can be seen that the effect of changes in the composition of output 
among revenue and expenditure bases for the euro area aggregate have been relatively modest 
in recent years, typically reaching no more than 0.3-0.4% of GDP. However, composition 
effects in individual euro area countries have frequently been larger than this. In our sample 
of 144 observations, the average (absolute) composition effect amounted to 0.3 of GDP, but in 
extreme cases they can be close to or even exceed 1% of GDP. In terms of levels, there is 
clearly no correlation between composition effects and the output gap.   
Figures 7.8 and 7.9 replicate Figures 7.6 and 7.7, but this time looking at annual changes in 
the composition effect. This captures the impact of differences in the growth rates of 
individual GDP components and is what matters for the assessment of the fiscal stance. The 
picture that emerges in terms of changes is similar to that in terms of levels. Namely, year-on-
year changes in the composition effect have been relatively modest for the euro area as a 
whole, typically no more than 0.3% of GDP, but have often been larger than this in individual 
countries. On average across the 132 observations in our sample from 1996-2006, the 
composition effect expressed in terms of annual changes was 0.4% of GDP and year-on-year 
changes in composition effects often reached 0.5% of GDP or more. Such effects would have 
a considerable impact on the assessment of the fiscal stance. Figure 7.9 points to a rather 
weak (negative) correlation between annual changes in these composition effects and changes 
in the output gap (i.e. suggesting that periods of higher growth have, at the margin, been 
driven by the less tax rich components of GDP).  
Table 7.4 reports summary statistics regarding the number of observations for which the fiscal 
stance is assessed to be tightening or loosening for the two sets of cyclically adjusted balance 
estimates (calculated according to the aggregated and disaggregated approaches) for the 
period 1996-2006. Both approaches point to a fiscal tightening in approximately the same 
number of cases (79-80 out of the 132 observations) 
                                                 
109 Observations pertain to 12 euro area countries (excluding Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia). 
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Figure 7.8     Effect of change in the composition of output 
on the euro area budget balance 
Figure 7.9     Change in composition effect and output 
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Sources: European Commission and ESCB for underlying 
data. Authors' calculations. 
Sources: European Commission and ESCB for underlying 
data. Authors' calculations. 
 
However, there are nine cases where the aggregate approach points to a fiscal tightening while 
the disaggregated approach points to a loosening fiscal stance and there are 10 cases where 
the reverse is true. Hence, in more than 15% of the observations, taking into account the 
estimated composition effects would give rise to a different assessment of the direction of the 
fiscal stance.  
Table 7.4  Uncertainty in the assessment of the fiscal stance due to composition effects
110 
Measured by disaggregated approach Total
Fiscal stance 
Tightening Loosening   
Tightening 70  9  79  Measured by 
aggregated 
approach  Loosening 10  43  53 
                                    Total  80  52  132 
Note: The sample consists of annual changes in the cyclically adjusted balance for the period 1996-2003 in 12 
euro area countries (excluding Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia). 
Sources: European Commission and ESCB for underlying data. Authors' calculations. 
7.5.  The behaviour of tax revenues  
Tax revenues frequently fall short of or exceed by a significant margin the levels that would 
be implied by the growth rate of the underlying tax bases and elasticities underlying cyclical 
adjustment. There are several reasons for this.  
In particular the behaviour of corporate income taxes is difficult to predict and the national 
accounts indicator of profits (i.e. the operating surplus) is at most a poor proxy for the 
corporate tax base. This is partly because the operating surplus differs from the company 
accounts definition of profits (e.g. applying different depreciation rules and excluding income 
from property and capital gains).
111 It is also due to the asymmetric tax treatment of profits 
                                                 
110 The sample consists of the authors' estimates of annual changes of cyclically adjusted budget balances for the 
euro area “12” countries calculated according to an aggregated approach (based purely on the deviation of output 
from trend) and a disaggregated approach (based on deviations of revenue and expenditure bases from trend).  
111 Note that in this paper we refer to personal and corporate income taxes in the broad sense as covering taxes 
on personal and corporate income from all sources (e.g. including capital gains), irrespective of whether such 
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and losses, which gives rise to significant and complex lags in corporate tax receipts. More 
specifically, losses incurred by a firm in one accounting period are not taxed negatively, but 
instead are carried forward and offset against future profits (either indefinitely or for a given 
period). As a consequence of these rules, during a period of economic recovery following a 
downturn, corporate tax receipts may initially remain subdued and later rebound strongly 
when the possibility for offsetting profits against previous losses expires.
112 The link between 
corporate taxes and operating surplus may be further weakened by profit shifting, within firms 
and across countries (among multinationals), and by merger and acquisition activity.   
Compensation of employees is a somewhat better proxy for the base of personal income taxes. 
Nonetheless, a significant proportion of personal incomes accrue from “non-wage” sources, 
such as the profits of unincorporated businesses and capital gains, which tend to fluctuate 
more than regular wage income.
113 As an example, Figure 7.10 shows the structure of 
personal income taxes as a percentage of GDP in Germany over the 1996-2005 period. It can 
be seen that while the wage-related component of personal income taxes remained fairly 
constant, changes in the ratio of personal income taxes to GDP have been explained largely 
by developments in other components of personal income taxes.
114 Furthermore, taxes 
specifically on wages and salaries may not necessarily evolve in the way predicted by 
standard elasticities. In particular, the “fiscal drag” resulting from progressive personal 
income tax systems may vary if earnings at different ends of the income distribution respond 
differently to periods of buoyant or subdued economic activity.  
Figure 7.10     Structure of personal income taxes in 
Germany 
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There are also several reasons why indirect taxes may not grow in line with private 
consumption. Firstly, some (albeit mostly minor) indirect taxes are not strictu sensu 
consumption taxes. Perhaps the most important of these are taxes related to the property 
purchases, which in recent years have boosted tax receipts in some European countries with 
booming real estate markets. Figure 7.11 shows the composition of indirect taxes in Spain 
                                                                                                                                                          
sources of income are taxed together or separately. Hence, we equate personal income taxes and corporate 
income taxes with all direct taxes paid by households and corporations respectively. 
112 See Creedy and Gremmell (2007) for an analysis of how corporate tax rules may affect the path of corporate 
tax receipts.  
113 See CBO (2002a) and CBO (2002b) for an assessment of the impact of capital gains on personal income tax 
receipts in the United States during the late 1990s and early 2000s stock market boom and bust.  
114 For example, between 1997 and 2003, the ratio of taxes on wages and salaries to GDP was stable at between 
6.6-6.8%. By contrast, the non-wage component of personal income taxes increased from 2.1% of GDP in 1997 
to 3.0% of GDP in 2000 and then declined to 1.8% of GDP in 2003. 
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between 1996-2005, split between VAT, excise duties, taxes on property transactions and 
other indirect taxes. In particular the proportion of indirect taxes related to transactions in the 
property market has increased significantly (from 0.6% of GDP in 1996 to 1.7% of GDP in 
2005) accounting for around half of the overall increase in the ratio of indirect taxes to GDP 
during this period.
115 Secondly, the assumed unit elasticity of indirect taxes to private 
consumption is based on the assumption that the regressive nature of excise taxes is broadly 
offset by progressivity in other indirect taxes, notably VAT (due to the fact that luxury goods 
are taxed at higher rates than staple goods). This, however, depends on the balance of 
consumption between goods subject to excise duties and other goods and services. More 
generally, the behaviour of indirect taxes may be sensitive to changes in the composition of 
consumption whereby purchases may be tilted towards more highly taxed goods during 
periods of greater economic activity and vice-versa.
116 
To gauge the impact of such influences on recent fiscal developments in the euro area, we 
compare actual tax revenues for the 2000-2006 period against the levels that would be implied 
by standard OECD tax bases and elasticities and available estimates of the impact of policy 
measures:
117 
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The resulting “unexplained” changes in revenues for the euro area (expressed as a percentage 
of GDP) are shown in Figure 7.12.
118 For the euro area it can be seen that the downturn of 
2001-2003 was accompanied by significant shortfalls of tax revenues compared to what one 
could have expected on the basis of the assumed elasticities and tax bases. Cumulatively, this 
loss in tax revenues amounted to more than 1% of GDP. Since 2004, however, these revenue 
                                                 
115 The other major determinant in the growth rate of indirect taxes in Spain has been VAT, which is also (at 
least partly) related to developments in the housing market, as VAT (as opposed to stamp duty) is paid on 
purchases of new dwellings. For an overview of the impact of booming asset markets on tax revenues in Spain 
see Martinez Mongay et al (2007). 
116 Overall government revenues will also be affected by revenues not falling within the four main tax categories 
considered for cyclical adjustment, notably capital taxes (which include, for example, inheritance and gift taxes) 
and other non-tax revenues (such as fines and licence fees).   
117 In this exercise we apply the unit elasticities for corporate income taxes and indirect taxes as specified in 
Girouard and André (2005) as well as their estimates for the elasticity of social security contributions with 
respect to compensation of employees. In the case of personal income taxes, in some cases the elasticities 
reported in Girouard and André gave rise to a systematic (negative) bias. In these cases, we applied instead the 
respective elasticity reported in Bouthevillain et al (2001). Estimates of the impact of policy measures are based 
primarily on information provided by national central banks.  
118 These unexplained changes in revenues can be seen as broadly analogous to the "residual" in Kremer et al 
(2006).  
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shortfalls have been more than offset by unexpected revenue gains (windfalls).
119 Personal 
and corporate income taxes as well as indirect taxes all contributed to this development while, 
as one would expect, the evolution of social security contributions is tracked much more 
closely by the corresponding tax base. Figure 7.13 plots the estimated revenue windfalls / 
shortfalls for the euro area 12 countries over the 2000-2006 period against changes in the 
output gap, showing that there is no obvious relationship, even though one might have 
expected one given the aggregate development at the euro area level.  
Figure 7.12     Revenue windfalls / shortfalls in the euro 
area (% of GDP) 
Figure 7.13     Tax revenue windfalls / shortfalls and 
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Following the exercise carried out in previous sections we can assess the implications of these 
"unexplained" changes in tax revenues for the assessment of the fiscal stance by comparing 
the change in the cyclically adjusted budget balance including and excluding such effects. The 
results are reported in Table 7.5. Out of our 84 observations, in 9 cases the fiscal stance is 
considered to be tightening, but would be assessed to be loosening if the estimated revenue 
windfalls would be netted out. On the other hand, in 12 cases a fiscal stance considered to be 
loosening on the basis of the change in the cyclically adjusted balance would have been 
tightening were it not for the observed revenue shortfalls.  
  Table 7.5  Uncertainty in the assessment of the fiscal stance due to revenue windfalls / 
shortfalls 
Change in cyclically adjusted balance     
(-/+) revenue windfall / shortfall  Total 
Fiscal stance 
Tightening Loosening   
Tightening 37  9  46  Change in 
cyclically adjusted 
balance  Loosening 12  26  38 
Total 49  35  84 
Note: The sample consists of annual changes in the cyclically adjusted balance for the period 1996-2003 in 12 
euro area countries (excluding Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia). 
Sources: European Commission and ESCB for underlying data. Authors' calculations. 
                                                 
119 This experience is not unique to the euro area. There have also been significant revenue windfalls in the 
United States in recent years (see Swiston et al (2007) for an analysis). 
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Accounting for revenue windfalls  
The magnitude of revenue windfalls and shortfalls in euro area countries in recent years raises 
the question of whether and how such variations in revenues could be better accounted for in 
the process of cyclical adjustment. The origins of revenue windfalls and shortfalls can usually 
be ascertained from an analysis of detailed tax revenue data. However, such data is not 
available in a sufficiently detailed, timely and harmonised way across countries for use in 
standardised cyclical adjustment methodologies.
120   
Relying instead on more aggregated data, alternatives may be to apply time varying 
elasticities or to include or complement cyclical adjustment based on the output gap with 
other indicators. To gauge the potential usefulness of doing so we undertake panel regressions 
of our unexplained changes in revenues on changes in the output gap (to test for time varying 
elasticities) and on other indicators often assumed to be related to revenue fluctuations, 
namely changes in stock and residential property prices and the change in the current account 
balance.
121 Given our small sample, with at most 77 observations, we test for each indicator 
individually and then include significant variables in a final regression.
122  
The results obtained for tax revenues (direct and indirect taxes) overall are shown in Table 7.6 
and the results for the individual tax categories (i.e. personal income taxes, corporate income 
taxes and indirect taxes) are reported in Tables 7.7-7.9 in Appendix. According to our results, 
the most relevant indicator is the change in the stock price index, the lagged value of which 
turns out to be significant at the 1% level for changes in direct and indirect taxes overall. The 
lagged change in the stock price index turns out to be significant for both corporate and 
personal income taxes (at the 1% and 5% level respectively), while the contemporaneous 
change in stock prices is also significant (at least at the 10% level) for indirect taxes. The 
lagged impact on direct taxes would be consistent with the idea that increasing stock prices 
take time to be reflected in capital gains realisations. Moreover, stock prices may also be a 
good indicator of profits, which then take time to be reflected in tax receipts given the well-
known collection lags. It should be stressed, however, that even for this best performing 
indicator, the overall explanatory power of the regressions in not large.  
The change in the output gap generally turns out not to have much explanatory power. On its 
own, it is found to be significant (at the 5% level) for corporate income taxes and for personal 
income taxes (with a lag) and significant at the 10% level for direct and indirect taxes overall. 
These results, however, were not robust when stock prices were included as an additional 
                                                 
120 Girouard and Price (2004) compute cyclically adjusted balances corrected for variations in capital gains tax 
receipts. However, the data necessary for such a correction is only available for a subset of OECD countries.  
121 Wolswijk (2007) finds evidence that tax elasticities in the Netherlands are sensitive to the output gap. 
Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2004) and Morris and Schuknecht (2007) find evidence of important budgetary 
effects of equity and real estate prices. 
122 The regressions cover 11 euro area countries (excluding Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia) and use 
fixed country effects. The estimations including residential property prices as an explanatory variable also 
exclude Portugal and Finland. The stock price indices used are as follows: Austria: Austrian Trades, Belgium: 
BEL 20, Germany: DAX 30 Performance, Spain: IBEX 35, Finland: Hex General, Greece: Athens General, 
Ireland: ISEQ, Italy: MIB 30, Netherlands: AEX, Portugal PSI-20. Residential property prices are for new and 
existing dwellings, good and poor condition and were rescaled as the difference between the annual change and 
the average annual change for all countries in the sample over the sample period. Changes in the output gap and 
in the current account balance are annual changes as a percentage of GDP. 
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explanatory variable in the regression. Moreover, for indirect taxes, the (lagged) change in the 
output gap turns out to be significant, but with the wrong sign.  
The change in the current account balance also turns out to be a relatively poor indicator for 
unexplained changes in revenues. It turns out to have the right sign (i.e. negative), but is only 
weakly significant (at the 10% level) for personal income taxes, and not significant at all for 
indirect taxes (as one might have presumed) or for corporate income taxes. Changes in 
residential property prices also (generally) have the expected sign, but do not appear as 
significant in the regressions.
123 Overall, these estimates highlight the difficulty of finding 
"broad", cross country indicators to account for the behaviour of tax revenues in individual 
countries, which may be explained by a multitude of factors.  
Table 7.6  Panel regression of tax revenue
124 windfalls / shortfalls in euro area countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Change in output gap  0.161 
(2.08)* 
      - 0 . 0 2  
(-0.26) 
Change in output gap (-1)   0.009 
(0.12) 
      
Change in stock price 
index 
   0.008 
(2.36)** 
    0.006 
(1.97)* 
Change in stock price 
index (-1) 
    0.011 
(4.86)*** 
   0.010 
(4.61)*** 
Change in current 
account balance 
     -0.041 
(-0.78) 
  
Change in residential 
property prices 




2  0.15 0.09 0.16 0.33 0.09 0.08 0.37 
Number of observations: 77. Number of euro area countries: 11. Years 2000-2006 
Notes: Values in brackets are t-statistics. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Parameter estimates significant at the 5% level are set in bold face. 
Data sample: Euro area countries except Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia. 
7.6.  Conclusions 
While cyclically adjusted budget balance estimates are an important tool for assessing the 
underlying budgetary position and the fiscal stance, they should be interpreted with caution in 
view of the considerable measurement issues that arise in their estimation. Cyclically adjusted 
budget balances are regularly revised ex post owing to revisions in the assessment of the 
output gap, which is rarely estimated accurately in real time. The impact of such revisions on 
the level of the cyclically adjusted budget balance can be quite large (as much as 1% of GDP). 
The impact of ex post revisions on annual changes of cyclically adjusted balances is much 
smaller, but still sufficient to lead to errors in fiscal surveillance. 
Even detracting from the problem of ex post revisions, cyclically adjusted balances may not 
always provide an appropriate picture of the underlying fiscal position and the fiscal stance. 
                                                 
123 The lack of explanatory power of the current account balance and of residential property prices is perhaps not 
so surprising given the nature of the exercise. It is generally assumed that large external deficits and booming 
property markets are associated with “tax rich” domestic demand driven output growth. However, such effects 
may already be (at least partially) captured by the use of private consumption as the tax base for indirect taxes. 
Moreover, it may also be that such effects are relevant for some countries but not others, depending on the nature 
of the tax system and distinct economic developments during the period considered.   
124 Direct and indirect taxes. 
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Standard approaches typically ignore the impact of changes in the composition of output, 
which can be quite large in individual countries, even if they have been relatively modest for 
the euro area in recent years. In addition, the tax bases and elasticities underlying cyclical 
adjustment cannot fully account for the actual behaviour of tax revenues, which have been 
characterised by significant windfalls and shortfalls in individual years.  
From a fiscal policy perspective, the important message is that cyclically adjusted budget 
balances are liable to overestimate the strength of the underlying budgetary position and the 
improvement of the fiscal stance when (i) the output gap (as measured ex post) is reaching its 
peak; (ii) there is a fiscally (relatively) favourable composition of output growth, and (iii) 
revenues are boosted by factors (e.g. booming equity markets) that are not accounted for in 
the tax bases used for cyclical adjustment purposes. During such periods, a prudent fiscal 
policy is called for whereby higher than expected revenues are used to improve the budget 
balance and so create additional "room for manoeuvre" in bad times without putting 
budgetary positions at risk.  
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Appendix 
  Table 7.7  Panel regression of revenue windfalls / shortfalls in euro area countries: 
personal income taxes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Change in output gap  -0.008 
(0.21)        
Change in output gap (-1)    0.074 
(2.13)**        0.068 
(2.06)** 
Change in stock price 
index     0.001 
(0.54)      
Change in stock price 
index (-1)      0.003 
(2.76)**     0.003 
(2.34)** 
Change in current 
account balance       -0.061 
(-1.97)*    -0.050 
(-1.72)* 
Change in residential 
property prices        -0.004 
(-0.30)   
R
2  0.13 0.19 0.14 0.22 0.18 0.10 0.30 
Number of observations: 77. Number of euro area countries: 11. Years 2000-2006 
Notes: Values in brackets are t-statistics. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Parameter estimates significant at the 5% level are set in bold face. 
Data sample: Euro area countries except Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia. 
 
  Table 7.8  Panel regression of revenue windfalls / shortfalls in euro area countries: 
corporate income taxes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Change in output gap  0.123 
(2.66)**        0.032 
(0.64) 
Change in output gap (-1)    0.025 
(0.54)        
Change in stock price 
index     0.003 
(1.45)      
Change in stock price 
index (-1)      0.006 
(4.58)***     0.006 
(3.58)*** 
Change in current 
account balance       -0.004 
(-0.10)    
Change in residential 
property prices        0.005 
(0.34)   
R
2  0.15 0.06 0.08 0.28 0.04 0.08 0.29 
Number of observations: 77. Number of euro area countries: 11. Years 2000-2006. 
Notes: Values in brackets are t-statistics. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Parameter estimates significant at the 5% level are set in bold face. 
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  Table 7.9  Panel regression of revenue windfalls / shortfalls in euro area countries: 
indirect taxes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Change in output gap  0.030 
(0.80)        
Change in output gap (-1)    -0.091 
(-2.66)**        -0.070 
(-1.96)* 
Change in stock price 
index     0.004 
(2.55)**      0.003 
(1.81)* 
Change in stock price 
index (-1)      0.001 
(1.07)     
Change in current 
account balance       0.032 
(1.24)    
Change in residential 
property prices        0.016 
(1.24)   
R
2  0.14 0.22 0.21 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.25 
Number of observations: 77. Number of euro area countries: 11. Years 2000-2006. 
Notes: Values in brackets are t-statistics. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Parameter estimates significant at the 5% level are set in bold face. 
Data sample: Euro area countries except Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia. 
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Discussion 
Lorenzo Codogno 
The aim of the paper is to discuss the importance of uncertainty in the estimates of the 
underlying budgetary position and the fiscal stance, especially in the context of the European 
multilateral surveillance. The paper addresses in a clear and well-documented fashion the 
issues at stake. Uncertainty is analysed by disentangling its major sources.  
In my view, these sources can be grouped in: (1) data revisions, (2) methodological issues 
related to the measurement of the output gap, (3) forecasting errors in GDP growth (4) the 
budgetary effect of changes in the composition of output, and (5) the behaviour of tax 
revenues.  
Starting with the uncertainty related to revisions of backward data (1), most of the changes are 
related to decisions by Eurostat. Some of them are simply normal revisions of data, while 
some others are linked to methodological changes introduced by Eurostat to improve the 
recording of data. These latter changes are supposed to improve the quality of statistics and 
thus incrementally reduce the impact of revisions over time. Some one-off changes, such as 
the shift to chain-weighted GDP accounting, have been particularly significant but not likely 
to repeat in the foreseeable future. Moreover, these changes are largely outside the control of 
policymakers and thus not subject to possible manipulations. The sign of their impact cannot 
be assessed ex ante. The paper estimates that changes related to the nominal fiscal balance, 
which captures the impact of statistical revisions, are broadly “marginal” for levels, although 
less so for changes.  
On the other hand, the paper shows that sizeable errors largely mirror revisions in the cyclical 
component of the budget balance, which is determined by the differentials between real time 
estimates and ex post data (after 3 years) on cyclically-adjusted balances net of one-off and 
temporary measures (CABs).  
Although the paper does not address methodological issues (2), these differentials are not 
likely to be related to the method used to estimate output gaps. Estimates used in the study are 
calculated according to the HP filter method that is no longer in use for the purpose of 
multilateral surveillance at the European Commission. Nevertheless, the shift to the new 
methodology based on a Cobb-Douglas production function would have likely resulted in no 
significant change in the overall results. Therefore, we are left with typical forecasting errors 
which make for typical volatility of any estimate of output gaps.  
Before addressing this issue in more detail, I should also add that the period chosen for the 
analysis may well represent a case of sample bias. The paper notes: “the strong upturn in 
economic growth in 2000 was initially identified as an improvement in trend output rather 
than a cyclical improvement”. This happened also in the following years as indicated by 
private-sector forecasts of GDP growth being always above actual data during that period (see 
for instance Consensus Economics). While similar mistakes may well repeat in the future 
around turning points of the business cycle, it looks like the period selected called for an 
exceptionally large revision and this may well explain why the paper finds a positive 
relationship between the error and the final output gap, implying a systematic underestimation 
of output gaps in absolute terms.   
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Besides, the results presented by the authors may be explained by a more subtle reason, i.e. 
the natural tendency by all forecasters, and especially by cautious governments, to assume a 
return towards trend growth over the forecast horizon (3). This implies a systematic 
underestimation of output gaps in absolute terms, i.e. estimates of a smaller absolute output 
gaps both in bad and good times, as the output gap estimate depends not only on past data but 
also on forecasts for future years. Therefore, the assessment by the authors that CABs are 
systematically overestimated in real time—and thus that are liable to give a distorted picture 
—appears solid, although for reasons not highlighted in the paper. In my view, they are linked 
to unbiased and inevitable forecasting errors on the one hand and to a biased—but also fully 
understandable—convergence of GDP projections towards trend growth on the other. The two 
issues are conceptually different, although clearly linked as new forecasts give rise to ex post 
changes in the assessment of past and future structural economic developments.  
Let me now move to the source of uncertainty related to the composition of output (4). Here 
the authors introduce an elegant way to estimate the shift in the composition of growth by 
making use of the cyclical adjustment methodology developed by the European System of 
Central Banks. I find the idea intuitive and effective in isolating this impact. The results show 
a modest impact for level/changes (0.3/0.4 percentage points for the Euro Area), but sizeable 
effects for individual countries (>1.0 percentage point). These sizeable effects suggest that 
more work on individual countries is needed to single out the underlying phenomena. Another 
interesting finding is that there is no correlation between the composition effect and the output 
gap, while the correlation is negative on changes, i.e. higher growth comes together with less 
revenue-rich components.  
Finally, the authors analyse the behaviour of tax revenues (5). The behaviour is difficult to 
predict as there are changes in the tax code, no good proxies for the tax base, profit shifting 
phenomena, mergers and acquisitions, and the effects of the fiscal drag. To make things even 
worse, EU enlargement to 25 in 2004 and to 27 in 2007 resulted in a more heterogeneous 
structure of revenues and expenditures across the European Union, and this is also true for the 
Euro Area. This suggests that there must be something better than the simple assumption of 
fixed elasticity of tax revenues to GDP. Although it is well-known that more reliable 
estimates of elasticities would come at the expense of simplicity/transparency/comparability 
of the approach, it would probably be worthwhile trying to improve estimates anyway.    
For the reasons explained above, the assessment of problems is likely to be less severe than 
suggested in the paper. Moreover, there are many ways estimates can be improved, but in the 
paper there are no explicit indications on the way forwards. For the purpose of multilateral 
surveillance, the paper suggests extra caution when there is a risk of a turning point in the 
economic cycle (assuming we can know it in real time) or there is a perception that revenues 
are boosted by factors that are not accounted for in the tax bases used for cyclical adjustment 
purposes, such as booming equity markets, or when the composition of output growth looks 
relatively favourable.  
All in all, it is a sound and well-rooted warning that cyclically adjusted balances may not 
always provide an appropriate picture of the underlying fiscal position and the fiscal stance. 
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